10John (Ioannis) Pavlopoulos, President Sea Guardian SG Ltd., Vice Admiral (ret.) H.N. , Honorary Commander in Chief of the Hellenic Fleet , Former Military Representative of Greece to the NATO and EU
THREAT & RISK ASSESSMENT BRIEF UPDATE
Brief Update No 25/09 Date: 14 Mar 2025
STATEMENT
This document has been approved for distribution by Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Operations Department. The provided Intel and information derive from open sources, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) and United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) respective WebPages and products.All rights reserved. No part of this Risk Assessment may be reproduced in any form: electronic, mechanical, or other means without written permission by Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd. Under no Circumstances can Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd be held responsible for any loss or damage caused by a reader’s reliance on information obtained by this Assessment.
Objectives
The purpose of this brief is to provide the Maritime Industry and the Security Stakeholders with:
Major maritime security incident summary and analysis for the time period 05 – 12 Mar 2025
Threat assessment updates concerning military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
Overview of risk assessment and relevant information, in order to support operational planningand decision making
RECENT KEY DEVELOPMENTS
On Mar 04, the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi met the Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sarah for the first time on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo. Unlike the rest of the Gulf States, Egypt is still wary of Syria’s new leadership.
On Mar 05, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Italy and Britain declared in a joint statement that they supported the $53 billion Arab plan to rebuild Gaza that would prevent Palestinians from being displaced from the enclave.
On Mar 06, the French foreign ministry spokesman, Christophe Lemoine, stated that Hamas should be “completely” excluded from governing Gaza after the war, while welcoming the Gaza reconstruction plan proposed this week by Arab League states during a summit in Cairo.
On Mar 06,speaking to Reuters the US Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, stated that the US is considering a plan in which it could ask allies to stop and inspect Iranian oil tankers. Iran could respond to such a plan by attacking or seizing commercial vessels or tankers in the Persian Gulf. The plan is part of the US “maximum pressure” campaign, which seeks to drive Iranian oil exports to zero and thereby coerce Iran to negotiate a new nuclear deal.
On Mar 06, the United Kingdom announced that it suspended sanctions and asset freezes on 24 Syrian entities in the Syrian energy, banking, and transportation sectors.
On Mar 06, the US in an effort to demonstrate how Russia facilitates Iranian-backed groups’ terrorism in the Middle East imposed sanctions on Houthi officials for facilitating attacks on international shipping and for recruiting Yemenis to fight for Russia in Ukraine. Houthi officials threatened with military action in response to these sanctions. According to sources, Russia has both provided intelligence for attacks on international shipping and attempted to recruit Yemenis to fight in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Between Mar 06 and 10, an unpresented wave of violence erupted in the western part of Syria, triggered by a deadly attack conducted by alleged supporters of the previous regime against security forces in the town of Jabla, near Latakia, cradle of the Shiite Alawite minority.The outbreak of violence, the worst since Dec 2024, threatens the country’s stability in an already fragile transition as interim President Ahmed al-Sharah tries to consolidate his power after more than 13 years of civil war in Syria. These insurgent cells continued to attack Syrian interim government personnel across Latakia and Tartous provinces, as Syrian forces deployed to re-impose security over the coastal region. Syrian Government forces have secured most populated areas, but this does not mean that government forces have defeated the insurgency in these areas. It does not appear that any one actor or group controls these Assadist insurgent cells.
On Mar 06, in a symbolic gesture of support towards Israel, the US President Donald Trump met in the Oval Office with eight former Israeli hostages released under the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas.
On Mar 07, following numerous reports on atrocities committed during the suppression operations of the Syrian Army against insurgents in western Syria, the UN and the US along with other counties have issued statements condemning the massacres of civilians and called on the de facto Syrian authorities to end violence against civilian population.
On Mar 07, the Israeli Energy Minister, Eli Cohen, announced that Israel will stop supplying electricity to the Gaza Strip, a week after humanitarian aid was cut off, in an effort to increase pressure on Hamas.
On Mar 07, the U.S. President Donald Trump in an interview with Fox Business Network stated that he wants to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran and has written to the Iranian leadership saying he hopes they will agree to negotiate.
