SEA GUARDIAN Threat & Risk Assessment 20 – 30 May 2025

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THREAT & RISK ASSESSMENT BRIEF UPDATE ​

​​ Brief Update No 25/12 Date: 30 May 2025

​​ STATEMENT

This document has been approved for distribution by Sea Guardian S.G Ltd / Operations Department. The provided Intel and Information derive from open sources, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) and United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), respective Web Pages and products retrofit the company’s Strategic / Operational and Security situational awareness processes for risks and threat assessment/impact to the Security of Maritime operations. All rights reserved, “no part of this Risk assessment may be reproduced in an form (electronical, mechanical, paper or other means) without written permission by Sea Guardian SG Ltd” which maintain the rights for personal data of this document writers. Under no Circumstances can Sea Guardian SG Ltd be held responsible for any loss or damage caused by a reader’s reliance on information obtained by this Assessment, especially on its firms, company’s management or individual decision-making.

Objectives

• The purpose of this brief is to provide periodically, in 15-day cycle, the maritime industry and Security Stakeholders or Shareholders with:
• Major maritime security incident summary and analysis in Geo-strategic frame for Operational Security and Security of shipping operations for the period 20-30 May 2025.
• Threat assessment updates concerning military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways.
• Overview of risk assessment and relevant information, in order to support operational planning and decision as well as the needs for assuredness (impact for insurance or Special security needs) after threats and risks Analysis (BCP/BIA).

RECENT KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• On May 20, Russia’s Khmeimim air base in Syria has reportedly come under attack. According to Russian media, Telegram channels, and pro-war bloggers, multiple unidentified militants attempted to breach the perimeter of the base but were repelled at its security checkpoints. The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported “security tension around the Russian air base of Khmeimim following an armed attack by a group believed to be an auxiliary group to the ministries of defence and interior. This refers to factions of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which was formerly designated as a jihadist group.

On May 20, the United Nation’s top court has sided with Equatorial Guinea in a row with Gabon over three islands in potentially oil-rich waters. The two Central African countries have been arguing over the isles – Conga, Mbanié and Cocoteros – since the early 1970s. The islands are virtually uninhabited but are in a maritime zone thought to contain significant oil deposits. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that Equatorial Guinea’s claim – based on a 1900 treaty dividing up French and Spanish colonial assets – should be honored.

• On May 21, it is stated that a number of countries have condemned the Israeli military’s actions after troops fired warning shots in the vicinity of a diplomatic delegation visiting the occupied West Bank. The Israeli military accused them of leaving an approved route and said shots were fired into the air “to distance them”. It said it “regrets the inconvenience caused”.
• On May 22, expert analysis and verified footage point to the use of “bunker buster” bombs in strikes on a hospital in Gaza Strip. Legal experts say the targeting of hospitals without warning may constitute a war crime. The Israeli army replied it was targeting a Hamas command and control centre beneath the European hospital complex, but did not provide any evidence of this, related to the bombardment of May 13.
• From May 22 to May 24, US and EU lifted the sanctions against Syria in an effort to reinforce the capacity of Syrian interim Government. On May 24, Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and other top officials in Istanbul as Western sanctions on Syria are lifted while earlier on May 20, the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio defending Trump decision in the Senate of Foreign Relations Committee to lift sanctions for Syria’s transitional authorities, warned that the country could be only weeks away from “potential collapse and a full-scale civil war of epic proportions”.

On May 23, it is stated that Israeli warplanes carried out a series of intense airstrikes on towns in southern Lebanon during evening hours, according to Lebanon’s official National News Agency (NNA). The agency reported that the Israeli aircraft launched three airstrikes on the towns of Al-Mahmoudiyah, Sajad, and the Mount Rehan Heights in the Jezzine region of Lebanon.

