11John (Ioannis) Pavlopoulos, President Sea Guardian SG Ltd., Vice Admiral (ret.) H.N. , Honorary Commander in Chief of the Hellenic Fleet , Former Military Representative of Greece to the NATO and EU
Brief Update No 25/02 Date: 23 – Jan – 2025
STATEMENT
This document has been approved for distribution by Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Operations Department. The provided Intel and information derive from open sources, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) and United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) respective WebPages and products.All rights reserved. No part of this Risk Assessment may be reproduced in any form: electronic, mechanical, or other means without written permission by Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd. Under no Circumstances can Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd be held responsible for any loss or damage caused by a reader’s reliance on information obtained by this Assessment.
OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this brief is to provide the Maritime Industry and the Security Stakeholders with:
Major maritime security incident summary and analysis for the time period 14 – 22 Jan 2025
Threat assessment updates concerning military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
Overview of risk assessment and relevant information, in order to support operational planningand decision making.
RECENT KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Between Jan 13 and 15, US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Michael Kurilla discussed security cooperation with IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi and IDF Air Force Commander Major General Tomer Bar in Israel, as well as the implementation and monitoring of the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire.
On Jan 14, a ballistic missile launched from Yemen was intercepted by Israeli air defense systems during the early morning. A fragment of the missile crashed into a home in Mevo Beitar, causing damage. The Houthis took responsibility for the attack, claiming that they had targeted the headquarters of the Israeli Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv with a hypersonic ballistic missile. The group later claimed to have successfully struck Israeli sites in the Tel Aviv area with UAVs and a power station in Eilat with a cruise missile.
On Jan 14, US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, warned Israel that Hamas has recruited “almost as many new militants as it has lost.” Blinken stated that Hamas’ new recruitment effort is a “recipe for an enduring insurgency and perpetual war.” The Wall Street Journal similarly reported on January 13 that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip, Mohammad Sinwar, has begun recruiting Gazans.
On Jan 15, Israel and Hamas approved a ceasefire-hostage agreement. Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani announced that mediators from the US, Qatar, and Egypt will monitor the ceasefire, which will take effect on Jan 19. Hamas appears to have agreed to allow the IDF to remain in the Philadelphi Corridor, an operationally and strategically significant IDF-held area in the southern Gaza Strip, during at least the first phase of the ceasefire.
On Jan 15, Syrian interim government officials met with senior Turkish defense officials in Ankara, likely to discuss military coordination as well as Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and Turkish efforts to coerce the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in order to disarm the later. The Syrian delegation in Ankara also likely briefed Turkish officials on the progress of their negotiations with the SDF which continued to push back against HTS demands for its disarmament and integration into the Syrian Defense Ministry.
On Jan 15, the IAF struck an HTS-affiliated convoy near the Syria-Golan Heights border. Syrian sources reported that an Israeli drone struck and killed two Public Security Department members as they collected surrendered weapons in the town of Ghadir al Bustan. The Israeli strike also killed the mayor of the town. The strike appears to be the first IDF strike that has directly targeted HTS-led government forces.
On Jan 15, the Houthis claimed that they conducted a cruise missile and drone attack targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and its accompanying naval vessels in the northern Red Sea. This alleged attack marks the sixth time that the Houthis have claimed to attack the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier since December 2024
On Jan 15, US CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla discussed the US-led anti-ISIS mission and recent developments in Syria with senior US and Iraqi military leaders in Baghdad.
On Jan 15, almost one year after adopting a text demanding that the Houthis immediately cease all attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea, the UN Security Council reiterated that demand in a new resolution, the draft of which was drawn up mainly by the US and Greece, and called for ongoing monitoring of the situation, as these attacks continue with increasing sophistication. Adopting resolution 2768 (2025), by a vote of 12 in favour to none against, with 3 abstentions (Algeria, China, Russian Federation), the Council extended, until 15th July 2025, its request that the Secretary-General provide it with written monthly reports on Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea. It also reiterated its demand that the Houthis immediately cease such attacks and release the Galaxy Leader and its crew. Further, the 15-nation organ took note of the use of advanced weaponry in these attacks and demanded that UN Member States stop providing arms to the Houthis. And, emphasizing the need to address the root causes of these attacks —including the conflicts contributing to regional tensions and the disruption of maritime security — the Council urged caution and restraint to avoid further escalation of the situation in the Red Sea and the broader region.
