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Objectives
The purpose of this brief is to provide the Maritime Industry and the Security Stakeholders with:
Major maritime security incident summary and analysis for the time period 30 Jan – 05 Feb 2025
Threat assessment updates concerning military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
Overview of risk assessment and relevant information, in order to support operational planningand decision making.
RECENT KEY DEVELOPMENTS
On Jan 30, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) released three Israeli hostages during the third hostage release. Hamas attempted to signal that it retains the ability to coordinate and communicate with other Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip.
On Jan 30, Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara said that Syrian sovereignty “under one authority and on one land” is a priority of the HTS-led interim government. Shara also promised to appoint an interim legislative council until a new constitution is drafted and announced the formation of a preparatory committee for the National Dialogue Conference, which will reportedly represent “different points of view.”
On Jan 30, Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara, Prime Minister Mohammad al Bashir, Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani, and Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra met with Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani and his accompanying delegation in Damascus. During the meeting the two parties discussed strengthening bilateral relations and strategic cooperation between Qatar and Syria.
On Jan 31, the IDF withdrew from the Rafah crossing to the neighboring Philadelphi corridor and announced that they will maintain a presence around the crossing. Staffers from the Palestinian Authority and the European Union assumed responsibility for the administrative affairs associated with the crossing.
On 31 Jan, according to an official representing the ceasefire committee, Israel submitted a complaint to the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire committee, claiming that Iranian envoys are delivering “tens of millions of dollars in cash” to Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut to fund the revival of Hezbollah.
On 01 Feb according to an Egyptian presidency statement, during a telephone conversation between Egypt’s President Fattah al-Sisi and US President Donald Trump, Sisi said that the world is counting on Trump to reach a “lasting” peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. The two presidents underlined the importance of continuing the implementation of the first and second phases of the Gaza ceasefire agreement and its consolidation, while also agreeing on the importance of continuing coordination and cooperation between the two countries.
On Feb 01 Hamas released three living male hostages into the Gaza strip including one Israeli-American hostage, while Israel released 183 Palestinian prisoners into the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Egypt.
On Feb 02 according to Russian news agency RIA, a Hamas delegation headed by political bureau member Moussa Abu Marzouk will conduct negotiations at the Russian ForeignMinistry. Russia has relations with all major players in the Middle East, including Israel, Iran, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas.
On Feb 02, Hezbollah announced that it will hold on February 23, 2025 the funeral of its former leader, Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in late September 2024 by an Israeli airstrike on the southern outskirts of Beirut. In a televised speech, Naim Qassem, Hassan Nasrallah’s successor at the head of the pro-Iran movement, promised “a grandiose and popular funeral” and that Hassan Nasrallah will be buried in south Beirut.
On Feb 02 Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi, stated that the Houthis have a responsibility to support Palestinian people against Israeli operations in the West Bank. Abdulmalik also stressed the Houthis’ readiness to “move immediately” against Israel if Israel escalates its operations in Gaza and Lebanon.
On Feb 03, the New York Times reported that a “secret team” of Iranian weapons engineers and scientists is “exploring” a faster approach to build a nuclear weapon in a “matter of months”. The new approach would decrease the time Iran needs to turn weapons-grade uranium (uranium enriched to 90 percent) into a nuclear weapon.
On Feb 04, the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sarah at the presidential palace in Ankara. The talks reportedly included a defense agreement to establish two turkish bases in Syria, as well as the training of the Syrian army and its pilots by the Turkish armed forces. Turkish media reports also say that the agreement stipulates that Turkey will deploy F-16 fighter jets to these bases until a Syrian air force is established and will use Syrian airspace for military purposes. There are also reports that Turkey will provide Syria with drones.
Between 02 and 04, Feb last week’s Trump proposal for location of Palestinians to other Arab counties, was condemned and rejected by Russia, China, Spain, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey as well as Palestinian groups.
On Feb 04 US President Donald Trump ordered the re-enforcement of “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon.Trump signed an executive order that targets Iranian oil sales to other countries.
