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Home OrganisationsEuropean Union Sea Guardian’s Threat & Risk Assessment brief update 05 November 2024

Sea Guardian’s Threat & Risk Assessment brief update 05 November 2024

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John (Ioannis) Pavlopoulos, President Sea Guardian SG Ltd, Vice Admiral (ret.) H.N., Honorary Commander in Chief of the Hellenic Fleet, former Military Representative of Greece to the NATO and EU.

THREAT & RISK ASSESSMENT BRIEF UPDATEBrief Update No 24/007 Date: 05 – Nov – 2024

STATEMENT

This document has been approved for distribution by Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Operations Department. The provided Intel and information derive from open sources, the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) and United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) respective WebPages and products. All rights reserved. No part of this Risk Assessment may be reproduced in any form: electronic, mechanical, or other means without written permission by Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd. Under no Circumstances can Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd be held responsible for any loss or damage caused by a reader’s reliance on information obtained by this Assessment.

OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this brief is to provide the Maritime Industry and the Security Stakeholders with:

  •  Major maritime security incident summary and analysis for the time period 31 Oct – 05 Nov 2024 
  • Threat assessment updates concerning military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
  • Overview of risk assessment and relevant information, in order to support operational planning

RECENT KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • On the night of Oct 26, Israel conducted its much-anticipated counterstrike against Iran as retaliation to the ballistic missile barrage of Oct 02. The Israeli Air force conducted several air strikes against military targets all over Iran. The strikes were executed by almost 100 Israeli aircraft which remained outside Iran’s airspace and by employing standoff air-to-ground weapons. Most of the targets were facilities, infrastructure and factories linked to UAV and Ballistic missiles deployment or manufacturing. There were no strikes on Iran’s oil industry or nuclear facilities while the casualties were minimal.
  • On Oct 27, Hezbollah has chosen Sheikh Naim Kassem to succeed longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah who was killed in an Israeli airstrike last month, as the militant group vowed Tuesday to continue “until victory is achieved.”
  • On Oct 28, Yemen’s Houthi rebels have resumed attacks, claiming fresh strikes on three vessels – two in the Arabian Sea and one in the Red Sea. Off these attacks only one has been confirmed which involved M/V MOTARO at the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits. The ship came under three ballistic missile attacks but likely sustained no damage or casualties.
  • On Oct 28, Iran’s government stated that they intent to use all necessary means to answer to Israel’s attack and that they intent to increase their annual defense budget by 200%.
  • On Oct 11, UN experts made a report on Houthis which highlights the fact that since Sep 23, through constant Iranian and Hezbollah support, they managed gradually to transform from a local insurgent organization within certain areas of Yemen to a powerful military organization who can expand its operational capabilities well beyond the territories under their control.
  • The UN Security Council on Oct 30, passed a resolution condemning “in the strongest terms” the multiple attacks by Houthi rebels off the coast of Yemen which have disrupted global trade and raised fears of further spillover from the war in Gaza. The resolution demands that the group immediately ceases all such attacks, as well as release the M/V Galaxy Leader and its crew. The text calls for respect while exercising the navigational rights and freedoms by merchant and commercial vessels, “takes note of the right of Member States” to defend their vessels from attacks, commends efforts taken so far to protect shipping under fire in the Red Sea, condemns the provision of any arms to the Houthis and “urges caution and restraint to avoid further escalation of the situation in the Red Sea and the broader region”.
  • On Nov 02, Israeli Navy SEALs captured Imad Amhaz – a senior member of Hezbollah’s naval force in an operation in Northern Lebanon. Israeli officials claim that Amhaz was detained in order to be interrogated and learn more about Hezbollah’s naval operations.
  • On Nov 03, Houthi officials stated they would continue their naval blockade of Israel until “the offensive and siege on the Gaza Strip and the attack on Lebanon ceases.”, and that they received “information” that Israeli shipping companies were selling off their resources to other companies in the sector. They added that they do not recognize any change of ownership and warned against any cooperation with Israeli shipping companies. Finally, Houthis stated that they would continue the naval blockade and target any ship owned by Israeli companies, linked to Israel or bound for its ports.
  • On Nov 03, the Iranians reportedly issued a Notice-to-Airmen (NOTAM) imposing restrictions on movement in their airspace from 2.30am on November 4, to 6.30am on November 6. This is considered as an indication that they will conduct an attack at the aforementioned dates.
  • On Nov 04, the Wall Street Journal issued a report according to which Iran is preparing to unleash a more powerful and sophisticated assault against Israel by deploying missiles with more destructive warheads and other advanced weapons. The report also mentions that Iran does not want to hamper the US presidential elections therefore its renewed attack will most likely take place after the final results are made known and prior to the inauguration of the new president in January 2025.