• On May 23 it was published that specifically, from piers II and III of the Piraeus Container Terminal, 1.337 million TEUs were handled between January and April 2025, compared to 1.272 million TEUs during the same period last year, recording an increase of 5.1%. The revival of traffic through the Suez Canal, following the ceasefire agreement in the Red Sea and the discounts on tolls offered by the Egyptian SCA Authority, creates positive prospects for the restoration of navigation through this strategic route and re-establish trust to the international shipping community.
• On May 23, US President Donald Trump has reportedly ordered US special envoy Steve Witkoff to break off talks with Iran and return to the US. Before meeting with the Iranian delegation, Witkoff met with Mossad chief David Barnea, who was accompanied to Rome by Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer. The fact that the American president ordered his negotiator to return back may mean some change in stance from the US but may also mean developments: The risk of a joint Israeli and US attack on Iran is not so likely, as President Trump tries to achieve a new treaty with Iran, avoiding a potential conflict.
• On May 23, in accordance with IBM/ICC it was reported that an incident of smuggling happened of an anchored ship in the south part of the Gulf of Guinea, near the Angola coasts. The area shows an escalation on criminal incidents against shipping from the first trimester of this year. The incidents in the first semester of the year are spread in all over the Gulf of Guinea

• On May 24, it stated that the Reclaim Campaign, a coalition of South Sudanese civil society organizations, has formally petitioned the International Criminal Court (ICC) to open a preliminary examination into alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of aggression committed by the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) in South Sudan.
• On May 27, Hamas has agreed to a ceasefire proposal put forth by the United States for Gaza, according to Al Jazeera’s sources, but an American official rejected the claim and said the deal being discussed was “unacceptable” and “disappointing”. Israeli officials also denied that the proposal was from the US, saying on Monday that no Israeli government could accept it, according to the Reuters news agency.
• On May 27, it is stated that the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi received a delegation of US businessmen participating in the Egyptian-US Economic Forum held in Cairo. Sisi affirmed that Egypt looked forward to establishing a US industrial zone in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, emphasizing that Egypt is ready to provide all the necessary facilities to US investors.

On May 27, the upsurge in Boko Haram attacks in northeast Nigeria has once again alarmed the region. Since the beginning of the year, the Islamist extremists have carried out numerous incursions into military bases, sabotaged roads, and targeted civilian communities. Despite the armed forces’ victory speeches, the situation remains difficult to contain, reviving fears of a return to the insecurity of past years.

On May 28, USA has warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to avoid any military action against Iran, as doing so could jeopardize ongoing negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear program. US President Donald Trump said he expressed this view during a recent phone call with the Israeli leader. President Trump said he did not consider it advisable to take aggressive action at this time, given that the two countries are close to a possible solution. He also noted that the situation could change at any time, underscoring the fragility of the current negotiation process.

• On May 28, it is stated that Lebanese army has largely disarmed Hezbollah in its southern strongholds-in part with the help of Israeli intelligence-as the country’s new government moves to enforce the cease-fire that halted an intense wave of fighting with Israel last year.
• On May 29, it is stated that talks between Syria and Israel have focused on the sides cutting back their military presence near the Golan Heights, a Syrian political source said. The source, who does not hold a government position, told The National that “no political issues have been discussed”. Syria is demanding that Israel withdraws its troops to the 1974 armistice line on the Golan Heights, the source said. Israel sent its forces across the line into Syrian territory after rebel forces toppled former president Bashar Al Assad last December.

Concerning the situation in Eritrea on May 29, the Tigray Interim Regional Administration announced that courts in Mekelle city will resume operations following what it described as a “mutual agreement” reached with judicial officials of the Government of Eritrea. Security issues “have been partially resolved through dialogue between the relevant authorities.” According to a statement issued by the Presidential Office on May 27, the consultations focused on “security problems affecting judicial bodies” and identified issues requiring both “short-term and long-term” solutions.

GEO-political / Geo-Strategic awareness profile: The Strategic pursuance for Russia remains steady, to expand its influence in parallel with the Moscow’s Meridien with the southern orientation (Syria, Yemen are in the 15 degrees sector) even if it seems that it has paused its perspectives due to the Ukrainian war, while the US and the coalition power seeks to expand and restore its influence around the Euro-Asia. Geo-politically the North Pole remains insufficient even if some Maritime companies sail through.

Geo-political / Geo-Economy profile: In the frame of Geo-economy the game is mainly between CHINA and US which has been set up from the dawn of 21^st Century, even if China has not developed so much its Strategic strength to play a global role in politics-military issues.