On Mar 07, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that they conducted aerial strikes against Hezbollah “military facilities” in southern Lebanon targeting weapons and rocket launchers that threatened Israel and were there in “flagrant violation” of the ceasefire agreement.
On Mar 07, the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Ismail Baghai condemning the recent outbreak of conflict in western Syria stated that “Nothing justifies the attacks on certain Alawite, Christian, Druze and otherminority communities, which have deeply shocked public opinion both in the region and internationally”. In addition, he formally rejected any Iranian involvement in the violence in Syria. Later that day the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Aragchi, stated to AFP that: “We have nothing to do with the current Syrian government and we are in no hurry on this issue”, emphasizing the fact that since the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Iran has not recognized the new Syrian authorities.
On Mar 07, Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have recommenced their attacks against US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) positions in Aleppo and Raqqa provinces, in Northern Syria.
On Mar 07, Houthi Supreme Leader, Abdulmalik al Houthi, threatened to resume attacks on maritime shipping in the Red Sea if Israel does not restart aid deliveries into the Gaza Strip by March 11. The Houthis have regularly threatened to restart their campaign against Israel in the event that Israel was not adhering to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire terms.
On Mar 08, according to Syria’s interim president, Assad loyalists belonging to Assad’s brother Maher’s 4th division and an allied foreign force, provoked the clashes on Mar 06 aimed at “inciting unrest and creating communal strife”. He did not reveal the foreign power, but spoke of “places that have come out damaged by the new reality in Syria” an apparent reference to Assad’s ally Iran, whose embassy in Damascus remains closed.
On Mar 09, Hamas stated its intention to start “immediately” indirect negotiations with Israel on the second phase of the ceasefire agreement and said that there were “positive signs” about the possibility of implementing the second phase of the deal, without elaborating. On the same day Israel also announced that it was preparing for negotiations. According to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office, “a delegation will be sent to Doha on Mar 10 as part of an effort to move negotiations forward”, following a “provocation by U.S.-backed mediators.
On Mar 09 in a video broadcast by Arab media, Syria’s interim President, Ahmed al-Sharah, called for national unity and said that current developments were within “expected challenges” as clashes continued between forces linked to Syrian de facto authorities and Alawite fighters, backing ousted President Bashar al-Assad. In addition, heannounced the establishment of an “independent” commission to investigate the killings – especially of civilians – recorded in the western part of the country, during clashes between security forces and insurgents loyal to Assad.
On Mar 09, the Hezbollah Secretary General, Naim Qassem, stated that Lebanese government efforts to establish a state monopoly on violence do not apply to Hezbollah.
On Mar 10, the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, strongly condemned the “massacres” of minorities unfolding in Syria and called on Syrian authorities to pursue the perpetrators which included radical Islamist terrorists and foreign jihadists.
On Mar 10, in his first interview with an international news agency, Syria’s interim president Ahmed al-Sharah stated at Reuters from the presidential palace in Damascus that the mass killings of members of ousted President Bashar al-Assad’s minority sect posed a threat to his mission to unite the country and vowed to punish those responsible, including his own allies if necessary. Sarah accused foreign-backed pro-Assad groups of causing the bloodshed but admitted revenge killings against the Alawite population “for years of accumulated injustices”. In a wide-ranging interview, Shara said security and economic prosperity were directly linked to the lifting of US sanctions against Syria. However, there has been no direct contact with the Trump administration in nearly two months since he took office amid concerns about Sarah’s ties to al-Qaeda. When asked why, he replied: “Syria is not on the US priority list. You should ask them this question. Syria’s door is open”. In addition, he left open the possibility of restoring relations with Moscow, rejected criticism from Israel and said he aimedto resolve differences with the Kurds, including meeting with the head of a Kurdish-led group that Washington has long supported.
On Mar 10, the Israeli government spokesman, David Menser, stated that Israel is ready to defend Syria’s Druze community following reports of mass killings of Alawites, members of another religious minority in the country. He called it a “massacre of civilians,” stressing that Israel was “ready, if necessary, to defend the Druze” without elaborating. Meanwhile, Syrian media are reporting a series of Israeli airstrikes in Daraa province in the south of the country.