On Jan 16, Qatar and the US finally announced the conclusion of an agreement that provides for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and the release of dozens of Israeli hostages, after more than 15 months of war between the Israeli armed forces and Hamas, having killed tens of thousands in the Palestinian enclave.
On Jan 16, HTS leader and interim head of state Ahmed al Shara addressed Israeli military activity in southern Syria during a meeting with the Qatari foreign minister. Shara said that Israel’s advance into Syria was “due to the presence of Iranian militias and Hezbollah” but that such a “pretext” no longer exists with HTS in power. He emphasized that Israeli forces must return to the 1974 disengagement line in the Golan Heights and that UN forces should deploy to the buffer zone.
On Jan 16, Iraqi Foreign Minister Faud Hussein, told Reuters that the Iraqi government is attempting to convince Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to either surrender their weapons or join the official Iraqi security apparatus.
On Jan 16, U.S. President-elect Donald Trump during an interview, said that a deal to declare a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and free dozens of hostages would never have been struck had it not been for pressure from him and members of his administration.
On Jan 17, the Houthis claimed that the US had conducted five airstrikes on the Harf Sufyan District. It later claimed to have targeted Eilat with four cruise missiles, a target in the Ashkelon area with a UAV and the Tel Aviv area with multiple UAVs, in addition to targeting the AC USS Harry S. Truman again.
On Jan 17, the Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed in Moscow the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty to deepen bilateral economic, political, and security ties. The agreement does not represent a significant shift in Russo-Iranian relations and used very similar language to Iran and Russia’s 2001 agreement. The agreement notably lacks a mutual defense clause and outlines bilateral defense and security cooperation, including joint military exercises and operations, personnel training, port visits by military vessels, exchange of military officers, and intelligence sharing.
On Jan 17, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Antonio Guterres visited UNIFIL sites in southern Lebanon. Mr Guterres reported that UN peacekeepers in Lebanon have identified over 100 weapons depots likely belonging to Hezbollah since the ceasefire’s implementation on Nov 27, 2024. During his visit to UNIFIL Headquarters in Naqoura, southwestern Lebanon, he also stated that IDF activity in UNIFIL’s area of operations and Lebanese territory, must stop.
On Jan 17, the Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas’s office stated that the PA holds legal and political jurisdiction over the Gaza Strip as the recognized governing authority of the Palestinian territories and is prepared to deploy administrative and security teams to the Strip. However, the ceasefire agreement does not task the PA with governing the Strip, nor does the ceasefire discuss post-war governance in any capacity.
On Jan 18 morning, the IDF intercepted a ballistic missile launched from Yemen, with fragments falling near Beitar Ilit, Bar Giora, and Mevo Beitar. Missile debris damaged homes in Mevo Beitar and Tzur Hadassah. The Houthis claimed to have hit the headquarters of the Israeli Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv. A second ballistic missile was later also intercepted by Israeli air defense systems. The Houthis claimed that they successfully hit two vital targets in Eilat with a ballistic and a cruise missile. The group also claimed that it targeted the USS Harry S. Truman and the warships accompanying it in the Red Sea using UAVs and cruise missiles. Al-Masirah reported that the US carried out four airstrikes on the Al-Azraqeen area north of Sanaa, but US CENTCOM did not confirm any US airstrikes that targeted Houthi sites in Yemen.
On Jan 19, the IAF conducted airstrikes targeting several Palestinian militia positions across the Gaza Strip prior to the ceasefire went into effect. IDF artillery also shelled militia infrastructure in the Gaza Strip prior to the start of the ceasefire.
On Jan 19 at 11.00h local time, when the cease fire agreement came to effect, three female Israeli hostages were released by Hamas, handing them over to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which were later delivered to the IDF in the southern Gaza Strip. Israel in its turn released 90 Palestinian prisoners and withdrew IDF forces from areas in the northern and southern Gaza Strip. The IDF remains in other, designated areas of the Gaza Strip, including the Philadelphi corridor. Gazans began to return to the northern Gaza Strip from IDF-designated humanitarian zones in the southern and central Gaza Strip, amid IDF withdrawal from these areas. In addition the IDF facilitated the entry of 630 humanitarian aid trucks into the Gaza Strip. On the same day Hamas announced that the next round of hostage releases will occur on Jan 26.
