174Vice Admiral (ret.) H.N. John (Ioannis) Pavlopoulos, Honorary Commander in Chief of the Hellenic Fleet, Former Military Representative of Greece to the NATO and EU
THREAT & RISK ASSESSMENT BRIEF UPDATE
Brief Update No 25/07 Date: 26 Feb 2025
STATEMENT
This document has been approved for distribution by Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Operations Department. The provided Intel and information derive from open sources, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) and United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) respective WebPages and products.All rights reserved. No part of this Risk Assessment may be reproduced in any form: electronic, mechanical, or other means without written permission by Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd. Under no Circumstances can Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd be held responsible for any loss or damage caused by a reader’s reliance on information obtained by this Assessment.
Objectives
The purpose of this brief is to provide the Maritime Industry and the Security Stakeholders with:
Major maritime security incident summary and analysis for the time period 19 – 25 Feb 2025
Threat assessment updates concerning military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
Overview of risk assessment and relevant information, in order to support operational planningand decision making.
RECENT KEY DEVELOPMENTS
On Feb 19, according to international media, discussions took place between the Interim Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Council, the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), on the issue of future integration of SDF forces into the Syrian armed forces. After the meeting the SDF stated that several areas of common interest between the two sides had been identified during the negotiations and that there are opportunities for cooperation between the Syrian state and the SDF.
On Feb 19, according to Syrian diplomatic sources speaking to Syrian media, the interim government asked Russian officials to put pressure on Iran in order to stop trying to destabilize Syria.
On Feb 19, Hamas and Israel announced the imminent release, scheduled for Feb 22, of six Israelis held hostages in the Gaza Strip, following the return on Feb 20 of the bodies of four Israelis.
On Feb 19 and 20, Senior Iranian officials met with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Secretary General Ziad al Nakhalah in Tehran.
On Feb 20 Hamas returned the bodies of four hostages, including, those of the last two children. However, before been handed over to the Red Cross they were paraded among Hamas supporters during an orchestrated propaganda ceremony.
On Feb 20, the Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Tehran to discuss the situation in Syria, the South Caucasus, and Afghanistan.
On Feb 21, Hamas announced that Israel would release 620 Palestinian prisoners on Feb 22 in exchange for the release of six living Israeli hostages held in the Gaza Strip.
On Feb 21, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi said that he and the Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara agreed on “general principles” but still disagreed on “practical details”, which likely refers to the integration of the SDF into the Syrian army.
On Feb 21, a meeting of leaders of Arab countries including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Jordan, was held in Riyadh in order to discuss a response to counter US President Donald Trump’s plan for the Gaza Strip and review Egypt’s proposal, which includes a three-year fund worth USD 20bn from Gulf and other Arab states.
On Feb 21, the Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, during a visit at the Tulkarem refugee camp in the northern West Bank, where the Israeli military has been conducting operations for several weeks, stated he had ordered the army to intensify operations after attacks on three buses on Feb 20 near Tel Aviv.
On Feb 22, Hamas released six Israeli hostages according to the hostage release agreement. However before been handed over to the Red Cross they were paraded among Hamas supporters during an orchestrated ceremony.
On Feb 22, US President Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Whitkoff, said he would travel to the Middle East region later this week, “probably” on Feb 26, to negotiate an “extension of the first phase” of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas.
On Feb 22, tens of thousands of Hezbollah supporters gathered on the outskirts of Beirut to attend the funeral of the slain leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, almost five months after he was killed. Several Iranian and Houthi officials also attended the ceremony in Beirut. Israel during the ceremony made its presence felt, with IAF fighter jets flying over, sending a clear “message” to Hezbollah and its allies
On Feb 22 the president of Lebanon, Joseph Aoun, stated that Lebanon no longer wants “the wars of others on its soil”, while welcoming the Iranian delegation which included Iranian parliament speaker Mohammed-Bagher Galimpaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, that visited Beirut for the funeral of former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.
On Feb 23, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that he postponed the release of 620 Palestinian prisoners scheduled for Feb 22 in exchange for the release of six Israeli hostages, until the next release of Israeli hostages is secured and Hamas ceases conducting “humiliating rituals” that “dishonor” them.
On Feb 23, Israel’s government stated that it is ready to resume “at any moment” the war in the Gaza Strip, while Hamas accused it of “seriously jeopardizing” a ceasefire agreement by postponing the planned release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners. The first phase of the fragile ceasefire, which came into effect on Jan 19 in the Palestinian enclave after 15 months of war, is supposed to end on Mar 1, but indirect negotiations on the second stage of the process have not even begun yet.
