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Home OrganisationsEuropean Union SEA GUARDIAN Threat & Risk Assessment 18 – 31 Dec 2024

SEA GUARDIAN Threat & Risk Assessment 18 – 31 Dec 2024

by admin
John (Ioannis) Pavlopoulos, President Sea Guardian SG Ltd., Vice Admiral (ret.) H.N. , Honorary Commander in Chief of the Hellenic Fleet , Former Military Representative of Greece  to the NATO and EU 

Brief Update No 24/013 Date: 06 – Jan – 2025

​​ STATEMENT

This document has been approved for distribution by Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Operations Department. The provided Intel and information derive from open sources, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) and United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) respective WebPages and products. All rights reserved. No part of this Risk Assessment may be reproduced in any form: electronic, mechanical, or other means without written permission by Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd. Under no Circumstances can Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd be held responsible for any loss or damage caused by a reader’s reliance on information obtained by this Assessment.

 Objectives

The purpose of this brief is to provide the Maritime Industry and the Security Stakeholders with:

  •  Major maritime security incident summary and analysis for the time period 18 – 31 Dec 2024 
  • Threat assessment updates concerning military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways,
  • Overview of risk assessment and relevant information, in order to support operational planning and decision making.

RECENT KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • On Dec 18, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken requested from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group, which spearheads the coalition of Syrian rebels that seized power in Damascus, to keep their promises of moderation in order to avoid being isolated by the international community, as they did with the Taliban in Afghanistan.
  • Overnight on Dec 18, the Arrow air defense system partially intercepted a Houthi ballistic missile before it entered Israeli airspace. The warhead however was undamaged and the shrapnel fell in the city of Ramat Gan, east of Tel Aviv, with cars and a school being damaged. The Houthis claimed to have struck two military sites in Tel Aviv area using hypersonic ballistic missiles

On Dec 19, the IDF announced that they have conducted airstrikes against Houthi ports and energy infrastructure in Yemen, in response to the Dec 18 attack against Israeli territory. According to the IDF the Israeli Air Force airstrikes overnight were carried out in two waves by 14 Israeli Air Force fighter jets, F-15I and F-16I, along with reconnaissance and air refueling aircraft that flew about 2,000 kilometers and fired more than 60 missiles at Houthi “military targets” along Yemen’s west coast and near the Sanaa capital. The first wave saw strikes on the Hudaydah Port, the Port of Salif, and the Ras Isa oil terminal, while the second wave hit fuel depots of two power stations located near Sanaa. The IDF stated that its strikes targeted sites used by the Houthis for military operations and put the three ports they struck out of use, while destroying eight tugboats.