On Mar 10, at a time of tension, as recent violent clashes in Latakia, Jabla and Banias have caused more than 1,000 deaths, the Syrian presidency in another astonishing move which marks a shift in the country’s policy, announced that an agreement has been reached with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that will gradually “integrate” all the political and military institutions of the autonomous Kurdish administration, into the Syrian state. The agreement concerns “the integration of all political and military institutions of northeast Syria” into the administration of the Syrian state. These “institutions” also include border posts, airports, and oil and gas rigs. The deal which was officially signed by Syria’s interim president Ahmed al-Sarah and Mazloum Abdi, the military commander of the SDF, is scheduled to be implemented by the end of the year.
On Mar 10, the head of Israeli diplomacy, Gideon Saar, urged Europe to stop offering “legitimacy” to the de facto Syrian government with a “well-known terrorist past”.
On Mar 10, the spokesman of the Syrian Defense Ministry Hassan Abdel Ghani, announced the impeding completion of the military operation in western Syria and stated that, “We are paving the way for a return to normality and the strengthening of security and stability”.
On Mar 11, the Syrian Interim Government announced the “end” of military operations they conducted against loyalists of Bashar al-Assad in the western part of the country, marking the deadliest incidents since the fall of the former president in Dec 2024, with over a thousand civilians among the victims. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, nearly all of the 1,068 civilians killed, mostly from the Alawite minority, were victims of summary executions by security forces or allied groups.
On Mar 11, the commander of the pro-Assad Coastal Shield Brigade, Mikdad Fatiha, posted a video of himself traveling near Safita Dam, Tartus Province indicating thatPro-Assad insurgent cells remain active in western Syria following the conclusion of interim government clearing operations.
On Mar 11, Druze militia provided new details about the agreement that prominent Druze militias and the interim Syrian government concluded on Mar 6. The Men of Dignity Movement stated that the agreement includes the establishment of security forces with Suwaydawis under the control of the interim Interior Ministry in Suwayda Province.
On Mar 11, Lebanon and Israel agreed to begin negotiations to set conditions for the IDF to withdraw from five outposts in southern Lebanon. The negotiations will also aim to resolve the status of thirteen areas along the Israel-Lebanon border that two countries have disputed since the United Nations established the “Blue Line” land boundary in 2000.
On Mar 11, the Israeli Defense Minister, Israel Katz, reiterated Israel’s intent to protect the Syrian Druze community during a visit to Israeli forces deployed in the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) zone.
On Mar 12, the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected the possibility of nuclear negotiations with the US, marking the third such instance in recent weeks.
On Mar 12, the Houthis threatened that they would target “any Israeli vessel” traveling through nearby Middle East waters, following their threat to resume attacks on Israel if it did not renew the flow of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip. The Houthis, who have also attacked ships with no apparent ties to Israel, stressed that they would target vessels in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Arabian Sea. The attacks had been on hold since a tenuous Gaza ceasefire and hostage release deal between Israel and the Hamas terror group took hold in January. After this the Israeli Air Force has in recent days raised its level of alert due to fears that the Houthis will also resume ballistic missile and drone attacks on Israel itself.
Military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
Military Operations
The current status in Syria is added to the general military conflict and unrest that takes place in the Middle East region, affecting also the East Mediterranean Sea.
During the past week there has been a new outbreak of violence, the worst since Dec 2024, which threatened Syria’s stability in an already fragile transition period. The new escalation of violence and targeted purges in the west of Syria have once again instilled a climate of fear and unrest not only among religious and other minorities in the country, but also among moderate Muslims themselves, who in no way want a new civil war.
It is assessed that former Assad loyalists, Alawite militias and Hezbollah forces still in Syria, instructed and supported by Iran, provoked the clashes aimed at crippling the Syrian Interim Government’s efforts to establish control over Syria and to stir unrest upon minorities within Syria. These insurrection groups were finally defeated and dispersed after extensive military operations conducted by HTS forces and affiliated military groups friendly to the Syrian Interim government. However, the atrocities committed by these forces during the suppression operations against insurgents in western Syria have indicated that the HTS has not abandoned its recent jihadist past and have raised legitimate questions about whether al-Sharaa and his transitional government are capable and willing to “disengage” the extreme terrorist so quickly and easily and lead Syria to a more stable future. Still, it is assessed that following the conclusion of interim government clearing operations, insurgent cells still remain active in western Syria and will highly likely pose a threat to the Syrian interim government efforts.