International Security / Strategic domain: All the security areas suffer from war, clashes and conflicts as well as reform of state’s elapsed governance which create an uncountable level of “uncertainty” for the strategic and economic normality.

MARITIME SECURITY INCIDENTS: 20 – 29 May 25¹

1 In accordance to JMIC and/or UKMTO sources

INCIDENT No	INCIDENT Type	INCIDENT TIME	INCIDENT DETAILS

THREAT ASSESSMENT UPDATE:

Military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways

Military Operations

Red Sea – Yemen

• The preemptive strikes carried out by US and UK forces against the Houthis in the past underscore the determination and will of Trump and his coalition to reaffirm the priority of freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal and the Red Sea.
• Houthi’s intention to continue launching attacks on Israel appears to have not changed. Although their intention to stop attacks on commercial shipping appears to be valid for the time being, there are new threats to ships approaching the coast and the wider area of ​​Houthi-controlled ports, which are related to harassment of shipping and electronic communications and navigation systems.
• Despite the Houthis’ statement to avoid attacks on shipping operations, it is estimated that the forces of the United Kingdom and the Israeli Air Force will continue to operate against them with the aim of completely destroying their military capabilities or forcing them to renounce their subordination to Iran and end their alleged support for Hamas in Gaza.
• Threat assessment due to actions of war is VERY LOW.

Gaza-Israel

• In the recent past, both Israel and Hamas have been reluctant to move forward with the second phase of the agreement. While Israel is seeking to extend its sovereignty over the first phase in order to secure the release of all hostages and the complete demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, Hamas is rejecting the idea of ​​disarmament and withdrawal from Gaza, using the hostages as leverage. Following the recent stalemate in negotiations on the second phase of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, the Israeli government has ordered the resumption of military operations against Hamas in Gaza.
• The extended first phase of the ceasefire agreement and the comprehensive ceasefire in Gaza have been completed. Any mediation efforts by important individuals figures who have close contact with Hamas, in general under the auspices of the US, have so far failed. On the contrary, the Israeli Security Council remains firm in its view that the war against Hamas must continue until it is ensured that all populations are free from its rule.
• Although the Houthis have already unsuccessfully attacked American warships throughout the entire sea route from the Red Sea to Israeli territory using ballistic missiles and drones, there have been no attacks or incidents against any merchant ship in port or near the coast. Nevertheless, the Houthis will almost certainly resume their offensive campaign mainly against Israel, with the risk of hitting any target near the coast as collateral damage.
• It is estimated that Israel will continue its efforts to expel Hamas from the West Bank by force, while it will begin to build infrastructure to receive future UN humanitarian aid to the domestic populations.
• Threat assessment due to actions of war is MEDIUM to HIGH.

Syria

• The current situation in Syria adds to the general military conflict in the Middle East as a factor that could ignite the Eastern Mediterranean region.
• Former Assad loyalists, Alawite militias, and Hezbollah forces still in Syria, led and supported by Iran, are believed to be causing the clashes aimed at hindering the Syrian Interim Government’s efforts to consolidate control of Syria. However, it is unclear how extensive the disbandment and integration of armed groups across Syria is. Integration remains stagnant, with the Syrian Defence Forces-SDF, which controls a third of Syrian territory, and part of the Druze militia, being the largest of these factions. The lifting of sanctions against Syria, successively by the US and the EU, as well as the subsequent direct meeting of interim president Ahmed al-Sharah last week with the president of Turkey, while it seems that the Syrian government have adopted simultaneous but separate agreements with the Druze militias in southern Syria and the SDF in northeastern Syria, indicates an effort and willingness to grant concessions to minority groups in order to succeed the full control of the situation urgently. The need for concession by the Syrian regime has been warned by the leader of US foreign affairs in the Senate earlier in the previous week, estimating the survival of the situation keenly contested. President Ahmed al-Sharah’s moves, however, indicate that the interim government’s priority is to integrate the SNA, in order to use it as leverage against the SDF.