1 In accordance to JMIC and/or UKMTO sources

THREAT ASSESSMENT UPDATE:

Military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways

Military Operations

  • During the ballistic attack against Israel on Oct 02, the Fattah-1 and Fattah-2 MRBM were used. These are medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), propelled by solid fuel rocket with a range about 1,500 km, speed between 13 to 15 MACH, carry a 450 kg warhead and are 13m in length. The latest model has a hypersonic glide vehicle that offers substantially more maneuverability.Those missiles to Iran’s arsenal provide extensive range and high probability of evading air defense systems due to their hypersonic velocity and terminal maneuvers capability.
  • The deployment of Iranian naval units, special operation small boats and even commercial ships fitted with antiship missiles, poses a significant threat for USN warships and merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf in case of an escalation in the region.

Terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways

  • After the recent kills of ISIS senior leaders in Iraq authorities claim that the remnants of this terrorist group no longer pose a danger to the country.

RISK ASSESSMENT

  • The risk of attacks or incidents in the East Mediterranean Sea and Northern Red Sea for the time being is assessed Low with the exception of Israeli ports, though the recent strikes at Israel with new types of ballistic and cruise missiles are quite alarming.
  • The ports of Haifa and Hadera due to their proximity to south Lebanon are the most exposed merchant and military ports of Israel, as they fall into the range of Hezbollah weaponry. In addition, the port of Eilat is well within range of Houthi attacks. Any port call should be arranged after a direct contact with the Israeli authorities.
  • The Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the southernmost part of the Rea Sea and the eastern part of the Gulf of Aden are still assessed to be the most hazardous areas, with one significant incident occurring during last period.
  • Traffic levels through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait have remained broadly stable in the past three months: they are down around 68% compared to “normal” with an equivalent increase in traffic around South Africa. The shipowners and operators of the roughly 200 vessels that continue to take the Red Sea route each week, already have a high-risk tolerance and will likely continue to transit the strait, despite the threat of Houthi targeting, including vessels with no links to their stated adversaries.
  • The pattern of the recent Houthi attacks indicates that their latest strategy favors the conduct of multiple attacks by ASBM, UAVs and cruise missiles.
  • The Houthis by obtaining Iran’s and Hezbollah’s huge support in both financial and in military terms have emerged to become new proxies to Iran’s geopolitical aims in the region. In addition, the pretext of supporting the Palestinian cause against the oppression of Israel and its western allies will continue to provide a vast recruiting pool for new members in hard line Muslims in Yemen and also abroad.
  • The US and UK airstrike campaign against Yemen during Sep-Oct 24 along with the naval USN and RN buildup in the area and the deployment of warships of international/EU maritime Operations “PROSPERITY GUARDIAN” and “ASPIDES”, seem to have mitigated at a certain degree, the Houthi targeting and attack capabilities.
  • During the following weeks, IDF land forces with significant air and artillery support will press on with their invasion at southern Lebanon and their military operations against Hezbollah in order to establish a buffer zone that will secure the region of northern Israel from further attacks and dismantle any military infrastructure such as tunnels and weapons caches.
  • The Houthis will conduct further attacks against Israel and merchant shipping and will try to increase their footprint in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and even East Mediterranean Sea.
  • Israel’s shipping companies’ efforts to mitigate the effects of the Red Sea Crisis and the Houthi campaign against their shipping industry by change of ship ownership and through cooperation with other shipping companies, have been already been noticed by the Houthis which they intent to target and attack those ships since they are linked to Israel.
  • It is assessed that Greek-owned ships in the Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Oman are at greatest risk of attack by the Houthis and are some of the most frequent targets amongst vessels from Western countries.