The HTS has become the predominant group and fully controls the interim Syrian government and the new Syrian Armed Forces. Most of the Syrian armed factions have started to dissolve and integrate into the new Syrian army and security apparatus. It is unclear how extensive the dissolve and integration of armed groups across Syria, yet the pace at which this integration occurs, has increased over the last days with the SDF that control one third of Syrian territory and part of the Druze militia being the largest of these factions. It is also unclear to what extent these groups will subordinate themselves to largely HTS-dominated command structures.
The agreement between Ahmed al-Sharaa and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) chief Mazloum Abdi, brokered by the United States, marks a turning point for Syria’s unity since the fall of the Assad regime in Dec 2024. The agreement is formally part of a broader effort by interim President al-Sharaa to integrate Kurdish structures into the central state which includes the integration of all SDF political and military institutions into Syrian state structures.
The Syrian government’s simultaneous but separate agreements with Druze militias in southern Syria and the SDF in northeastern Syria indicate its willingness to grant concessions to minority groups under specific conditions. These agreements lay the foundation for future negotiations over how the SDF and Druze militias will integrate into the interim government and the degree of autonomy the SDF and Druze militias will retain in their respective territories.
Conflict between the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish and Turkish-backed forces in northern Syria has reemerged after a small ceasefire between Mar 01 and 07. It is assessed that Turkey, after successfully pacifying the PKK threat within its borders, will increase its efforts to remove the SDF threat from its southern borders by forcing it to totally dissolve and integrate to the new Syrian military.
The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)attacks on the SDF, suggests that Syrian interim government has limited control over the SNA and indicates that either it has not yet integrated the SNA factions as individuals or it has allowed SNA factions to integrate into the Defense Ministry as blocs. The SNA units will therefore seem to remain loyal to their respective political leaders and Turkey and not necessarily follow the Syrian Defense Ministry chain of command.
Overall, the ceasefire in Lebanon was maintained even though from time-to-time IDF forces had conducted minor strikes against selected targets within Southern Lebanon. The IDF has withdrawaled from Southern Lebanonwith the exception of 5 specific key outposts and the LAF has backfilled the IDF previous held positions. Hezbollah’s military capabilities and assets in Lebanon remain low and there is no indication of resurgence. In addition, the Lebanese government’s intention to enforce a state monopoly on arms will not only inhibit the rearming of Hezbollah but will gradually lead to the eviction of this organization from Lebanon.
The first phase of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas formally ended on Mar 01, but has been informally extended. Indirect negotiations for the second phase have not yet begun and it is unclear if, and until when, the parties will continue to abide by the agreement brokered by Qatar, Egypt and the US.
Overall, the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is still maintained with an informal extension to the first phase, even though from time-to-time IDF forces conducted minor strikes against selected targets in the area near Khan Younis. Both Israel and Hamas seem reluctant in proceeding to the second phase of the agreement, while Israel seeks to extent the first phase in order to secure the release of all hostages and bodies and the complete demilitarization of the Gaza Strip. Hamas on its side rejects the notion of disarming and leaving Gaza and is using the hostages as leverage for the upcoming negotiations. Even though Israel demands and Hamas notions jeopardize the entire ceasefire agreement, it is assessed that once more the countries mediating the indirect negotiations will intervene and break the stalemate in order to the ceasefire agreement move on to the second phase, by most likely securing the exchange of all hostages and prisoners.
After the implementation of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip on Jan 19, the IDF have diverted their attention to operations in the West Bank, against Hamas cells. These operations have increased in intensity over the last few weeks. It is assessed that Israel will push forward its efforts in dislodging Hamas from the West Bank by force.
Since Jan 19 there have been no US, UK or IAF airstrikes against Yemen.
Both Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthis which ceased military operations against Israel after the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, continue to uphold the cease fire and there have been no new attacks or incidents, especially in the Red Sea and the Golf of Aden. Nevertheless, the Houthi new threats against Israel, the US and merchant shipping are alarming.
Terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
The reemergence of terrorists group associated with ISIS and Al Qaeda in Syria since Nov 2024, has enhanced the terrorist threat level across the East Mediterranean Sea. Nevertheless, the risk of open conflict between these groups and the HTS has recently forced certain groups to lay down their arms and join with HTS.