  • On Dec 19, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Forces conducted an airstrike targeting ISIS leader Abu Yusif aka Mahmud in the Dayr az Zawr Province, Syria, resulting in two ISIS operatives killed, including Abu Yusif.
  • On Dec 19, Abdelhamid Dbayba, prime minister of the U.N.-recognized government formed in Tripoli, stated that they have reached out to Russia after receiving reports which claimed that they were moving their military assets to Libya after the fall of Bashar Al-Assad and that Tripoli will not allow any foreign forces to enter Libya without an official agreement.
  • On Dec 20, the U.S. State Department stated that U.S. diplomats have arrived in Syria for talks with the new Syrian authorities to push for unity in the country after 13 years of civil war. It was the first official diplomatic mission sent to Damascus since the outbreak of Syria’s civil war in 2011, following Assad’s overthrow.
  • On Dec 21, a Houthi ballistic missile hit a playground in Jaffa, south of Tel AVIV, after several failed interception attempts by Israeli air defense systems, lightly wounding 16 people. The Houthis claimed to have targeted an Israeli military site in the Tel Aviv area with the Palestine 2 ballistic missile. Later that day, a UAV suspected to have been launched from Yemen was shot down by the IDF over southern Israel.
  • On Dec 21, U.S. CENTCOM forces conducted airstrikes against a missile storage facility and a command-and-control facility operated by Houthis around territory in Sana’a, Yemen. During the operation CENTCOM forces also shot down multiple Houthi UAVs and an antiship cruise missile over the Red Sea. The operation involved US Air Force and Navy assets, including F/A-18 aircrafts. It was later confirmed that USS Gettysburg accidentally shot down a F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jet over the Red Sea in a friendly fire incident (blue on blue)
  • On Dec 21, Hamas and two other Palestinian organizations, the Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine stated that a ceasefire agreement is “closer than ever” for the Gaza Strip.
  • On Dec 22, Syria’s new leader, Ahmad al-Sarah (formerly Golani), during the visit of the head of Turkish diplomacy, Hakan Fidan, in Damascus, stated that all country’s weapons will be placed under state control, called for the lifting of sanctions on Syria and also stated that in the coming days his government will announce the new composition of the Ministry of Defense and the army. In addition, Ahmad al-Shara also received a Lebanese delegation, promising to end the “negative” Syrian influence in the neighboring country.
  • On Dec. 23, U.S. CENTCOM forces conducted an airstrike in the Dayr az Zawr Province, Syria, killing two ISIS operatives and wounding one.
  • On Dec 23, officials from Jordan, Qatar and Saudi Arabia conducted meetings in Damascus with the new Syrian leadership.
  • On Dec 23, Iran’s Foreign Ministry expressed its support for Syria’s sovereignty following the fall of Tehran’s ally Bashar al-Assad and his regime, while stating that it has “no direct contact” with the new Syrian leadership.
  • On 23 Dec, the IDF intercepted a UAV outside the Israeli airspace, with the Houthis claiming to have launched two UAVs towards Ashkelon and the Tel Aviv area.
  • On Dec 23, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that he had ordered his army to “destroy the infrastructure” of the Houthis, referring to the missile attack during Dec 21 in Tel Aviv. “I asked our armed forces to destroy the infrastructure of the Houthis because anyone who attempts to attack us will be hit hard,” he also added.
  • On Dec 23, the IDF carried out strikes against “infrastructure” at the Zanda crossing on the Syrian-Lebanese border, through which weapons destined for the Shiite Lebanese Hezbollah movement were passing. The strikes come a month after a fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah came into effect, which the two sides accuse each other of violating.
  • On Dec 24, the Houthis claimed responsibility for firing a “Palestine 2 hypersonic ballistic missile” at a military target in central Israel, while the Israeli military claimed that it was intercepted by the Arrow defense system before entering Israeli airspace.
  • On Dec 24, in coordination with the Federal Government of Somalia, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) conducted an airstrike against the al-Shabaab militant network in Somalia.
  • On Dec 24, Israel’s parliament voted to extend for another year the state of emergency that came into effect in the country, following the Hamas attack on Oct 7, 2023.
  • On Dec 24, according to a statement from the new authorities in Syria, Syria’s de facto leader Ahmed al-Sarah agreed today with other rebel leaders to disband all armed groups and incorporate them to the Ministry of Defense and the new Syrian army.
  • On Dec 24, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, stated that his country has sent its first batch of food aid to Syria and that after ousting Bashar al-Assad, a close ally of Russia, Ukraine is interested in restoring relations with Syria.
  • On the morning of Dec 25, a Houthi missile was intercepted by air defense systems outside Israeli airspace. Later that day, a UAV launched by the group crashed into an open area near Ashkelon, causing no casualties. The Houthi military spokesman, Yahya Sharia, claimed that a hypersonic ballistic missile “Palestine 2” was used during the attacks.