On Feb 23, the Syrian presidency stated that Syria’s new President Ahmed al-Sarah has been invited to the Arab League Council to be held on Mar 4 in Cairo, a first invitation to the summit since the ouster of Bashar al-Assad from Damascus. The aim of the meeting is to discuss an alternative plan to that of US President Donald Trump for Gaza.
On Feb 23, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel demands “the complete demilitarization of southern Syria” and will not tolerate the deployment of forces of the new Syrian de facto government south of Damascus. In addition, he stressed that the IDF will remain in the area of Mount Hermon and its surroundings indefinitely to protect Israel and counter any threat.
On Feb 23, the Council of Foreign Ministers of the EU decided to suspend a series of restrictive measures in Syria concerning energy, transport, as well as the facilitation of financial and banking transactions related to energy, transport, humanitarian aid and reconstruction purposes.
On Feb 23, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khomeini vowed to continue “resistance” against Israel in a message released on the occasion of the funeral in Lebanon former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike in September.
On Feb 24, Israel has informed mediators that it is willing to release the 620 Palestinian prisoners who were scheduled to release on Feb 22 if Hamas returns on the same day the bodies of the four hostages that were scheduled for later this week.Israel is also demanded that Hamas not hold any ceremony with the coffins, as it did with the bodies of the Bibas family and 83-year-old Oded Lifsic.
On Feb 24, the Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi ruled out any “direct negotiations” with the US under the current policy of “maximum pressure” on Tehran thatUS President Donald Trump has reinstated in his new term in the White House.
On Feb 24, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan welcomed Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at the presidential palace in Ankara who had earlier met with his Turkish counterpart, Hakan Fidan. During the meetings Turkey called for the abolition of Kurdish autonomy and the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces, of which the Kurdish YPG forces are the main body. Lavrov on the other hand stressed that different political, ethnic and religious groups should take part in the National Assembly on the future of Syria, adding that developments in this direction will play a positive role in relations between Moscow and Damascus.
On Feb 24, the Syrian interim government began a two-day National Dialogue Conference on the country’s future in Damascus with over 600 invitees attending. Syria’s interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa during the opening of the Conference vowed to guarantee the state’s monopoly on arms. In addition, in his opening speech Sharaa said that “Syria does not accept division, it is an integrated whole and its strength is based on its unity”. Notably the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) have not been invited to participate.
On Feb 25, the spokesman for the US National Security Council, Brian Hughes, stated that the White House supports the Israeli decision to suspend the release of hundreds of Palestinians and that President Trump was willing to stand by Netanyahu’s government “whatever course of action it chooses with Hamas”.
On Feb 25, Israel announced that it had expelled at least 40,000 Palestinian residents of three refugee camps in the northern occupied West Bank, where the army has been conducting large-scale operations for over a month. In addition, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said he had ordered his men to “prepare for an extended stay” in the camps “in the coming year.”
On Feb 25, Hamas stated that it is considering suspending indirect negotiations with Israel if it fails to meet its obligation to release hundreds of Palestinian prisoners scheduled for Mar 01.
On Feb 25, the Israeli government announced that it will not release 620 Palestinian prisoners, demanding an end to “humiliating ceremonies” that “dishonor” hostages. In response, Hamas accused Israel of “seriously jeopardizing the entire ceasefire agreement” and called on countries mediating indirect negotiations, “especially the US” to intervene.
On Feb 25, the Syrian National Dialogue Conference issued a statement denouncing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s “provocative statements” that the Jewish state would not allow Syrian forces to deploy south of Damascus, with conference participants condemning Israel’s invasion of Syrian territory and calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops.
On Feb 25, the attendees of the two-day Syrian National Dialogue Conference issued a statement consistent with the interim government’s stated goals at the end of the conference. The National Dialogue Conference and the conference’s final statement, do not appear to impact who will comprise the future constitutional committee. The interim government likely designed the conference and statement to legitimize the constitutional committee and its decisions.
Military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
Military Operations
The current status in Syria is added to the general military conflict and unrest that takes place in the Middle East region, affecting also the East Mediterranean Sea. Though the HTS has become the predominant group and fully controls the interim Syrian government. The conflict in the northern part of Syria between rival groups backed by Turkey, Turkish lead rebels and Kurdish militias are still ongoing. Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) continueto attack SDF positions along key ground lines of communication. It is assessed that the situation will not highly likely changein the near future.