On Jan 19, the Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra rejected Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander Mazloum Abdi’s proposal that the SDF join the Syrian Defense Ministry as a “military bloc.” Abdi has repeatedly advocated for a “decentralized” administration and said that he wants the SDF to integrate into the Defense Ministry as a “bloc” and that they have not yet decided to hand over its weapons to the Syrian interim government.
On Jan 19, the Syrian Interim Defense Ministry announced that after conducting a series of meetings, over 60 military factions agreed to join the new Syrian armed forces. However, the HTS-led government has not yet announced how it intends to integrate these factions under the Defense Ministry.
On Jan 19, the IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said that the IDF must be prepared for “significant operations” in the West Bank in the “coming days.” The IDF similarly stated that it will deploy new forces to the West Bank amid Hamas’ efforts to stoke conflict there despite the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.
On Jan 19, in an e-mail sent to shipping companies by the Houthi-affiliated, stating that they will stop attacking merchant vessels transiting through the Red Sea with the exception of Israeli-linked ships, in response to Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement. It also stated that attacks on Israeli-linked ships will cease only after the full implementation of all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement. The HOCC also confirmed that the Houthis will re-trigger “sanctions”—referring to attacks on maritime traffic— on the United States, United Kingdom and Israel if the Houthis are attacked.
On Jan 20, the Houthi Foreign Affairs Minister Jamal Amer met with Hamas Representative to Yemen Moaz Abu Shamala at the Houthi Defense Ministry in Sanaa, Yemen. During the meeting Shamala thanked the Houthis for their support of Hamas in the Oct 7 War.
On Jan 20, Donald Trump was sworn in as the 47th President of the United States. During his inaugural address, he listed his priorities—on trade, immigration, and national security— while criticizing President Joe Biden, who sat nearby. He declared, “America’s decline is over.” On the same day, immediately after his inauguration, he made sweeping changes, effectively repealing 78 policies of his predecessor Joe Biden and implementing key points of his political agenda with a series of executive orders he signed immediately after taking office. The new US President had made it clear since his election that he intends to move forward rapidly with changes in the federal state, while keeping his campaign promises to his voters.
On Jan 20, US President Donald Trump signed an executive order to lift sanctions on Israeli settlers accused of committing violence against Palestinians in the West Bank.
On Jan 20, the Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi said that Houthi operations targeting Israel are “linked” to Israel implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement. He also claimed that US airstrikes targeting Houthi military infrastructure and the increased US naval presence in the Red Sea have failed in the past to deter the Houthis from attacking Israel.
On Jan 20, the Houthi rebel television network Al Masirah and the Houthi’s Saba news agency reported that Houthi rebels have released after more than a year the crew members of the Galaxy Leader Ro/Ro vessel being captured off the coast of Yemen in November 2023. The seafarers who were held, were released and handed over to Oman following the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The crew consists of 25 members of various nationalities, mainly of Ukrainian, Bulgarian, Filipino and Mexican nationality. In addition, the Houthi Supreme Political Council “announced that the release of the crew members of the Galaxy Leader, who had been arrested on November 19, 2023 as part of the campaign to support Gaza,” was taken in “support of the ceasefire agreement” in the Gaza Strip
On Jan 20, Syria’s de facto leader Ahmed al-Shara congratulated Donald Trump on assuming the U.S. presidency and said he looked forward to improving relations between Damascus and Washington. “We believe he is the leader who will bring peace to the Middle East and restore stability to the region”, Ahmed al-Sarah said.
On Jan 21, both the IDF Chief of Staff and Southern Command commander, resigned from the IDF. Both officers said that they took responsibility for failing to prevent Hamas’ October 7 attack into Israel.
On Jan 21, according to Marine Traffic, the Russian cargo ship Sparta II entered the port of Tartus. The Sparta II is likely transferring Russian military equipment to Libya, given that the Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported Russia’s intention to use the vessel to transport equipment from Syria to Libya. Russia may have reached an agreement with the HTS-led interim government to evacuate Russian military assets from Syria.