JMIC over the last weeks has received information from regional partners regarding pirate activity off the coast of Somalia and recommends merchant vessels to remain vigilant when transiting these waters and make necessary precautions according to Best Management Practices and industry guidelines, having armed guards onboard.
RISK ASSESSMENT
East Mediterranean Sea
The risk of attacks or incidents in the East Mediterranean Sea for the time being is assessed LOW with the exception of all Israeli ports and the Syrian Coastline. Any port call in Israel should be arranged after a direct contact with the Israeli authorities, while it is not clear whether there are still any Syrian authorities or if they fully represent the newly establish interim government.
Merchant vessels that participate in any way in Russian exports against established sanctions are in danger of being targeted and attacked with limpet mines or other sabotage devices. In addition, an escalation in attacks against merchant shipping around Ukrainian ports and territorial waters is expected over the following period. It is assessed that these threats and attacks will stop only after a ceasefire in Ukraine has been firmly established.
The emerging insurgency in coastal Syria and the terrorist groups and other uncharted armed groups in northern and western Syria, pose a threat to the region’s security environment and could potentially be dangerous for merchant shipping security along the Syrian coastline and ports.
Established factions in northern and western Libya pose a threat to the region’s maritime security and could potentially be dangerous for merchant shipping security along the Libya coastline and ports.
It seems that Turkey has succeeded, perhaps even beyond its own expectations, to pacify the Kurdish populations within its borders, to bring an end to a 40-year conflict and to demolish Kurdish Independence aspirations. The PKK’s immediate alignment toAbdullah Öcalan’s call for disarmament and a ceasefire, came as a surprise to all Kurdish populations in the region. It is assessed that over the next period Turkey will attempt to also pacify all these populations (which Turkey reviews as part of the PKK) in Syria, Iraq and Iran, in order to achieve its strategic objective of removing any possibility of establishing a state or a self governed semi-autonomous areas of Kurdish origin to its borders.
Over the last days Turkey and HTS coordinated efforts to coerce the SDF to disarm and be integrated into the HTS-led defense apparatus, have led to a historic agreement with of SDF leadership. However, it is assessed that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi, who had previously separated the SDF from the PPK’s decisions, has attained specific assurances by the US and the Interim Syrian Government that will enable the SDF to retain its existence as a separate block within the future Syrian Defense Ministry and Civil apparatus.
It is assessed that the emerging insurgency in coastal Syria likely influenced the terms that Shara was willing to compromise on and forced him to concede from his previously held position regarding terms of military and political integration, leading to a deal beneficial to SDF and contrary to Turkey’s original plans.
It is assessed that SNA and Turkish Armed Forces in Northern Syria will continue to assail the SDF forces in greater intensity and volume over the next period in an effort to gain some territorial gains and to force them to fully dissolve and to be integrated into the HTS-led defense apparatus, contrary to the recent Syrian-SDF agreement.
Turkey, HTS and Interim Syrian Government cooperation is constantly deepening and it is assessed that Turkey has already incorporated Syria into its close allies, as it did with the West Libya GNA government. Therefore Turkey managed to increase its footprint in the region and to further pursue its geopolitical goals.
It is assessed that the efforts of Turkey to project itself as a “regional power” in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), as well as East Africa either through political intervention or military presence, have proved rather successful and are expected to be intensified over the next period.
Recent HTS-led interim government’s efforts in the northern, southern and eastern parts of Syria to dissolve former opposition forces and integrate them into the new Syrian Defense Ministry have so far proved successful and have increased its political power.
Nevertheless, the recent insurgent activity in western Syria and the ensuing conflict that led to severe casualties amongst civilian population between March 6 and 10, has been a significant blow to Syria’s interim President, Ahmed al-Sharah efforts to consolidate his power and derailed his effort to reunite Syria, lead the country to a more stable future and to reassure the international community over his jihadist-radical Islamic past.