On Feb 04the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office announced that an Israeli delegation will travel to Doha on February 8 and 9 to negotiate the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage agreement.
On Feb 04 Hamas spokesman, Abdel-Latif al-Qanua, announced that negotiations with Israel on the “second phase” of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip have begun. The second of three phases will focus on an agreement to free the remaining hostages and withdraw Israeli forces from Gaza. “Contacts and negotiations for the second phase have begun”.
On Feb 04 U.S. President Donald Trump met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the White House. During a joint press conference following the meeting, Trump announced his intention for the U.S. to “take control of the Gaza Strip”, “defusing all dangerous unexploded bombs and all weapons”, “getting rid of the destroyed buildings” and work to develop the area economically, while at the same time reiterating the suggestion that Palestinians living in the enclave should be relocated elsewhere. After repeated questions, Trump made clear that he does not see a world in which Palestinians will ever return to Gaza. Trump’s proposal for the Gaza Strip surprised even Israelis to some extent, according to a senior adviser to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “We knew about the idea, but we were surprised by the scale,” the official told to the Times of Israel.
Military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
Military Operations
The volatile state in Syria since Nov 2024, is added to the general military conflict and unrest that takes place in the Middle East region, affecting also the East Mediterranean Sea. Though the HTS has become the predominant group and fully controls the interim Syrian government, it is almost certain that conflicts between rival rebels’ factions will resume over the status in future Syria.
Conflicts in the northern part of Syria between rival groups backed by Turkey, Turkish lead rebels and Kurdish militias as well as in the eastern part between HTS and other armed groups, are still ongoing. Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) continueto attack SDF positions along key ground lines of communication.
Overall, the ceasefire in Lebanon is still maintained and has even been extended for an additional 23 days, which means that the ceasefire will now be in effect until Feb 18. IDF forces continue from time to time to conduct minor strikes against selected targets within Southern Lebanon. It is expected that the IDF will withdraw from Lebanonby February 18 and that the LAF will backfill the IDF by this date.
After the implementation of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip on Jan 19, the IDF ceased their operations there and diverted their attention to operations in the West bank against Hamas cells. These operations have increased in intensity over the last few days.
Both Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthi movement which ceased military operations against Israel after the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip continue to uphold the cease fire and there have been no new attacks or incidents.
Since Jan 19 there have been no US, UK or IAF airstrikes against Yemen.
A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia’s continuedaccess to its bases in Syria, reportedly failed. The departure of a significant number of vessels from the Port of Tartus suggests that the Kremlin is not optimistic about the results of ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. The location of the vessels off the coast of Tunisia also suggests that these ships are not bound for Libya, though Russia sent some assets from Syria to Libya by air in Dec 2024 and Jan 2025.
On Feb 01 the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy unveiled a new underground missile depot in southern Iran. The IRGC claimed that the facility contains medium-range Ghadr-380 anti-ship cruise missiles with a range of 1000 km, reportedly with anti-jamming technology, smart guidance, and rapid launch capability.
Terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
The reemergence of terrorists group associated with ISIS and Al Qaeda in Syria since Nov 2024, has enhanced the terrorist threat level across East Mediterranean Sea. Nevertheless, the US, UK and French efforts in destroying potential terrorist targets and infrastructure in Syria have equally increased. In addition, the risk of open conflict between these groups and the HTS has recently forced certain groups to lay down their arms and join with HTS.
On Feb 04 according to Bloomberg, Libyan protesters who call themselves the “Oil Crescent Movement” shut down Es Sider and Ras Lanuf ports. The protesters prevented the oil tanker “Alpha Finlandia” from loading a shipment of approximately 600,000 barrels at Es Sider port and the loading process of one of the tankers at Ras Lanuf port. On Jan 6, the protesters issued a statement under the name of the movement, giving the National Oil Corporation (NOC) a two-week ultimatum from the date of the statement to meet their demands. They warned of resorting to shutting down oil fields and closing ports in the region if their demands had not been met. The protesters called for fair distribution of resources, improved living conditions for the residents of the Oil Crescent region, and the relocation of the headquarters of five oil companies from Tripoli to the Oil Crescent area.