Syrian armed factions have started to integrate into the new Syrian army and security apparatus. It is unclear how extensive the integration of armed groups across Syria, yet the pace at which this integration occurs has increased over the last weeks. It is also unclear to what extent groups that integrate into the Defense Ministry will subordinate themselves to largely HTS-dominated command structures.
Overall, the ceasefire in Lebanon was maintained even though from time-to-time IDF forces had conducted minor strikes against selected targets within Southern Lebanon. The IDF has withdrawaled from Southern Lebanonwith the exception of 5 specific key outposts and the LAF has begun to backfill the IDF previous held positions.
Overall, the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is still maintained even though hostage exchange on Israel’s part has been paused as retaliation for Hamas conducting “humiliating ceremonies” that “dishonor” hostages prior to their release. Even though Hamas actions jeopardize the entire ceasefire agreement, it is assessed that once more countries mediating the indirect negotiations will intervene and break the stalemate in order to finalize the first phase of the ceasefire agreement and to move on to the second.
Both Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthi movement which ceased military operations against Israel after the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip continue to uphold the cease fire and there have been no new attacks or incidents, especially in the Red Sea and the Golf of Aden. Nevertheless, the recent Houthi threats against Israel and the US if the ceasefire in Gaza is not respected, are alarming.
After the implementation of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip on Jan 19, the IDF ceased their operations there and diverted their attention to operations in the West Bank, against Hamas cells. These operations have increased in intensity over the last few weeks.
Since Jan 19 there have been no US, UK or IAF airstrikes against Yemen.
Terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
The reemergence of terrorists group associated with ISIS and Al Qaeda in Syria since Nov 2024, has enhanced the terrorist threat level across the East Mediterranean Sea. Nevertheless, the risk of open conflict between these groups and the HTS has recently forced certain groups to lay down their arms and join with HTS.
JMIC over the last weeks has received information from regional partners regarding pirate activity off the coast of Somalia and recommends merchant vessels to remain vigilant when transiting these waters and make necessary precautions according to Best Management Practices and industry guidelines, having armed guards onboard.
On Feb 17, Yemen-flagged Dhow Saytuun 2 was hijacked in the vicinity of Somalian East coast. The Dhow was taken to the high seas for three days for piracy activities however, it was abandoned soon after with no impacts to merchant shipping.
On Feb 19 HTS-led General Security Forces arrested individuals in southern Syria, who attempted to smuggle weapons to Lebanese Hezbollah.
On Feb 21 the US Joint Command for the Middle East Region (CENTCOM), which resumes its campaign against ISIS and Al Qaeda, reported via X that it had killed in the northwestern part of Syria a member of al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch, the Hurras ad Din group, which recently announced it was disbanding.
On Feb 22, Reuters reported that according to a letter dated Feb 14, Russian authorities are stepping up measures at ports, including hiring divers to carry out inspections on ships’ hulls, in response to growing threats to merchant shipping and infrastructure.The letter, issued by Russia’s Ministry of Transport and the Federal Service for Sea and River Transport (ROSMORRECHFLOT), instructs seaport masters to inform ship owners that all ships will be inspected for foreign objects and explosives upon arrival and docking, including the use of divers and telemetric equipment for underwater checks. This highlights an increased threat to the safe operation of transport infrastructure and merchant ships carrying dangerous and high-risk goods. Already three oil tankers in the Mediterranean and another in the Baltic Sea have been damaged by explosions during last month in separate incidents with unknown motives. However, it is assessed that these attacks have been conducted by Ukrainian Special Forces or secret services (GRU) in an attempt to disrupt Russian exports.
On Feb 23 Russia’s Rosmorport port agency stated that a cargo ship suffered a rupture while sailing in the Sea of Azov. The Panamanian-flagged Pavel Grabovskiy was carrying 2,939 tons of corn from Rostov to Samsun, Turkey. Under currently unclear conditions, water ingress was detected due to a crack in a ballast tank.
RISK ASSESSMENT
East Mediterranean Sea
The risk of attacks or incidents in the East Mediterranean Sea for the time being is assessed LOW with the exception of all Israeli ports and the Syrian Coastline. Any port call in Israel should be arranged after a direct contact with the Israeli authorities, while it is not clear whether there are still any Syrian authorities or if they fully represent the newly establish interim government. In addition, merchant vessels that participate at any way in Russian exports against established sanctions are in danger of being targeted and attacked with limpet mines or other sabotage devices. It is assessed that after an imminent peace treaty in Ukraine, these threats will no longer exist.