It is assessed that the recent insurgent activity in western Syria was highly likely ignited by Iran which seeks to exacerbate sectarian tensions in Syria and to try to destabilize the Syrian interim government in order for Hezbollah to reemerge in Syria, to mitigate Turkey’s influence in the country and derail Turkish regional policy. Iran and Turkey’s opposing interests and policies in Syria and other parts of the region could increase fissures in the Iran-Turkey relationship.
The interim government will need to take concrete action, including charging, prosecuting, and sentencing perpetrators of sectarian violence, in order to demonstrate that the state is willing and able to protect minority communities. Insurgent cells that remain active in western Syria following the conclusion of interim government clearing operations are threatening any efforts of a unified new Syria under HTS dominance.
There is still risk for Syria to become another “failed state” in the MENA region, following the footsteps of Libya and Iraq.
The international community is already engaging and interacting with the Interim government in Syria and sanctions are gradually being lifted. However, in view of recent event in western Syria, the EU and most countries remain uncertain and intend to wait for this government to show its true intentions on how to build and run the future Syrian State, and also on how they interact with other countries. Over the last two months, the interim Syrian Government has successfully established lines of communication and reinvigorated diplomatic relations with Turkey, most Arab states, the US and EU. It is assessed that relations with Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are already at a high level, with the rest of the Arab states following at a lower level. Egypt considers HTS as a potential threat due to its ties with Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood and has reluctantly invited Syria back to the Arab League Council in an effort to remove Syria from Turkey’s foothold and align it with Arab Nations interests.
For the time being, US participation in the formation of the new Syria is not a priority for Trump and it is assessed that the US President will not withdraw any US forces currently stationed in Syria in order to reassure SDF.
During last week, the International Community witnessed first handed the sheer determination and absolute resolve of the US President Donald Trump in promoting and implementing agreements according to his designs on the issue of the war in Ukraine. Taking this into account, it is assessed that the US President’s “bold” proposed plan for US to take control of the Gaza Strip in order to be rebuilt and the relocation of Palestinians to other Arab countries, even though it has been rejected by most of the Arab countries, will gradually in the long term begin to represent the only plausible solution to the geopolitical stalemate in the Middle East. It is also assessed that the Trump administration will find little difficulty in applying the “required” pressure to the Arab states and especially to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan in order to advance US goals in the region.
It is assessed that the US will undoubtedly increase their efforts in putting an end to the Israeli-Hamas-Palestinian Authority conflict over the Gaza Strip and will try to establish a lasting solution that will bring peace and stability in the region, before turning its full attention to Iran and its remaining proxies.
Israel will certainly have a pivotal role both in mitigating Turkey’s ambitions, influence and overall foothold in the new Syria on behalf of US, and generally in promoting US objectives in the region. Over the next period it is also expected that the influence of Saudi Arabia in Syria and the overall region will be elevated, acting as a secondary pillar for US objectives and policies.
It is unclear if Russia has lost its bases in Syria for good. It is assessed that for the time being, Russia will maintain a minimum number of forces in Syria after having moved many fighting units back to Russia. However, it is expected that in the long-term Russia will try to establish a new naval and air base into the Mediterranean basin (either in East Lybia, Tunisia or Algeria) as well as in Soudan, in order to assure its presence in those regions.
It is assessed that further Israeli efforts to neutralize Syria as a potential threat, to defend the friendly Druze community and to establish a safe zone during the next weeks, could lead to a new escalation in tensions between Israel and Turkey over the future of Syria, since their interests are colliding. It is highly likely that the US will try to play a mediator role to improve the relations between Turkey and Israel, avoiding any further tensions.
In Lebanon over the next period, it is assessed that Hezbollah military will be gradually but steadily evicted by the Lebanese army (LAF) which has backfilled IDF previous held positions according to the agreement that followed the ceasefire period which ended on Feb 18. The agreement which permits IDF to maintain control of 5 key outposts within Lebanon will provide the future base for Israel to come to terms with the new Lebanon leadership. Hezbollah requires time and support from Iran to rebuild and reorganize. It is assessed that under current circumstances in the region it is highly unlikely in the near future for Hezbollah to regain its military capabilities, or to assume significant operations against Israeli forces in Lebanon and Syria, or against Israeli territory.