• It is estimated that president al-Sharah having achieved an early support by Turkey so far, is oriented to his next priority to achieve an agreement with Israel over Golan heights, which has to pass through difficult and “shallow waters”.
• It is estimated that the risk of Syria becoming another “failed state” in the MENA region is reduced after the EU and US recognition of the regime. That fact creates reasonable certainty that in the near future Syrian ports will become safer for trade activities after the lifting of sanctions.
• It is assessed that Turkey will intensify its efforts to remove the Syrian Defence Forces (SDF) threat from its southern border, forcing it to completely disband and integrate into the new Syrian army. The attacks by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) against the SDF suggest that the interim government has limited control over the SNA. The interim government’s intent is to integrate SNA factions into the Ministry of Defense as a bloc. It is clear that the lifting of sanctions will not have an immediate positive economic impact, since both Turkey and the Syrian government seems to have as a priority the acquisition of full control over the country, in their own way than the prosperity of people live in.
• The Israeli Defense Forces continue to periodically to carry out attacks against Hamas and the Islamic Jihad group in Syria and in contrast to the new Syrian Interim Government, which is considered hostile to Israel due to its Islamic and jihadist background. Israel’s objective aims to secure and impose a security zone at the Golan heights. It is estimated that Israel’s further efforts to neutralize Syria as a potential threat are part of the general direction of eliminating any threat to date and creating the necessary “living space” around its borders.
• Threat assessment due to actions of war is MEDIUM.

Lebanon

• Overall, the ceasefire in Lebanon has held, although IDF forces have occasionally carried out small attacks on selected targets in South Lebanon. The IDF has withdrawn from South Lebanon, with the exception of five specific key outposts, and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have taken over the positions previously occupied by the IDF. Hezbollah’s military capabilities and assets in Lebanon remain low, and there are no signs of a resurgence. In addition, the Lebanese government’s intention to impose a state monopoly on arms and the establishment of a committee to disarm Palestinians in host communities in the country indicate a desire for a cessation of hostilities on its borders.
• Threat assessment due to actions of war is MEDIUM.

Sudan-Eritrea

• The violent power struggle in the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia risks sparking another civil war in Ethiopia, which could, in turn, quickly escalate into an economic, humanitarian and security crisis in the Eritrea-Ethiopia region, with repercussions across Africa and even Europe.
• After more than two years of violent conflict, Sudan’s civil war appears to have entered a critical phase, marked by intensified attacks and a hardening of stances by rival power structures. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are now fighting not only for territory but also for political legitimacy, as both sides escalate military operations across the country. Fighting has escalated in key strongholds, especially in Darfur and Kordofan areas, where the RSF is moving forward with plans to form a parallel government.
• External powers, such as Iran, the UAE, Russia and Turkey, have shown interest in exploiting the conflict in the region to consolidate their own influence around the Red Sea. Salafist-jihadist groups would also benefit from such crises, as they would create a wall of instability across Africa, stretching from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, while the external support that Ethiopia is seeking from Iran after signing a Memorandum of Understanding earlier this month is seen as a valuable support for the aforementioned campaign.
• Threat assessment due to actions of war is MEDIUM.
• This internal conflict in conjunction with the clash of epidemic cholera and the warnings from JIMC, proposes threats and risks for Merchant ships sailing near the cost or berthing in Sudan is for “attempts of piracy” / “Hijacking, smuggling, open fires” / “electronic – Cyber threats” leveling at, VERY LOW / VERY LOW / HIGH.

Terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways

• The re-emergence of terrorists group associated with ISIS and Al Qaeda in Syria since Nov 2024, has enhanced the terrorist threat level across the East Mediterranean Sea. Nevertheless, the risk of open conflict between these groups and the HTS has recently forced certain groups to lay down their arms and join with HTS.
• JMIC over the last weeks has received information from regional partners regarding pirate activity off the coast of Somalia and recommends merchant vessels to remain vigilant when transiting these waters and make necessary precautions according to Best Management Practices and industry guidelines, having armed guards onboard.
• Since the clash of wars and attacks have been formulated two main threats for the shipping community (the Defense/Military against Military with collateral threats to merchant vessels and the Maritime Operational Security threats due to a threat for the “Demolition of shipping track-routes” – Dstr-Destroy), these Geo-politic threats have a direct effect in the Global economy and especially for the Europe and the EU.