Terrorist groups and other uncharted armed groups in northern and western Syria pose a threat to the region’s security environment and could potentially be dangerous for merchant shipping security along the Syrian coastline and ports.
Turkey is attempting on one hand to pacify the Kurdish populations on its southern territory and along its southern borders and on the other hand to occupy more Syrian territory under the pretext of creating a safe zone. It is assessed that SNA with Turkish Armed Forces support, will continue to assail SDF forces. Over the last days Turkey and HTS coordinated efforts to coerce the SDF to disarm and be integrated into the HTS-led defense apparatus, have beginning to bear fruit with at least part of SDF leadership willing to discuss the issue. However the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi is unlikely to give up the SDF‘s ability to defend Kurdish areas against active attacks by Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) in the near future.
It is assessed that the National Dialogue Conference, though designed to provide legitimacy to the political process intended by the interim government and to highlight that it consults a broad swath of Syrians, has ultimately failed its cause by alienating mainly the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and also other factions in Syria.
Turkey, HTS and Interim Syrian Government cooperation is constantly deepening and it is assessed that Turkey will attempt to incorporate Syria into its close allies, as it did with the West Libya GNA government, in order to increase its footprint in the region and pursue its geopolitical goals. It is assessed that Turkey’s secondary objective is to be awarded with the reconstruction of Syria in order for 2,5 million Syrian refugees to be established in northern Syria, and to pacify the local Kurdish populations.
It is assessed that the efforts of Turkey to project itself as a “regional power” in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), as well as East Africa either through political intervention or military presence, will be intensified over the next period.
Recent HTS-led interim government’s efforts in the southern and western parts of Syria to dissolve former opposition forces and integrate them into the new Syrian Defense Ministry have so far proved successful. Nevertheless, conflicts in the northern part of Syria between rival groups backed by Turkey, Turkish lead rebels and Kurdish militias suggest that it will likely be difficult to finally reach to an agreement which will dissolve the SDF and integrate of SDF forces into the Syrian armed over the following months. There is still risk for Syria to become another “failed state” in the MENA region, following the footsteps of Libya and Iraq.
The international community is already engaging and interacting with the Interim government in Syria and sanctions are gradually being lifted. However, the EU and most countries remain uncertain and intend to wait for this government to show its true intentions on how to build and run the future Syrian State, and also on how they interact with other countries. Over the last two months, the interim Syrian Government has begun to successfully establish lines of communication and to reinvigorate diplomatic relations with Turkey, most Arab states, the US and EU. It is assessed that relations with Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are already at a high level, with the rest of the Arab states following at a lower level. Egypt considers HTS as a potential threat due to its ties with Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood and has reluctantly invited Syria back to the Arab League Council in an effort to remove Syria from Turkey’s foothold and align it with Arab Nations interests.
It has become obvious that for the time being, US participation in the formation of the new Syria is not a priority for Trump and it is assessed that the US President will eventually withdraw any US forces currently stationed in Syria. A US withdrawal from Syria however, would very likely create opportunities for ISIS to rebuild itself in particular in northeastern Syria.
It is assessed that the US President’s “bold” proposed plan for US to take control of the Gaza Strip in order to be rebuilt and the relocation of Palestinians to other Arab countries, even though at first hand has been rejected by many countries, will gradually in the long term begin to represent a plausible solution to the geopolitical stalemate in the Middle East. It is also assessed that the Trump administration by applying pressure to the Arab states and especially to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan with the threat of cutting foreign aid will be able to advance US goals in the region.
It is assessed that the recent phone call between Trump and Putin, the visits of the US Secretary of State in Israel and the Arab Countries of the region and finally the forthcoming visits of the US President’s special envoy, Steve Whitkoff at the Middle East region later this week, suggest that the US will increase their efforts in putting an end to the Israeli-Hamas-Palestinian Authority conflict over the Gaza Strip and will try to establish a lasting solution that will bring peace and stability in the region before turning its full attention to Iran and its remaining proxies.
It is assessed that Israel will certainly have a pivotal role both in mitigating Turkey’s ambitions, influence and overall foothold in the new Syria, on behalf of US and generally in promoting US objectives in the region. Over the next period it is also expected that the influence of Saudi Arabia in Syria and the overall region will be elevated, acting as a secondary pillar for US objectives and policies.