RISK ASSESSMENT
East Mediterranean Sea
The risk of attacks or incidents in the East Mediterranean Sea for the time being is assessed LOW with the exception of all Israeli ports and the Syrian Coastline. Any port call in Israel should be arranged after a direct contact with the Israeli authorities, while it is not clear whether there are still any Syrian authorities or if they fully represent the newly establish government.
Terrorist groups and other uncharted armed groups in northern and western Syria pose a threat to the region’s security environment and could potentially be dangerous for merchant shipping security along the Syrian coastline and ports.
Turkey is attempting on one hand to pacify the Kurdish populations on its southern territory and along its southern borders and on the other hand to occupy more Syrian territory under the pretext of creating a safe zone. It is assessed that SNA with Turkish Armed Forces support will continue to assail SDF forces in the Kobani region and along the Tigris River and that these efforts could also be a precursor to a wider Turkish or Turkish-backed operation in Northern Syria, with the cooperation or support of the Syrian interim government.Turkey and HTS have coordinated their efforts to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into the HTS-led defense apparatus since the fall of the Assad regime, but with no effect till now.
Turkey, HTS and Interim Syrian Government cooperation is constantly deepening and it is assessed that Turkey will attempt to incorporate Syria into its close allies, as it did with the West Libya GNA government, in order to increase its footprint in the region and pursue its geopolitical goals. It is assessed that Turkey’s secondary objective is to be awarded with the reconstruction of Syria in order for 2,5 million Syrian refugees to be established in northern Syria, and displace the local Kurdish populations.
It is assessed that the efforts of Turkey to project itself as a “regional power” in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), as well as East Africa either through political intervention or military presence, will be intensified over the next period.
Recent HTS-led interim government’s efforts in the southern and western parts of Syria to dissolve all former opposition forces and integrate them into the new Syrian Defense Ministry have begun bearing fruit. Nevertheless, conflicts in the northern part of Syria between rival groups backed by Turkey, Turkish lead rebels and Kurdish militias and especially the SDF and Druze community’s commitment to a vision of a “decentralized government system” indicate that it will highly likely be impossible to finally reach to a lasting agreement on how to govern the country over the following months. There is risk for Syria to become another “failed state” in the MENA region, following the footsteps of Libya and Iraq.
The international community is beginning to engage with the Interim government in Syria and already sanctions to the previous regime are gradually being lifted. However, the EU and most countries remain uncertain and intend to wait for this government to show its true intentions on how to build and run the future Syrian State, and also on how they interact with other countries. Over the last two months, the interim Syrian Government has begun to successfully establish lines of communication and to reinvigorate diplomatic relations with Turkey, most Arab states, the US and EU. It is assessed that relations with Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are already at a high level, with the rest of the Arab states following at a lower level, while Egypt considers the HTS as a potential threat due to its ties with Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood.
For the US, establishing channels of communication with the new Syrian de facto government under HTS leader Ahmed al Shara, trying to determine whether they will keep their promises of unity and moderation, is assessed to be a priority. However, ISIS or other terrorist group reemerging through this turmoil is a daunting possibility that requires constant vigilance and even though, Trump has openly declared that he does not want the US to be fully involved with the forming of future Syria. It is assessed that the US President, even if he may withdraw any US forces that are currently in Syria, he will eventually be forced at the least to support and secure the SDF against SNA and Turkish aggression and to take action against any terrorist groups thatmight arise. It is highly likely that in the near future, the US military forces will establish a strong footprint on Cyprus Island keeping a certain level of alert to intervene into the Middle East, if required.
It is assessed that the US President’s “bold” proposed plan for US to take control of the Gaza Strip in order to be rebuilt and the relocation of Palestinians to other Arab countries, even though at first hand has been rejected by many countries, will gradually in the long term begin to represent a possible solution to the geopolitical stalemate in the Middle East.