  • After the recent IDF operations, Hezbollah and HAMAS leadership has been annihilated and both organizations’ Command and Control Capabilities have been greatly diminished.
  • The current military situation in the region favors Israel tremendously and provides a window of opportunity in order to shift the entire security system in the Middle East to its benefit, by imposing its views on what the next day in Gaza and Lebanon should be and by diminishing Iran’s military capabilities and overall regional footprint.
  • The new oil terminal station at Jask will boost Iran’s efforts to mitigate the effects on its oil exports in case that its main terminal station at Kharg island in the Persian Gulf comes under Israeli attack, or if the Hormuz Straits are closed to merchant shipping.
  • The Israeli counter strike against Iran as retaliation for the attack of Oct 02, was quite limited and its targets were strictly military and focused mainly against Iran’s capability in producing UAVs, cruise and ballistic missiles and its air defense system. It is assessed that the Israeli government for the time being, in order not to hamper bilateral relations, will comply with US government’s mandates which include restrain and avoiding further escalation. However, this does not exclude the possibility of a new and more far-reaching attack against Iran, after the US elections.
  • The outcome of the US Elections οn 05 Nov 2024 is expected to determine to a certain degree Israel ‘s further actions against Iran in order to achieve its strategic goals in the region.
  • Israel and Iran seem to be locked into a course of military conflict that is becoming increasingly difficult to prevent. To stop this spiral of escalation and potentially impending catastrophe, conditions must be created that lead at least one side to recoil sternly.
  • The recent deployment/dispersal of Iranian naval forces in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea for exercises, as a precaution measure to avoid being targeted by Israeli missile attack succeeded, since no ships or other maritime assets were destroyed during the attacks.
  • There are no signs indicating that the Straits of Hormuz are about to be blocked by Iran. Any blockade of the Hormuz Straights by the Iranian Naval Forces will have a severe impact globally, since the flow of oil from the region will be hampered or even halted and it seems that Iran is not willing to do so. Despite no current indication of harassment, seizure, or attack to merchant shipping in the Arabic Golf, it is assessed that freedom of navigation will be amongst the first casualties in case of severe escalation between Israel and Iran.
  • Houthi renewed threats, the dismantle of Hamas and Hezbollah leadership as well as Command and Control capabilities, the Israeli invasion in southern Lebanon, the constant air strikes at Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, Iran’s and Israel’s entanglement in a continuous cycle of attack and counterattack which each time is moved to higher level, indicate at an ever-increasing tension and a high risk of a regional war in the Middle East and the Arabic Peninsula, with global re-precautions, till the time the new US Administration will be established in the White House by the end of January 2025.
  • The current situation around the seas of the Arabic Peninsula will continue the months to come to create risk for the shipping industry and will deter vessels to cross the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Regardless the result of the US elections the 5th of November, it is assessed that the situation will not improve significantly, at least till summer of 2025.

Taking into account the November 6th result of the US elections, it is assessed that both Iran and Israel will keep a moderate stance against each other, waiting to identify the potential new policy of Trumps’ administration by the end of January 2025.

Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944373465) can support your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and provide assistance in decision making by producing tailored made assessments upon request on ports in the region, on routes, on cargos and specific merchant vessels.

You can refer to our Threat & Risk assessment analysis brief No 24/001//10 Sep 24 for more information and background analysis on the events and situation in the region.

www.sguardian.com

last week’s report: https://allaboutshipping.co.uk/2024/10/31/sea-guardians-threat-risk-assessment-brief-update-30-october-2024/

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