It has become clear that Russia has lost its bases in Syria for good. It is assessed for the time being, that Russia will move its forces from Syria back to Russia territory in order to reinforce the operations against Ukraine. However, it is expected that in the long-term Russia will try to establish a new naval and air base into an East Libya area (controlled by General Haftar) and also in Soudan in order to assure its presence in the region.
It is assessed that further Israeli efforts to neutralize Syria as a potential threat and to establish a safe zone during the next weeks, could lead to a new escalation in tensions between Israel and Turkey over the future of Syria, since their interests are colliding. It is highly likely that the US will try to play a mediator role to improve the relations between Turkey and Israel, avoiding any further tensions.
In Lebanon over the next period, it is assessed that Hezbollah military will be gradually but steadily evicted by the Lebanese army (LAF) which has moved to backfill IDF previous held positions according to the agreement that followed the ceasefire period which ended on Feb 18. The agreement which permits IDF to maintain control of 5 key outposts within Lebanon will provide the future base for Israel to come to terms with the new Lebanon leadership. Hezbollah requires time and support from Iran to rebuild and reorganize. It is assessed that under current circumstances in the region it is highly unlikely in the near future for Hezbollah to regain its military capabilities or to assume significant operations against Israeli forces in Lebanon and Syria or against Israeli territory.
Hamas will likely use the first phase of the ceasefire in Gaza and the return of Gazians to Northern Gaza to re-organize and replenish its forces and move cells around the Gaza Strip without Israeli retaliation. It is assessed that Hamas can only achieve limited reorganization and will be unable to regenerate itself during this period or to seriously impede the IDF if the ceasefire collapses. Nevertheless, the return of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip will make it difficult for the IDF to conduct operations with the same intensity as it did before the ceasefire.
While the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas has been in place since Jan 19, recent events proved once again how fragile it is. Hamas intention to bolster morale and project an image of an organization that has regained its vigor by conducting humiliating ceremonies prior to every hostage release has totally backfired. All it has achieved is to strengthen the Israeli resolve and determination and to jeopardize discussions over the issue of the second phase of the ceasefire. Still, it is assessed that once again countries mediating indirect negotiations will again intervene in order to finalize the first phase of the ceasefire agreement and to move on to the second one.
On the other hand, theIsraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the full support of the US has openly declared his willingness to order the IDF to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip if the agreements are not kept and also to intensify operations in the West Bank.
The Houthi threats of immediately resuming attacks against Israel and merchant shipping in the Red Sea and Golf of Aden if the agreements are not kept, are always looming ominously every time that the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza is put in jeopardy.
It is assessed that in the future we could witness an escalation in tensions in Libya between Libyan parties, Turkey and Russia, which may lead to a new round of armed conflict that could threaten merchant shipping around Libyan territorial waters.
Suez Canal – Northern Red Sea
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Suez Canal and the Northern Red Sea for the time being is assessed LOW.
Cessation of kinetic retaliations between Yemen and Israel due to the ceasefire in Gaza has significantly decreased concern for collateral damage on merchant vessels in the vicinity of Eilat port and while transiting the Gulf of Aqaba.
The risk of attacks or incidents in Eilat port for non-Israeli vessels is assessed LOW provided that there will be no problems or incidents in implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, nor any attacks against the Houthis in Yemen. In case of renewed hostilities between Israel and the Houthis, due to recent Hamas and Israeli deviations from the ceasefire agreements, the risk of attacks or incidents against merchant vessels will automatically revert to HIGH.
The risk for merchant shipping transiting the Gulf of Aqaba if they are heading for Jordanian, Egyptian or Saudi Arabian ports and with no Israeli, US or UK ties, is assessed to be LOW, since the Houthis are avoiding to attack any Arab state port in the region.
Numerous shipping agencies indicate that there has been a small increase in the number of merchant vessels which transited through the Suez Canal with 987 vessels from Dec 2024 rising to 1.033vessels for Jan 2025 and that the trend is to slowly increase. It is assessed, provided there will be no more future Hamas deviations from the ceasefire agreements, that there will be not issues with the implementation of the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, and that by late Feb 2025 there will be a substantial increase in the volume of ships transiting the region.
Bab-el-Mandeb Straits – Southern Rea Sea
The southernmost part of the Rea Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait are still assessed to be the most hazardous areas for international shipping, with no significant incident occurring during last period.
After the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement the risk of attacks or incidents against non-Israeli ships is assessed LOW provided that there will be no problems or incidents in implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, nor any attacks against the Houthis in Yemen.