While the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas has been in place since Jan 19, recent events proved once again its fragility. Israeli efforts to extent the first phase in order to secure the release of all hostages and bodies prior proceeding to the second phase of the agreement and to raise the issue of Hamas eviction and the complete demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, the humanitarian aid cut-off and the subsequent rejections over these by Hamas, have once more jeopardized the overall ceasefire agreement. Still, it is assessed that once again countries mediating indirect negotiations will again intervene in order to finalize the first phase of the ceasefire agreement and to move on to the second phase. However, it is assessed that the issue of Hamas eviction and the complete demilitarization of the Gaza Strip will prove to be the hardest to tackle before reaching to the third phase of the ceasefire agreement.
On the other hand, theIsraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the full support of the US has openly declared his willingness to order the IDF to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip, if the agreements are not kept and also to intensify operations in the West Bank
The Houthi statements on forthcoming attacks against Israel and merchant shipping in the Red Sea and the Golf of Aden, highlight the threat that they continue to pose to global commerce around strategic maritime routes.It is assessed that over the next period they will attack Israeli vessels, which will likely include vessels that are traveling to and from Israel or affiliated with Israeli entities in order to pressure Israel in renewing the flow of humanitarian aid and electricity into the Gaza Strip. The Houthis may also attack US vessels as well, given the close relationship between the United States and Israel.
Suez Canal – Northern Red Sea
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Suez Canal and the Northern Red Sea for the time being is assessed LOW for non-Israeli vessels and MODERATE for Israeli vessels.
The Houthi statements on forthcoming attacks against Israel and merchant shipping in the Red Sea have significantly increased concern for collateral damage on merchant vessels in the vicinity of Eilat port and while transiting the Gulf of Aqaba.
The risk of attacks or incidents in Eilat port for non-Israeli vessels is assessed LOW provided that there will be no problems or incidents in implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, nor any attacks against the Houthis in Yemen. In case of renewed hostilities between Israel and the Houthis, due to recent Hamas and Israeli deviations from the ceasefire agreements, the risk of attacks or incidents against merchant vessels will automatically revert to HIGH.
The risk for merchant shipping transiting the Gulf of Aqaba if vessels are heading for Jordanian, Egyptian or Saudi Arabian ports and with no Israeli, US or UK ties, is assessed to be LOW, since the Houthis are avoiding to attack any Arab state port in the region.
Even though there has been has been a small increase in the number of merchant vessels which transited through the Suez Canal during the last two months it is assessed, that in view of the recent Houthi statements on forthcoming attacks against Israel and merchant shipping and unless Israel and Hamas have reached on an agreement on the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, there will be a substantial decrease in the volume of ships transiting the region.
Bab-el-Mandeb Straits – Southern Rea Sea
The southernmost part of the Rea Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait are still assessed to be the most hazardous areas for international shipping, with no significant incident occurring during last period.
After the Houthi statements on forthcoming attacks against Israel and merchant shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits, the risk of attacks or incidents against non-Israeli ships is assessed LOW and against Israeli ships MODERATE, provided that there will no Houthi attacks against Israel and merchant shipping and that Israel and Hamas have reached on an agreement on the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement.
In case of renewed hostilities between Israel and the Houthis due to deviations from the ceasefire agreements, the risk of attacks or incidents against merchant vessels will automatically revert to HIGH.
In view of the recent escalation, it is highly likely assessed that the Houthis will target vessels with multiple layers of indirect associations to Israel, US or UK in order to be attacked at a short notice. Maritime industry stakeholders should take into account such associations when conducting threat and risk assessments.
It is assessed that the US and UK airstrike campaign against Yemen will be recommenced in case of Houthi attacks, while the naval units of the USN and the RN along with the warships of international/EU maritime Operations “PROSPERITY GUARDIAN” and “ASPIDES”, will continue patrolling the area on high readiness.
Gulf of Aden
The eastern part of the Gulf of Aden is still assessed to be the one of the most hazardous areas for international shipping, with no significant incident occurring during last period.
After the Houthi statements on forthcoming attacks against Israel and merchant shipping in the Gulf of Aden, the risk of attacks or incidents against non-Israeli ships is assessed LOW and against Israeli ships MODERATE provided that there will no Houthi attacks against Israel and merchant shipping and that Israel and Hamas have reached on an agreement on the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement.