RISK ASSESSMENT

Gulf of Guinea

• The Gulf of Guinea, long considered the international center of piracy, was overrun in the first quarter of the year by the Singapore Strait. The Gulf of Guinea, which stretches from Senegal to Angola, has become a major center of piracy and maritime crime in recent years. This has significantly affected maritime trade and regional security. These include armed attacks on ships, prolonged hostage situations, and the theft of valuable cargoes such as crude oil and petroleum, with the most violent groups originating from Equatorial Guinea, Togo, and Nigeria.

• Attacks by Islamist militants in Nigeria have forced large numbers of people to flee the city of Marte. The political instability resulting from the re-election of President Tijan Thiam in Côte d’Ivoire is an immediate sign of the risk of worsening, generally in West Africa.

• The recent UN top court decision to be sided with Equatorial Guinea than Conga of them disputing about the isles – Conga, Mbanié and Cocoteros is concerned as an issue that could enhance the risks of illegal activities in the Gulf and a hot spot for piracy-bound places, as they are in practice unhabituated, so far.
• The risk of incidents of “attempts of piracy” / “Hijacking, smuggling, open fires” / “electronic – Cyber threats” is HIGH / VERY HIGH / “NCR”.
• East Mediterranean Sea
• Due to the conflicts in its coasts, threat assessment due to actions of war is MEDIUM to HIGH.
• The emerging insurgency in the coastal areas of Syria and terrorist groups in general could potentially pose a threat to the security of commercial shipping along the Syrian coast and ports. It is not yet clear whether the new Syrian government has achieved full control over Syrian ports but after the EU and US recognition of the regime creates a promising environment for security improvement.
• • Any approach to ports in Israel should be arranged after direct contact with the Israeli authorities, while the potential approach to ports in Lebanon carries an unspecified threat mainly arising from collateral effects of hostilities.
• • The recent situation in Libya following the clashes in the capital Tripoli and the entrenched factions in northern and western Libya, pose a threat to maritime security in the region and could potentially pose a threat to the security of commercial shipping along the coast and ports of Libya. The security situation is assessed as MEDIUM to HIGH.
• • Finally, commercial vessels involved in any way in the export of Russian oil against established sanctions are at risk of being targeted (these specific threats require a separate and specific analysis). Furthermore, an escalation of attacks on commercial shipping around Ukrainian ports and territorial waters is expected in the coming period, as the war in Ukraine is not yet over. It should be considered that the Caspian Pipeline Consortium – CPC in Novorossiysk also exports oil from Kazakhstan, which could easily be misinterpreted by adversaries as Russian oil exports and ships could be targeted by mistake.
• The risk of incidents of “attempts of piracy” / “Hijacking, smuggling, open fires” / “electronic – Cyber threats” is LOW / “NCR” / “NCR”, with the exception of Israeli ships and ports, where the risk is SIGNIFICANT.
• Israel – Hamasconflict
• Threat assessment due to actions of war is HIGH.
• It is estimated that in the coming period, Israel will intensify its military operations in an attempt to destroy Hamas’ military capabilities, in order to be able to enter into future negotiations on even more favorable terms, in order to achieve the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, it is expected that the countries mediating in indirect negotiations will seek as a priority to avoid escalating the humanitarian crisis.
  • It is no longer certain whether the US government fully supports Israel’s military operations to establish full control of the Gaza Strip. It is estimated that the US President’s “bold” proposed plan for the US to take control of the Gaza Strip with the aim of rebuilding and relocating Palestinians to other Arab countries, although it has been rejected by most Arab countries, is gradually advancing as the only solution to the geopolitical impasse in the Middle East. It is also estimated that the Trump administration will not have difficulty exerting the “required” pressure on Arab states, and especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, in order to advance US goals in the region.
• • Nevertheless, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the Israeli Army to resume and intensify military operations in the West Bank in order to appease the remaining Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
• Syria
• The opposing interests and policies of Iran and Turkey in Syria and elsewhere in the region could increase the cracks in Iran-Turkey relations. In the coming period, Turkey, following the policy of appeasement, will focus on its relations with the interim government in order to achieve its strategic goal of removing any possibility of the establishment of a state or a self-governing semi-autonomous region of Kurdish origin on its borders.
• Cooperation between Turkey, HTS and the Syrian Interim Government is constantly deepening their relationship and it is estimated that Turkey has already integrated Syria into its close allies, as it did with the GNA government of Western Libya.
• It is assessed that relations between Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are already at a high level, with the rest of the Arab states following at a lower level. Egypt views HTS as a potential threat due to its ties to Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood and has reluctantly invited Syria to return to the Arab League Council in an effort to remove Syria from Turkey’s stronghold.
• In the coming period, Saudi Arabia’s influence in Syria and the wider region is also expected to increase, acting as a secondary pillar for US goals and policies.