It is assessed that the SDF’s fight against Turkey and its proxies will render it unable to support US policy objectives in Syria. The SDF cannot conduct offensive operations against ISIS and other terrorist groups while contending with the threat from Turkey and its allies in Syria.
It is assessed that Israel will certainly have a pivotal role both in mitigating Turkey’s ambitions, influence and overall foothold in the new Syria, on behalf of US and generally in promoting US objectives in the region.
Relations between Russia and the interim Syrian government have proved problematic and have not improved despite Russian efforts. After the recent events concerning the Syrian annulation of the treaty which granted Russia a long-term military presence in Tartus, the demand for the immediate withdrawal of Russian military assets and the recent meeting, has become clear that Russia has lost its bases in Syria for good. Over the last few days Russia has continued to extract by sea its remaining military assets. It is assessed for the time being, that Russia will move its forces from Syria back to Russia territory in order to reinforce the operations against Ukraine. However, it is expected that in the long term Russia will try to establish a new naval and air base into an East Libya area (probably the Cyrenaica peninsula) controlled by General Haftar, in order to assure its presence in the Mediterranean Sea.
It is assessed that further Israeli efforts to neutralize Syria as a potential threat and to establish a safe zone during the next weeks could lead to a new escalation in tensions between Israel and Turkey over the future of Syria, since their interests are colliding. It is highly likely that the US will try to play a mediator role to improve the relations between Turkey and Israel, avoiding any further tensions.
In Lebanon over the next period, it is assessed that Hezbollah military will be gradually but steadily evicted by the Lebanese army, while the uphold of the ceasefire agreement, which has been renewed till Feb 18, will provide the future base for Israel to come to terms with the new Lebanon leadership. Hezbollah requires time to rebuild and is unlikely to resume significant operations against Israeli forces in Lebanon over the next weeks. It is doubtful that Hezbollah will be able to reconstitute a significant portion of its military capabilities during the 60-day ceasefire period.
Hamas will likely use the first phase of the ceasefire in Gaza and the return of Gazians to Northern Gaza to reorganize and replenish its forces and move cells around the Gaza Strip without Israeli retaliation. It is assessed that Hamas can only achieve limited reorganization and will be unable to regenerate itself during this period or to seriously impede the IDF if the ceasefire collapses. Nevertheless, the return of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip will make it difficult for the IDF to conduct operations with the same intensity as it did before the ceasefire.
It is assessed that the Palestinian Authority (PA) will seek to lead post-war governance in the Gaza Strip, but this will almost certainly require a military confrontation with Hamas. IDF operations have destroyed Hamas as a military organization, but small Hamas cells will remain capable of resisting a PA takeover after the IDF leaves.
In the west bank it is assessed that the IDF will focus its main efforts against Hamas cells and will increase operations both in volume and intensity within Jenin refugee camp.
It is assessed that in the future we could witness an escalation in tensions in Libya between Libyan parties, Turkey and Russia, which may lead to a new round of armed conflict that could threaten merchant shipping.
Suez Canal – Northern Red Sea
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Suez Canal and the Northern Red Sea for the time being is assessed LOW.
Cessation of kinetic retaliations between Yemen and Israel due to the ceasefire in Gaza has significantly decreased concern for collateral damage on merchant vessels in the vicinity of Eilat port and while transiting the Gulf of Aqaba.
The risk of attacks or incidents in Eilat port for non-Israeli vessels is assessed LOW provided that there will be no problems or incidents in implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, nor any attacks against the Houthis in Yemen. In case of renewed hostilities between Israel and the Houthis due todeviations from the ceasefire agreements the risk of attacks or incidents against merchant vessels will automatically revert to HIGH.
The risk for merchant shipping transiting the Gulf of Aqaba if they are heading for Jordanian, Egyptian or Saudi Arabian ports and with no Israeli, US or UK ties, is assessed to be LOW, since the Houthis are avoiding to attack any Arab state port in the region.
Bab-el-Mandeb Straits – Southern Rea Sea
The southernmost part of the Rea Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait are still assessed to be the most hazardous areas for international shipping, with no significant incident occurring during last period.