In case of renewed hostilities between Israel and the Houthis due to deviations from the ceasefire agreements, the risk of attacks or incidents against merchant vessels will automatically revert to HIGH.
For the rest part of the Gulf of Aden the risk of attacks or incidents is assessed LOW, but in case of renewed hostilities between Israel and the Houthis due to deviations from the ceasefire agreement, the risk of attacks or incidents against Israeli vessels will automatically revert to MODERATE.
It is assessed that the naval units of the USN and the RN along with the warships of international maritime Operation “PROSPERITY GUARDIAN” and “EU ASPIDES” will continue patrolling the area in high readiness.
Recent information from regional partners regarding piracy activity off the coast of Somalia is assessed to be alarming and should move the shipping industry to enhance its security posture.
Arabian Sea – Gulf of Oman
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman for the time being is assessed LOW.
Hormuz Strait – Persian Gulf
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Hormuz Straits and the Persian Gulf for the time being is assessed LOW.
Nevertheless, the announcement and uncertainties arising from the reactivation of the “Maximum Pressure Campaign” towards Iran by the US, could escalate tensions in the region and potentially lead to incidents impacting the maritime environment. The specific issue needs a close monitoring of the situation.
OVERALL ASSESSMENT
Over the following period, US President Donald Trump will pursue the next three US goals that will reshape geopolitically the region. First to end the war in Gaza, second to bring an end to Hamas and Hezbollah and third to complete the “Abraham Accords” which he considers to be his own vision and work. In this context, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Russia will be used as leverage in order to push the Arab Countries and Iran along with its proxies to settle with US objectives and goals for the region.
Syria has begun to reemerge as a sovereign state in the region but still the way ahead is full of uncertainty. There is still risk for Syria to become another “failed state” in the MENA region, following the footsteps of Libya and Iraq. In this case it is highly likely that Syria will break into three distinctive regions-states. One to the northern and western region under HTS and SNA backed by Turkey, a second in the eastern region under SDF and a third in the southwestern region under the Druze backed by Israel.
Turkey has finally achieved in its goal to pacify the PKK threat and to demolish Kurdish Independence aspirations within its borders. However, the next step of pacifying every other Kurdish organization and militia in its neighboring countries and especially in Syria, is rather challenging.
Over the last period the respective foothold of both Turkey and Israel over Syria has increased bringing ever closer these two countries in a possible standoff over supremacy in the region. In contrast Iran has made a failed last attempt to reassert its foothold in Syria.
Since Jan 19, 2025 and the pause of the Houthis’ disruptive campaign against merchant shipping in the Red Sea, the stalemate in maritime security and freedom of navigation for merchant shipping in the region has been gradually lifted. However, it is assessed that unless the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas successfully proceeds to the second phase there is a small chance for improved regional stability and an increase in maritime security and volume of maritime traffic.
It is assessed that over the next period, unless Israel recall its cut off of humanitarian aid and electricity from the Gaza Strip, the Houthis will highly likely attack Israeli vessels, which will likely include vessels that are traveling to and from Israel or affiliated with Israeli entities. Therefore, the risk of attacks against Israeli vessels is assessed to be MODERATE.
The pause in the disruption of the flow of merchant shipping through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea is already proving to be precarious and should not be deemed rigid and solid in the short or midterm. The negotiations on the second phase of the ceasefire agreement, when they commence, are expected to be difficult. Israel demands the complete demilitarization of Gaza and the elimination of Hamas while the Palestinian group insists it will remain in the enclave. In addition, the matter of upholding and implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement by all key players in the region smoothly and without any problems or incidents, is a huge challenge on its own.
It is assessed that the recent Houthi statements will deter global firms and ship-owners to re-enter in volume the Red Sea and the Suez Canal at all types of ships and cargos.
It is also assessed that the risk of entering Israeli ports is now MODERATE.
The matter of returning the flow of merchant shipping through the region to its previous volume which is linked with the progression of US efforts in maintaining the overall stability and security in the region will be determined over the next weeks.
Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944373465)cansupport your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and provide assistance in decision making by producingtailored made assessments upon request on ports in the region, on routes, on cargos and specific merchant vessels. You can refer to our previous Threat & Risk assessment analysis briefs for more information and background analysis on the events and situation in the region.
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