• It is unclear whether Russia has permanently lost its bases in Syria. It is estimated that for now, Russia will maintain a minimal number of forces in Syria, having moved many combat units back to Russia. However, the reported attack on a Russian air base associated with HTS foreshadows an upcoming increase in tension between Russia and the Syrian interim government.
• Over the past two months, the Syrian interim government has successfully established lines of communication and revived diplomatic relations with Turkey, most Arab states, the US and the EU, although the risk of a relapse into an unwinnable situation is compounded by many unclear factors.
• International community is already engaging and interacting with the Interim government in Syria and sanctions are gradually being lifted. Over the last two months, the interim Syrian Government has successfully established lines of communication and reinvigorated diplomatic relations with Turkey, most Arab states, the US and EU.
• In the coasts of Syria and Lebanon the risk of incidents of “attempts of piracy” / “Hijacking, smuggling, open fires” / “electronic – Cyber threats” is “NCR” / MEDIUM /”NCR” as there is no trusted information that the interim Government controls the coastline/harbors of Syria.
• Lebanon
• In Lebanon, over the coming period, is estimated that Hezbollah’s army will be gradually but steadily driven out by the Lebanese Army (LAF), which has filled positions previously held by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), in accordance with the agreement that followed the ceasefire period that ended on February 18. The agreement allowing the Israel Defense Forces to maintain control of 5 key outposts inside Lebanon will provide the future basis for Israel to come to terms with the new Lebanese leadership.
• Hezbollah needs time and support from Iran to rebuild and be reorganized. It is estimated that under the current conditions in the region, it is extremely unlikely in the near future that Hezbollah will regain its military capabilities, as well as undertake significant operations either against Israeli forces in Lebanon and Syria, or against Israeli territories.
• In the coasts of Syria and Lebanon the risk of incidents of “attempts of piracy” / “Hijacking, smuggling, open fires” / “electronic – Cyber threats” is “NCR” is “NCR” / MINOR /”NCR” due to the unstable conditions in the North and South.
• Suez Canal – Northern Red Sea
• Threat assessment due to actions of war is MEDIUM, especially for ships proceeding the Jordanian harbors from the south.
• The recent renewed Houthi attacks on Israel following the collapse of the ceasefire with Hamas have escalated the risk to ships anchored in the port of Eilat or transiting the Gulf of Aqaba with Eilat as the port of call.
• • The risk to commercial shipping transiting the Gulf of Aqaba, if the ships are headed to ports in Jordan, Egypt or Saudi Arabia and do not have ties to Israel, is assessed as MODERATE, as the Houthis have a non-aggression pact with the US and refrain from attacking ports of any Arab state in the region.
• • The de-escalating environment around the Arabic Peninsula it is assessed due to the ongoing US-IRAN talks. In addition, it is assessed that the Houthis have agreed to postpone any attacks against merchant vessels of western interest for the period of US-IRAN negotiations for the nuclear project of the later.
• • Nevertheless, the positive development of the situation has led to a small increase in the number of commercial ships passing through the Suez Canal in recent weeks, which was indicatively reflected in an increase of container arrivals at the port of Piraeus. It will take some time to fully restore confidence in safe passage through the Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden.
• • The opportunity of a transit fee reduction in the Suez Canal, along with the cessation of attacks against the Houthis and the postponement of attacks for “destruction” against commercial ships creates a positive environment for the international shipping. While the military activities in the Red Sea remain low, opportunities for pirate activities from the east coast of Africa could not be disregarded.
• • From the other hand electronic/communication/navigational harassment should be taken seriously as a navigational security threat by masters of merchant vessels.
• • Due to the safety of navigation, off the coasts of Syria and Lebanon, in the Suez Canal and the Northern Red Sea the risk of incidents of “attempts of piracy” / “Hijacking, smuggling, open fires” / “electronic – Cyber threats” currently assessed as VERY LOW / MEDIUM / “NCR”, except for Israeli vessels or of Israeli interests, for which it is SIGNIFICANT.
• Bab-el-Mandeb Straits – Southern Rea Sea
• Threat assessment due to actions of war is considered MEDIUM, as far as the Houthis maintain consensus for not attacking vessels so far.
• In view of the recent escalation between Israel and the Houthis, it is highly likely that ships of direct or indirect Israeli interest are priority targets and could be attacked at short notice.
• • The International Maritime Operations “US-UK PROSPERITY GUARDIAN” and “EU ASPIDES”, although the security situation has improved, will continue to patrol the area on high alert.
• • Recent information regarding the unrest in Sudan-Ethiopia and Eritrea is assessed as worrying and should prompt the shipping industry to strengthen its security posture when transiting or visiting ports along this coastline, especially when visiting Port Sudan, considering the new health risks and the rebels attacks (RSF).
• • Electronic harassment risks to ship navigation and electronic/communications/navigation security have re-emerged in the region, particularly for ships near the coastline or in ports dominated by the Houthi, combined with the approach of ships by vessels manned with armed crews, posing as government officials.
• It is estimated that the capabilities of Somali pirates continue to exist and will manifest themselves immediately when the region is assimilated into a lower intensity of military operations. So, the re-emergence of piracy cannot be excluded.