On Jan 21, Syrian media reported that Syria’s interim government annulled a treaty granting Russia a long-term military presence in Tartus and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Russian. The agreement, signed in 2017, extended the Russian Navy’s lease on the port of Tartus for 49 years. However, its future became uncertain after Assad was overthrown by Islamist rebels last month. The HTS-led interim government also suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus.
On Jan 22, the White House office stated that the US President Donald Trump has signed an executive order re-inscribing the US list of “Foreign Terrorist Organizations – FTO”. It also stated that “Houthi activities threaten the security of US citizens and US personnel in the Middle East, the security of our closest partners in the region, and the stability of global maritime trade,”, calling the policy pursued by Trump’s predecessor “weak.” Washington, according to the announcement, will work with allies in the region to “eliminate the capabilities of Ansar Allah,” stop its “operations,” “deprive it of its resources,” and thus “end its attacks”.
Military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
Military Operations
The volatile state in Syria since Nov 2024, is added to the general military conflict and unrest that takes place in the Middle East region, affecting also the East Mediterranean Sea. Though the Bashar al-Assad regime has fallen and the HTS has become the predominant group, it is almost certain that conflicts between rival rebels’ factions will resume over the status in future Syria.
Conflicts in the northern part of Syria between rival groups backed by Turkey, Turkish lead rebels and Kurdish militias as well as in the eastern part between HTS and other armed groups, are still ongoing.
Overall, the ceasefire in Lebanon is still maintained though IDF forces from time to time conduct minor strikes against selected targets within the country.
After the implementation of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip on Jan 19, the IDF ceased their operations there and diverted their attention to operations in the West bank against Hamas cells within Jenin refugee camp.
Both Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthi movement ceased military operations against Israel after the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.
Since Jan 19 there have been no US and UK airstrikes against Yemen.
Terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
The reemergence of terrorists group associated with ISIS and Al Qaeda in Syria since Nov 2024, has enhanced the terrorist threat level across East Mediterranean Sea. Nevertheless, the US, UK and French efforts in destroying potential terrorist targets and infrastructure in Syria have equally increased.
Weapons smuggling has almost certainly persisted throughout the US naval action in the Red Sea. The Houthis more often rely upon overland transport and small dhows that are difficult to intercept, however.
RISK ASSESSMENT
East Mediterranean Sea
The risk of attacks or incidents in the East Mediterranean Sea for the time being is assessed LOW with the exception of all Israeli ports and the Syrian Coastline. Any port call in Israel should be arranged after a direct contact with the Israeli authorities, while it is not clear whether there are still any Syrian authorities or if they represent the newly establish government.
The rise of terrorist groups and other uncharted armed groups in northern and western Syria could potentially be dangerous for merchant shipping security along the Syrian coastline and ports, destabilizing the security environment in the region even further.
Turkey is attempting on one hand to definitively dismantle the Kurds on its southern border and on the other hand to occupy more Syrian territory under the pretext of a safe zone. It is assessed that SNA with Turkish Armed Forces support will continue to assail SDF forces in the Kobani region and that these efforts could also be a precursor to a wider Turkish or Turkish-backed operation in Northern Syria. Ankara has repeatedly insisted that the U.S.-backed Kurdish militia has to be disbanded, arguing that it has no place in Syria’s future. Turkey identifies the Kurdish PYD faction and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an extension of the Kurdish PKK group, linking them to terrorism. Turkey and HTS have coordinated their efforts to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into the HTS-led defense apparatus since the fall of the Assad regime, but with no effect till now. On the other hand, the SDF is trying to secure an agreement with the interim Syrian government which will include the SDF joining the Syrian Defense Ministry as a “military bloc” and establishing a “decentralized” administration in the SDF held territory. It assessed that in the near future it is highly unlikely that there will be any type of agreement allowing the maintaining of SDF forces “autonomy”.
It is assessed that the efforts of Turkey to project itself as a “regional power” in the MENA region and East Africa, either through political intervention or military presence will be intensified over the next period.