  • On Dec 25, the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that Kurdish fighters in Syria “will either lay down their weapons or be buried in Syrian lands along with their weapons”.
  • On Dec 26, 25 IAF (Israeli Air Force) jets carried out airstrikes in Yemen against Houthi targets, hitting the Sanaa International Airport (where an air traffic control tower, the departure lounge and the runway were damaged), the Hezyaz power station near Sanaa, as well as infrastructure in Al Hudaydah, As-Salif, and Ras Qantib ports, including a power plant.
  • On Dec 27, the Houthis launched another ballistic missile overnight at Tel Aviv, claiming to have successfully targeted the Ben Gurion Airport, causing casualties and putting it out of operation. According to the IDF it was intercepted outside of Israeli airspace by the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system of the US, marking its first operational use since its deployment to Israel in Oct.
  • On Dec 27, the U.N. Security Council gave the green light to a new African Union force expected to be deployed in Somalia in a few days, to help counter the radical Islamist militant group “Al Shabaab”. The resolution was adopted by the votes of 14 out of 15 members of the Security Council. The US abstained due to reservations about its funding. The resolution provides for the replacement of the African Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) by the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission (AUSSOM) as of Jan 01 2025.
  • On Dec 27, according to Bloomberg and TASS the Chairman and Managing Director of the Suez Canal Authority Osama Rabie said during a meeting with President of Egypt Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, that Egypt has lost more than 60% of Suez Canal revenues, which stood at about $7 billion, in the outgoing year as a consequence of the Houthis disruption campaign against merchant shipping in the Red Sea.
  • On Dec 29, in an interview with Al Arabiya, the Syrian leader Ahmad al-Sharah stated that elections in Syria could take up to four years, referring for the first time to a possible electoral calendar since the fall of Bashar al-Assad. He also stated that drafting a new constitution is likely to take up to three years and warned that it would take about a year for Syrians to see drastic changes. On relations with abroad, al-Sharah said that Syria has still strategic interests with Russia.
  • On Dec 29, the French Air Force conducted air strikes on targets of the Islamic State (ISIS) in territory within Syria. The news was announced by France’s Armed Forces Minister Sebastien Lecorny, adding that the fight against terrorism continues and the French Armed Forces are committed to it.
  • On Dec 30 and 31 according to CENTCOM, U.S. Navy ships and aircraft destroyed a Houthi command-and-control facility and advanced conventional weapons production and storage facilities that included missiles and UAVs. In addition, U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force aircraft destroyed a coastal Houthi radar site and seven cruise missiles and UAVs over the Red Sea.
  • On Dec 30, Hamas reportedly refused to release 12 of the 34 hostages in the first phase of an alleged deal in the works, offering instead the bodies of 12 dead abductees, a Palestinian source told Israeli state news agency KAN.
  • On Dec 30, a ballistic missile launched by the Houthis was intercepted by the Arrow defense system before crossing into Israeli airspace, with fragments of the missile falling in Beit Shemesh, west of Jerusalem. The Houthis claimed to have launched two missiles targeting the Ben-Gurion Airport and a power station south of Jerusalem.
  • On Dec 30, Syria’s leader, Ahmad al-Shara, during an interview with Al Arabiya, said that he intends to dissolve HTS and the other groups because “Syria cannot be run with a mentality of organizations and militias”.
  • On Dec 30, HTS leader Ahmad al Shara met with Kuwaiti Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullah Ali al Yahya and Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council Jassam Mohammed al Badawi in Damascus. In addition, the new Syrian foreign minister, Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani, met with his counterpart from Ukraine and claimed that his country is interested in establishing “strategic partnership” with Ukraine.
  • On Dec 30, according to Reuters, Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations issued a final warning to Yemen’s Iranian-backed Houthi rebels to stop missile strikes against his country, saying they risked the same destiny as Palestinian Hamas, Lebanon’s Hezbollah and deposed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
  • On Dec 31, an unspecified Israeli official speaking to Israeli media expressed interest in increasing cooperation with the US-led international coalition against the Houthis in Yemen. These comments came amid continued US airstrikes targeting the Houthis.
  • On Dec 31, the French Defense Ministry confirmed that French fighter jets, backed by American drones, targeted two ISIS facilities in central Syria. The operation marked France’s first airstrike into Syria since the fall of the Assad regime earlier this month.