After the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement the risk of attacks or incidents against non-Israeli ships is assessed LOW provided that there will be no problems or incidents in implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, nor any attacks against the Houthis in Yemen.
In case of renewed hostilities between Israel and the Houthis due to deviations from the ceasefire agreements, the risk of attacks or incidents against merchant vessels will automatically revert to HIGH.
Despite the recent de-escalation, it is assessed that the Houthis will continue to monitor vessels with multiple layers of indirect associations to Israel, US or UK in order to be targeted and attacked at a short notice, if the situation escalates again. Maritime industry stakeholders should take into account such associations when conducting threat and risk assessments.
It is assessed that the US and UK airstrike campaign against Yemen will be paused while the naval units of the USN and the RN along with the warships of international/EU maritime Operations “PROSPERITY GUARDIAN” and “ASPIDES”, will remain in the area in high readiness.
Gulf of Aden
The eastern part of the Gulf of Aden is still assessed to be the one of the most hazardous areas for international shipping, with no significant incident occurring during last period.
After the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement the risk of attacks or incidents against non-Israeli ships is assessed LOW, provided that there will be no problems or incidents in implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement nor any attacks against the Houthis in Yemen.
For the rest part of the Gulf of Aden the risk of attacks or incidents is assessed LOW.
It is assessed that the naval units of the USN and the RN along with the warships of international maritime Operation “PROSPERITY GUARDIAN” and “EU ASPIDES” will remain in the area in high readiness.
Arabian Sea – Gulf of Oman
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman for the time being is assessed LOW.
Hormuz Strait – Persian Gulf
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Hormuz Straits and the Persian Gulf for the time being is assessed LOW.
Overall Assessment
The change in US presidency with Donald Trump assuming duties, the recent escalation of efforts by the International Community against the Houthi threat in the form of US-UK-coalition decisive airstrikes and the adoption of another UNSC Resolution, the advantageous military situation that has emerged for Israel against Iran and it’s proxies, the total loss of the Iranian and Russian foothold in Syria and finally the ceasefire agreement between Israel and HAMAS at Gaza which will also includes the exchange of hostages and still stands, are the major factors which finally forced the Houthis to cease their disruptive campaign against merchant shipping in the Red Sea and therefore breaking the almost year and a half stalemate in maritime security and freedom of navigation for merchant shipping in the region.
However, this sudden pause in the disruption of the flow of merchant shipping through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea is quite precarious and should not be deemed rigid and solid in the mid or long term. It is assessed that even minor deviations from the ceasefire agreement could lead to hostilities, which would subsequently prompt the Houthis to again direct threats and attacks against international shipping at a short notice. In addition, the matter of upholding and implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefireagreement by all key players in the region smoothly and without any problems or incidents, is a huge challenge on its own.
It is assessed that the recent Houthi statements won’t be enough to encourage global firms and ship-owners to reenter in volume the Red Sea at all types of ships and cargos and over the next months, but still there will be an increase in the overall number of ships and especially container ships transiting through the Suez Canal.
The current situation around the seas of the Arabic Peninsula will continue the weeks to come to create risks for the shipping industry and will deter vessels other than container ships to cross the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.
The matter of returning the flow of merchant shipping through the region to its previous volume which is linked with the progression of efforts in maintaining the overall stability and security in the region, will be determined over the next months.
It is assessed that in the short term the Houthis will resume with their campaign against Israeli merchant shipping in the Red Sea through invoking their pretext of supporting the Palestinian struggle and forcing Israel to uphold the agreements.
It is also assessed that the risk of entering Israeli ports is now LOW since the Houthis pledged to stop attacking Israeli territory.
Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944373465) can support your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and provide assistance in decision making by producing tailored made assessments upon request on ports in the region, on routes, on cargos and specific merchant vessels.
You can refer to our Threat & Risk assessment analysis brief No 24/001//10 Sep 24 for more information and background analysis on the events and situation in the region.