Conflicts in the northern part of Syria between rival groups backed by Turkey, Turkish lead rebels and Kurdish militias, no matter the HTS-led interim government’s efforts to dissolve all former opposition forces and integrate them into the new Syrian Defense Ministry, indicate that it will highly likely be impossible to finally reach to an agreement on how to govern the country over the following month. There is risk for Syria to become another “failed state” in the Middle East & North Africa region (MENA), following the footsteps of Libya and Iraq.
The new Syrian leadership of HTS is under the microscope of the international community and Syrians themselves who want to see whether it will show respect for human rights, the treatment of minorities in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country, and the future of the semi-autonomous Kurdish regions of northern Syria. During the last period, the interim Syrian Government has begun to establish lines of communication and made attempts to reinvigorate diplomatic relations with Turkey, the Arab states, the US and EU. It is assessed that relations with Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are already at a high level, with the rest of the Arab states following at a lower level, while Egypt considers the HTS as a potential threat due to its ties with Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood. It has to be considered that the international community has not yet established a plan for how to engage with the transitional government in Syria, and most countries will wait for this mosaic of militias and armed groups to show their true intentions on how to build and run the future Syrian State.
For the US establishing channels of communication with the new Syrian de facto government under HTS leader Ahmed al Shara, trying to determine whether they will keep their promises of unity and moderation, is assessed to be a priority. However, ISIS or other terrorist group reemerging through this turmoil is a daunting possibility that requires constant vigilance and even though, Trump has openly declared that he does not want the US to be involved with the forming of future Syria. It is assessed that the US President will eventually be forced at the least to support the SDF against SNA and Turkish aggression and to take action against any terrorist groups that might arise.
It is assessed that the SDF’s fight against Turkey and its proxies will render it unable to support US policy objectives in Syria. The SDF cannot conduct offensive operations against ISIS and other terrorist groups while contending with the threat from Turkey and its allies in Syria.
Relations between Russia and the interim Syrian government have proved problematic and have worsened. After the recent events concerning the Syrian annulation of the treaty which granted Russia a long-term military presence in Tartus and the demand for the immediate withdrawal of Russian military assets, it has become clear that Russia has lost its bases in Syria for good. Over the last few days Russia has been granted leave by the Syrian Interim government to extract by sea its remaining military assets. It is assessed that Russia will move its forces from Syria into an East Libya area (probably the Cyrenaica peninsula) controlled by General Haftar, in order to establish a new naval and air base to assure its presence in the Mediterranean Sea.
It is assessed that further Israeli efforts to neutralize Syria as a potential threat and to establish a safe zone during the next weeks will almost certainly lead to a new escalation in tensions between Israel and Turkey over the future of Syria, since their interests are colliding.
In Lebanon over the next period, it is assessed that Hezbollah military will be gradually but steadily evicted by the Lebanese army, while the ceasefire agreement will be renewed and that eventually Israel will come to terms with the new Lebanon leadership.
Hamas will likely use the first phase of the ceasefire in Gaza to reorganize its forces and move cells around the Gaza Strip without Israeli retaliation. It is assessed that Hamas can only achieve limited reorganization and will be unable to regenerate itself during this period or to seriously impede the IDF if the ceasefire collapses.
It is assessed that the Palestinian Authority (PA) will seek to lead post-war governance in the Gaza Strip, but this will almost certainly require a military confrontation with Hamas. IDF operations have destroyed Hamas as a military organization, but small Hamas cells will remain capable of resisting a PA takeover after the IDF leaves.
Suez Canal – Northern Red Sea
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Suez Canal and the Northern Red Sea for the time being is assessed LOW.
Cessation of kinetic retaliations between Yemen and Israel due to the ceasefire in Gaza has significantly decreased concern for collateral damage on merchant vessels in the vicinity of Eilat port and while transiting the Gulf of Aqaba.
The risk of attacks or incidents in Eilat port for non-Israeli vessels is assessed LOW provided that there will be no problems or incidents in implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, nor any attacks against the Houthis in Yemen. In case of renewed hostilities between Israel and the Houthis due to
deviations from the ceasefire agreements the risk of attacks or incidents against Merchant vessels will automatically revert to HIGH.