MARITIME SECURITY INCIDENTS: 18 – 31 Dec 241

1 In accordance to JMIC and/or UKMTO sources

INCIDENT NoINCIDENT TypeINCIDENT TIMEINCIDENT DETAILS

THREAT ASSESSMENT UPDATE:

Military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways

Military Operations

  • The volatile state in Syria since Nov, is added to the general military conflict and unrest that takes place in the middle east region, affecting also the East Mediterranean Sea. Though the Bashar al-Assad regime has fallen and the HTS has become the predominant group, it is almost certain that conflicts between rival rebels’ factions will resume over the status in future Syria.
  • Conflicts in the northern part of Syria between rival groups backed by Turkey, Turkish lead rebels and Kurdish militias and in the eastern part between HTS and other armed groups, are still ongoing.
  • The airstrikes of IDF against former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) targets continue at almost a daily bases and in an effort to mitigate the risk of hi-tech armament and arsenal left behind by the SAA to fall into HTS or any other group hands.
  • The Houthis during the last period seem to have taken the lead in attacks against Israel by conducting several attacks with Palestine 2 hypersonic ballistic missiles and long-range UAVs.
  • The US and UK forces, Operation’s “Prosperity Guardian” assets and US CENTCOM assets along with IAF aircrafts have conducted several attacks over the last period against Houthi military and infrastructure, as a response to the Houthis attacks against Israel and US escorted merchant convoys passing through the Red Sea.
  • The Israeli ARROW and US THAAD air defense systems have provided so far satisfactory protection against Houthi ballistic missiles with the exception of the Palestine 2 hypersonic ballistic missile which has proved more difficult to be intercepted.

Terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways

  • The reemergence of terrorists group associated with ISIS and Al Qaeda in Syria since Nov, has enhanced the terrorist threat level across East Mediterranean Sea. Nevertheless, the US, UK and French efforts in destroying potential terrorist targets and infrastructure in Syria have equally increased.
  • The recent U.N. Security Council’s green light to a new African Union force expected to be deployed in Somalia in a few days, to help counter the radical Islamist militant group Al Shabaab and the US AFRICOM airstrikes, are expected to counter/mitigate the “Shabaab Youth” terrorist organization threat in Somalia over the next period.