• Due to the unstable situations in Middle East and the Northern Red Sea (Sudan-Eritrean), the risk of incidents of “attempts of piracy” / “Hijacking, smuggling, open fires” / “electronic – Cyber threats” is MEDIUM, except for Israeli vessels for which it is SIGNIFICANT.

Gulf of Aden – Somalia

• Threat assessment due to war and defense nature of possible attacks is LOW as the Houthi is assessed that maintain its consensus for not attacking vessels so far.
• The eastern part of the Gulf of Aden is still assessed to be one of the most hazardous areas for international shipping, with no significant incident occurring during last period. This creates expectations for a better security situation while sailing in the international corridor.

• It is assessed that the naval units of the USN and the RN along with the warships of international maritime Operation “PROSPERITY GUARDIAN” and “EU ASPIDES” will continue patrolling the area in high readiness.

• Recent information from regional partners regarding piracy activity off the coast of Somalia is assessed to be alarming and should trigger the shipping industry to enhance its security posture.

• The eastern part of the Gulf of Aden is still assessed to be one of the most hazardous areas for international shipping, with no significant incident occurring during last period. This creates expectations for a better security situation while sailing in the international corridor.

• The risk of incidents of “attempts of piracy” / “Hijacking, smuggling, open fires” / “electronic – Cyber threats” is currently assessed as LOW / HIGH /” NCR” as there are 3 incidents in the time-frame of less war activities in the first trimester of this year.

Arabian Sea – Gulf of Oman

• In the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman the risk of incidents of “attempts of piracy” / “Hijacking, smuggling, open fires” / “electronic – Cyber threats” is currently assessed as, is VERY LOW / VERY LOW.

Hormuz Straits – Persian Gulf

• The ongoing negotiations between US-IRAN talks reduce significantly tensions and ambiguity for approaching vessels.

• In the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf the risk of incidents of “attempts of piracy” / “Hijacking, smuggling, open fires” / “electronic – Cyber threats” is LOW to MEDIUM “NCR”.

Malacca Straits

• Incidents in the first quarter of this year have increased, while it is known that pirate groups in the region have extensive experience in such actions, as well as that kidnappings and smuggling are more frequent than in other “hot spots”.
• Even if the Straits of Malacca Council has taken new initiatives, while inviting Japan for further actions against piracy and related activities, it is considered a given that merchant ships, by themselves, should pay more attention to safeguarding their interests and those of their companies, using their own capabilities or those provided by the private sector.
• It is also noteworthy that the incidents for 2025 occurred not within the straits but mainly during the entry and exit of the straits. The risk of incidents of “attempts of piracy” / “Hijacking, smuggling, open fires” / “electronic – Cyber threats” is HIGH ”NCR”.