The risk for merchant shipping transiting the Gulf of Aqaba if they are heading for Jordanian, Egyptian or Saudi Arabian ports and with no Israeli, US or UK ties is assessed to be LOW, since the Houthis are avoiding to attack any Arab state port in the region.
Bab-el-Mandeb Straits – Southern Rea Sea
The southernmost part of the Rea Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait are still assessed to be the most hazardous areas for international shipping, with no significant incident occurring during last period.
After the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement the risk of attacks or incidents against non Israeli ships is assessed LOW provided that there will be no problems or incidents in implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, nor any attacks against the Houthis in Yemen.
In case of renewed hostilities between Israel and the Houthis due to deviations from the ceasefire agreements the risk of attacks or incidents against merchant vessels will automatically revert to HIGH.
Despite the recent de-escalation, it is assessed that the Houthis will continue to monitor vessels with multiple layers of indirect associations to Israel, US or UK in order to be targeted and attacked at a short notice, if the situation escalates again. Maritime industry stakeholders should take into account such associations when conducting threat and risk assessments.
It is assessed that the US and UK airstrike campaign against Yemen will be paused while the naval units of the USN and the RN along with the warships of international/EU maritime Operations “PROSPERITY GUARDIAN” and “ASPIDES”, will remain in the area in high readiness.
Gulf of Aden
The eastern part of the Gulf of Aden is still assessed to be the one of the most hazardous areas for international shipping, with no significant incident occurring during last period.
After the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement the risk of attacks or incidents against non-Israeli ships is assessed LOW, provided that there will be no problems or incidents in implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement nor any attacks against the Houthis in Yemen.
For the rest part of the Gulf of Aden the risk of attacks or incidents is assessed LOW.
It is assessed that the naval units of the USN and the RN along with the warships of international maritime Operation “PROSPERITY GUARDIAN” and “EU ASPIDES” will remain in the area in high readiness.
Arabian Sea – Gulf of Oman
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman for the time being is assessed LOW.
Hormuz Strait – Persian Gulf
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Hormuz Straits and the Persian Gulf for the time being is assessed LOW.
Overall Assessment
The change in US presidency with Donald Trump assuming duties, the recent escalation of efforts by the International Community against the Houthi threat in the form of US-UK-coalition decisive airstrikes and the adoption of another UNSC Resolution, the advantageous military situation that has emerged for Israel against Iran and it’s proxies, the total loss of the Iranian and Russian foothold in Syria and finally the ceasefire agreement between Israel and HAMAS at Gaza which will also includes the exchange of hostages, are the major factors which finally forced the Houthis to cease their disruptive campaign against merchant shipping in the Red Sea and therefore breaking the almost year and a half stalemate in maritime security and freedom of movement for merchant shipping in the region.
However, this sudden pause in the disruption of the flow of merchant shipping through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea is quite precarious and should not be deemed rigid and solid in the mid or long term. It is assessed that even minor deviations from the ceasefire agreement could lead to hostilities, which would subsequently prompt the Houthis to again direct threats and attacks against international shipping at a short notice. In addition, the matter of upholding and implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire
agreement by all key players in the region smoothly and without any problems or incidents, is a huge challenge on its own.
It is assessed that the recent Houthi statements won’t be enough to encourage global firms and ship-owners to reenter in volume the Red Sea and over the next days but still there will be a small increase in the overall number of ships transiting through the Suez Canal.
The current situation around the seas of the Arabic Peninsula will continue the weeks to come to create risks for the shipping industry and will deter vessels to cross the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.
The matter of returning the flow of merchant shipping through the region to its previous volume which is linked with the progression of efforts in maintaining the overall stability and security in the region, will be determined over the next months.
It is assessed that in the short term the Houthis will resume with their campaign against Israeli merchant shipping in the Red Sea through invoking their pretext of supporting the Palestinian struggle and forcing Israel to uphold the agreements.
It is also assessed that the risk of entering Israeli ports is now LOW since the Houthis pledged to stop attacking Israeli territory.
Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944373465) can support your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and provide assistance in decision making by producing tailored made assessments upon request on ports in the region, on routes, on cargos and specific merchant vessels.
You can refer to our Threat & Risk assessment analysis brief No 24/001//10 Sep 24 for more information and background analysis on the events and situation in the region.