RISK ASSESSMENT

  • The risk of attacks or incidents in the East Mediterranean Sea and Northern Red Sea for the time being is assessed LOW with the exception of all Israeli ports and the Syrian Coastline. Increased kinetic retaliations between Yemen and Israel is a concern for collateral damage for vessels while in Israeli ports. Any port call should be arranged after a direct contact with the Israeli authorities, while it is not clear whether there are still any Syrian authorities or if they represent the newly establish government.
  • The Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the southernmost part of the Rea Sea and the eastern part of the Gulf of Aden are still assessed to be the most hazardous areas for international shipping, with no significant incident occurring during the assessed period (18 to 31rst Dec).
  • As targets of opportunity for the Houthis diminish due to the decrease of Marine Traffic through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, it is assessed that vessels with multiple layers of indirect associations to Israel, US or UK will be targeted ever more frequently. Maritime industry stakeholders should take into account such associations when conducting threat and risk assessments.
  • It is assessed that the US and UK airstrike campaign along with the naval USN and RN buildup in the area and the deployment of warships of international/EU maritime Operations “PROSPERITY GUARDIAN” and “ASPIDES”, have proved to be ineffective and have not mitigated enough the Houthi threat against merchant shipping, bringing the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits essentially under Houthi control, neutralizing the Suez Canal and imposing embargo to the port of Eilat (from south directions).
  • The fact that the Houthis are essentially in control of two out of eight major choke points for marine traffic worldwide (Suez Canal & Bab-el-Mandeb Straits), indicate that the international community so far has shown little effort to fully comprehend and counter their threat.
  • It is assessed that the Houthi, as Iran’s last remaining proxy in the region, have now focused their attention and their military efforts and assets on hits against Israeli territory placing the campaign of disrupting merchant shipping as secondary objective.
  • Recent IDF, UK and US airstrikes against the Houthi military and infrastructure in Yemen is assessed to mark the beginning of a more powerful and decisively campaign of the International Community against the Houthi threat for the weeks to come. In addition, IDF assets and intelligence -targeting capabilities recently established in Somaliland (territory of Somalia) are expected over the next period to play a crucial role in countering and containing the Houthi threat. It also assessed that Egypt will be forced also to act against the Houthis due the severe loses of Suez Canal revenues as a consequence of the Houthis disruption campaign against merchant shipping in the Red Sea.
  • The new rise of terrorist groups in northern Syria could potentially be dangerous for merchant shipping security along the Syrian coastline and ports and destabilizes the security environment in the region even further.
  • Conflict in the north of Syria between rival groups backed by Turkey, Turkish lead rebels and Kurdish militias, no matter the HTS-led interim government efforts to dissolve all former opposition forces and integrate them into the new Syrian Defense Ministry, indicates that it will highly likely be impossible to reach to an agreement on how to govern the country and that Syria will eventually become another “failed state” in the Middle East & North Africa region (MENA), following the footsteps of Libya and Iraq.
  • The fall of Bashar al-Assad has been greeted with scenes of jubilation in the country, but the new leadership under HTS is under the microscope of the international community and Syrians themselves who want to see whether it will show respect for human rights, the treatment of minorities in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country, and the future of the semi-autonomous Kurdish regions of northern Syria.
  • With the sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Iran’s foothold in the Middle East has been destroyed – first in Gaza, then in Lebanon, and now in Syria. It is assessed that, the “Axis of Resistance” in the Middle East, which consisted mainly of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah/Lebanon, Hamas and Houthi fighters and actively supported by Russia, has sustained a decisive blow and has now been broken.
  • For the U.S. establishing channels of communication with the new Syrian de facto government under HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharah and trying to determine whether they will keep its promises of unity and moderation is assessed to be a priority. However, ISIS or other terrorist group reemerging through this turmoil is a daunting possibility that requires constant vigilance and even though Trump has openly declared that he does not want US to be involved with the forming of future Syria, he will eventually be forced at the least to support the SDF against SNA and Turkish aggression and to take action against any terrorist groups that might arise.
  • Turkey is undisputedly the regional player who benefited most. In the north of Syria, Turkey is attempting on one hand to definitively dismantle the Kurds on its southern border and on the other hand to occupy more Syrian territory under the pretext of a safe zone. It assessed that SNA with Turkish armed forces support will continue to assail SDF forces in the Kobani region. Since the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Ankara has repeatedly insisted that the U.S.-backed Kurdish militia be disbanded, arguing that it has no place in Syria’s future. Turkey identifies the Kurdish PYD faction and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an extension of the Kurdish PKK group, and links them to terrorism. It is assessed that the efforts of Turkey to project itself as a “regional power” in the MENA region and East Africa, either through political or military intervention will be intensified over the next period.
  • It is assessed that Russia will attempt to move its forces from Syria into an East Libya area (probably the Cyrenaica peninsula) controlled by General Haftar, in order to establish a new naval and air base to assure its presence in the Mediterranean Sea.
  • It is assessed that the SDF’s fight against Turkey and its proxies will render it unable to support US policy objectives in Syria. The SDF cannot conduct offensive operations against ISIS and other terrorist groups while contending with the threat from Turkey and its allies in Syria.
  • Israel is assessed that has also greatly benefited by the fall of the allied to Iran Assad’s regime and that this will assist its efforts to mitigate the threat of Hezbollah in Lebanon, now that the main routes of supplies and support from Iran have been cut off. Nevertheless, over the next weeks we will almost certainly see a new escalation in tensions between Israel and Turkey over the future of Syria, since their interests are colliding.
  • US and IDF air strikes in former SAA arms depots and critical military assets is assessed to severely mitigate the risk of sophisticated and high tech ballistic and antiship missile equipment to fall to HTS or other military group’s hands.
  • It is assessed that the international community has not yet established a plan for how to engage with the transitional government in Syria and that most countries will wait for this mosaic of militias and armed groups to show their true intentions on how to build and run the future Syria.
  • The current situation around the seas of the Arabic Peninsula will continue the weeks to come to create risk for the shipping industry and will deter vessels to cross the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. However taking into consideration that the recent blows to Iran’s foothold in the Middle, first in Gaza, then in Lebanon, and now in Syria, Russia’s predicted loss of access to Syrian ports, airports and naval bases in the Mediterranean Sea and the advantageous military situation that has emerged for Israel, it is assessed that at the beginning of Feb 2025 the newly appointed Trump administration will spearhead an effort by the international community to finally counter the Houthis’ threat against merchant shipping. This will bring the last of Iran’s proxies to heel and will undoubtedly change the overall balances in the whole Middle East region, opening the way for the U.S. and Israel to deal with Iran itself.

Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944373465) can support your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and provide assistance in decision making by producing tailored made assessments upon request on ports in the region, on routes, on cargos and specific merchant vessels.

You can refer to our Threat & Risk assessment analysis brief No 24/001//10 Sep 24 for more information and background analysis on the events and situation in the region.

www.sguardian.com

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