Piracy – Boarding conditions, hijacking, smuggling, electronic harassment

• During this six-month period, under the cover of clashes and attacks is larking piracy as the hot areas are terrain of military operations, so there were no significant number of “boarding incidents”. In some cases of attempting approaches to ships with unclear estimation about the intention for boarding were indicated, combined with harassment of electronic/communication/navigation systems. Especially in the Persian Gulf / Strait of Hormuz and near Houthi-controlled ports in the Southern Red Sea.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

• During the first quarter of this year, there have been successive shifts in the geopolitical situation and security environment in the Middle East region at an unprecedented speed and pace, most of which have to do with US President Donald Trump’s “unorthodox way” in dealing with foreign policy issues and the overwhelming “pace of battle” compared to most heads of state worldwide. Already, the US President’s goals: first for ending the war in Gaza, secondly, ending the Houthis, Hamas and Hezbollah and thirdly, completing the “Abraham Accords”, seem to be on track, as a result of which Middle East is entering a phase of recession on all fronts, with the exception of the East Med region where the situation still seems to be on a tightrope, mainly due to Israel’s aspirations in the field.

• In the coming period, the US will undoubtedly intensify its efforts to end the Israel-Hamas-Palestinian Authority conflict over the Gaza Strip and will try to create a lasting solution that will bring peace, although any ceasefire proposals have not been adopted, so far, by Israel, while Hamas seems more willing for this. The possibility of a new US and IRAN agreement seems achievable as it is under the direct control of Donald Trump, who warns Israel for not taking any military action against IRAN.

• Syria has begun to re-emerge as a sovereign state in the region, currently prioritizing, from what it seems, a good relationship with Turkey and control of the Western regions, with access to the Mediterranean. Israel’s insistence on creating a security zone in southwestern Syria, taking advantage of the presence of the Druze population, creates some risks, but it is a priority in its pursuit of a more controlled geopolitical situation in the Middle East.

• Turkey has succeeded in finally achieving its goal of eliminating the PKK threat within its borders, and it welcomes its friendship with the Syrian interim government very warmly. In the recent period, the respective positions of both Turkey and Israel in Syria have increased, bringing these two countries even closer to a possible confrontation for dominance in the region. Iran is distancing itself from the possibility of any influence in Syria, but even if the actors are reduced, the confrontation of the remaining ones in the region is increasing. It is also estimated that the risk of entry into Israeli ports remains HIGH, while in the ports of Syria and Lebanon remains MODERATE.

• Although the Houthis have postponed attacks on shipping since January 2025, a new threat profile has emerged related to the harassment of communication/electronic/navigation aids. It should be seriously considered that the existence of military operations had reduced the occurrence of piracy raid incidents. However, it should not be concluded that the Somalis have lost their capabilities. This is also supported by the fact that during February / March 2025 three incidents of piracy and seizure of ships occurred in the Gulf of Aden / Northern coast of Somalia in a period when the Houthi attacks were suspended (see the following IMB / ICC and ACLED charts).

• Following the discount announced by Egypt for the Suez transit fees and the general recession, there are signs of improvement in shipping traffic through the Red Sea. It is estimated that the recent development of events has caused a slight increase in the re-entry of global companies and shipowners into the Red Sea and the Suez Canal in all types of ships and cargo. It is estimated that in the coming period, the Houthis will possibly attack ships of Israeli interest traveling to and from Israel or associated with Israeli entities, but the resurgence of piracy is the most likely scenario. The signs from reflecting the enhancement of Piraeus TEU’s delivery rate are also supported by the statistics of JIMC.

New uncertainties are emerging in the Gulf of Guinea and the Straits of Malacca in Indonesia. The Gulf of Guinea is already showing a greater escalation and over a wider area than last year, while incidents of alleged piracy in the Straits of Malacca are mainly concentrated at the exit of the Singapore Strait. These areas are already under close monitoring for the coming weeks, from this process.

Viewers can also see the previous report dated 22 May 2025 and connect both.

Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944373465) can
support your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and provide assistance in decision making by producing tailored made assessments upon request on ports in the region, on routes, on cargos and specific merchant vessels. You can refer to our previous Threat & Risk assessment analysis briefs for more information and background analysis on the events and situation in the region.