In case of renewed hostilities between Israel and the Houthis due to deviations from the ceasefire agreements, the risk of attacks or incidents against merchant vessels will automatically revert to HIGH.
Despite the recent de-escalation, it is assessed that the Houthis will continue to monitor vessels with multiple layers of indirect associations to Israel, US or UK in order to be targeted and attacked at a short notice, if the situation escalates again. Maritime industry stakeholders should take into account such associations when conducting threat and risk assessments.
It is assessed that the US and UK airstrike campaign against Yemen will continue to be paused while the naval units of the USN and the RN along with the warships of international/EU maritime Operations “PROSPERITY GUARDIAN” and “ASPIDES”, will continue patrolling the area on high readiness.
Gulf of Aden
The eastern part of the Gulf of Aden is still assessed to be the one of the most hazardous areas for international shipping, with no significant incident occurring during last period.
After the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement the risk of attacks or incidents against non-Israeli ships is assessed LOW, provided that there will be no problems or incidents in implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement nor any attacks against the Houthis in Yemen.
For the rest part of the Gulf of Aden the risk of attacks or incidents is assessed LOW.
It is assessed that the naval units of the USN and the RN along with the warships of international maritime Operation “PROSPERITY GUARDIAN” and “EU ASPIDES” will continue patrolling the area in high readiness.
Recent information from regional partners regarding piracy activity off the coast of Somalia is assessed to be alarming and should move the shipping industry to enhance its security posture.
Arabian Sea – Gulf of Oman
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman for the time being is assessed LOW.
Hormuz Strait – Persian Gulf
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Hormuz Straits and the Persian Gulf for the time being is assessed LOW.
Nevertheless, the announcement and uncertainties arising from the reactivation of the “Maximum Pressure Campaign” towards Iran by the US, could escalate tensions in the region and potentially lead to incidents impacting the maritime environment. The specific issue needs a close monitoring of the situation.
OVERALL ASSESSMENT
Over the next period the US President Donald Trump will try to pursue the next three US goals which will reshape geopolitically the region. First to end the war in Gaza, second to bring an end to Hamas and Hezbollah and third to complete the “Abraham Accords” which he considers to be his own vision and work. In this context, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Russia will be used as leverage in order to push the Arab Countries and Iran along with its proxies to settle with US objectives and goals for the region.
Syria has begun to reemerge as a country in the region but still the way ahead is full of uncertainty.
Since Jan 19, 2025 and the pause of the Houthis’ disruptive campaign against merchant shipping in the Red Sea, the stalemate in maritime security and freedom of navigation for merchant shipping in the region has been gradually lifted. It is assessed that as the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas is proceeding and vessels and infrastructure remain untargeted, improved stability is expected.
However, this pause in the disruption of the flow of merchant shipping through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea is quite precarious and should not be deemed rigid and solid in the mid or long term. It is assessed that even minor deviations from the ceasefire agreement could lead to hostilities, which would subsequently prompt the Houthis to again direct threats and attacks against international shipping at a short notice. In addition, the matter of upholding and implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement by all key players in the region smoothly and without any problems or incidents, is a huge challenge on its own.
It is assessed that the recent Houthi statements will discourage global firms and ship-owners to re-enter in volume the Red Sea at all types of ships and cargos and over the next months, but still already there has been an increase in the overall number of ships (especially container ships) transiting through the Suez Canal.
The current situation around the seas of the Arabic Peninsula will continue the weeks to come to create risks for the shipping industry and will deter vessels other than container ships to cross the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.
It is assessed that in the short term, Houthis might resume with their campaign against Israeli merchant shipping in the Red Sea through invoking their pretext of supporting the Palestinian struggle and forcing Israel to uphold the agreements.
It is also assessed that the risk of entering Israeli ports is now LOW since the Houthis pledged to stop attacking Israeli territory.
The matter of returning the flow of merchant shipping through the region to its previous volume which is linked with the progression of US efforts in maintaining the overall stability and security in the region will be determined over the next weeks. Stock markets globally are emitting positive signs for trade and economy, as the policy of the newly elected President of the US is unfolding.
Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944373465) cansupport your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and provide assistance in decision making by producingtailored made assessments upon requeston ports in the region, on routes, on cargos and specific merchant vessels. You can refer to our previous Threat & Risk assessment analysis briefs for more information and background analysis on the events and situation in the region.
