2John (Ioannis) Pavlopoulos, President Sea Guardian SG Ltd., Vice Admiral (ret.) H.N. , Honorary Commander in Chief of the Hellenic Fleet , Former Military Representative of Greece to the NATO and EU
THREAT & RISK ASSESSMENT BRIEF UPDATE
Brief Update No 25/03 Date: 30 – Jan – 2025
STATEMENT
This document has been approved for distribution by Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Operations Department. The provided Intel and information derive from open sources, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) and United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) respective WebPages and products.All rights reserved. No part of this Risk Assessment may be reproduced in any form: electronic, mechanical, or other means without written permission by Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd. Under no Circumstances can Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd be held responsible for any loss or damage caused by a reader’s reliance on information obtained by this Assessment.
Objectives
The purpose of this brief is to provide the Maritime Industry and the Security Stakeholders with:
Major maritime security incident summary and analysis for the time period 22 – 29 Jan 2025
Threat assessment updates concerning military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
Overview of risk assessment and relevant information, in order to support operational planningand decision making.
RECENT KEY DEVELOPMENTS
On Jan 22, the Syrian Interim Defense Minister, Marhaf Abu Qasra, warned that the Syrian interim government is “ready” to use force against the SDF if needed as part of the government effort to integrate the SDF into the new Syrian armed forces. Qasra told reporters that the interim government is continuing to negotiate with the SDF but “if we have to use force, we will be ready”.
On Jan 22 according to turkish sources, Turkey has made an agreement with imprisoned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan to disarm the PKK. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Nationalist Movement Party leader Devlet Bahçeli have recently held talks with Ocalan who is expected to call on the PKK to “lay down arms” on Feb 15. However, it remains unclear whether the PKK would heed these calls to disarm. The disarmament of the PKK would also likely not satisfy Turkey’s demand to “eliminate” the SDF.
On Jan 22, the President of the Suez Canal Authority, Admiral Ossama Rabiee, met with Arsenio Dominguez, Secretary General of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The meeting took place on the sidelines of the official visit of the IMO Secretary General to Egypt on the occasion of the opening of a regional representative office of the organization. At the beginning of the meeting, Admiral Ossama Rabiee stressed the readiness of the Suez Canal to operate at its full capacity to serve the navigation services of major shipping lines in light of preparations for the gradual return of global trade traffic to its normal course, through the Suez Canal with the return of stability in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab region.He pointed out that the Suez Canal continues to provide its shipping and maritime services normally and develop them optimally to meet customers’ requirements and keep pace with developments in the maritime transport industry. He also stressed that the Canal has now intensified its maximum efforts to complete the project of developing the southern sector, which contributes to increasing the maritime safety factor in emergency response, as well as increasing reception capacity by 6-8 additional ships.For his part, Mr. Arsenio Dominguez, welcomed the return of stability to the Red Sea region and the strait of Bab al-Mandab, which will lead to the gradual return of shipping through the Suez Canal normally. Dominguez added that the Suez Canal is an indispensable global corridor for international trade, and called on major shipping companies to reassess their itineraries in the coming period to facilitate their gradual return to the Suez Canal, as security conditions in the Red Sea region begin to stabilize.
On Jan 22 according to a press statement released by State Department spokeswoman Tammy Bruce, the new head of U.S. diplomacy, Marco Rubio, during a phone call with the Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan whose country he described as a key ally, stressed the “need for an inclusive transition in Syria” and to “ensure that the new administration prevents” the risk of the country “becoming a source of international terrorism”.
On Jan 22 IMO Secretary-General Mr. Arsenio Dominguez welcomed the release of the crew of the M/V GALAXY LEADER, after more than a year in captivity, stating that “I am grateful for all the Member States, regional entities, and international partners whose steadfast support and strategic engagement were pivotal in securing the crew’s freedom, and to ensuring their wellbeing. Today’s breakthrough is a testament to the power of collective diplomacy and dialogue, recognizing that innocent seafarers must not become collateral victims in wider geopolitical tensions. It is also a return to operations in the Red Sea as we have been accustomed to, and upholding of the freedom of navigation”.
On Jan 23, according to Axios news agency, Israel and Hamas appear to have agreed to allow Gazans to return from the southern to the northern Gaza Strip. A multinational consortium led by US and Egyptian contractors will oversee the movement of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip
through the Netzarim Corridor. This agreement may prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militias from moving large quantities of weapons and fighters to the northern Gaza Strip.
On Jan 23, the Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji announced that the Iraqi federal government is trying to bring all weapons under government control. The Iraqi government recently launched a media campaign to promote the restriction of weapons to the state.
On Jan 24, the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office announced that the IDF will refrain from withdrawing from southern Lebanon by Jan 26. The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement stipulates that the IDF would withdraw by then and that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would backfill. Axios news agency reported that Israel claims that the LAF failed to destroy Hezbollah weapons and military infrastructure south of the Litani River, which it is required to do according to the ceasefire agreement. On the other hand the Lebanese government stated that it considers the continued IDF presence a “violation” of the ceasefire agreement and called for the United States to intervene.
On Jan 24, the United Nations halted all travel into Houthi-controlled areas after the Houthis detained additional UN staff. The Houthis have already detained 16 UN personnel, along with individuals linked to the former US Embassy in Sanaa and various aid groups.
On Jan 25,the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent announced that the Houthi rebels released 153 people they had detained as part of the more than decade-long war in Yemen. Their release came the day after the UN said seven Houthi employees had been detained by the organization. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres “strongly” condemned these “arbitrary” and “unacceptable” arrests, demanding the “immediate and unconditional release” of all UN staff detained in Yemen.
On Jan 25 US President Donald Trump, during an interview, proposed that residents of the Gaza Strip be relocated to Egypt and Jordan as part of a peace plan that would also help tidy up the Palestinian enclave, where a ceasefire agreement is broadly holding up, as it enters its second week today. He compared the enclave to a “demolition site” and said he had spoken about the situation with King Abdullah II of Jordan and would discuss it with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on Jan 27. He also praised the Jordanian monarch for accepting Palestinian refugees and told him “I would like you to welcome others”. Asked if he was referring to long-term resettlement of the citizens of the Gaza Strip, Trump said “it could be one or the other” adding that this way Palestinians “will be able to live in peace, so for change.”
On Jan 25, U.S. President Trump as gesture of solid support to Israel, ordered agencies to release and send 1,800 2,000-pound Mk84 air bombs to Israel that the previous Biden administration delayed delivering, citing fears of their use in densely populated areas where the Israeli Air Force (IAF) routinely bombed. He also told the media while on board Air Force One: “They were in storage, we released them today and they will have them. They paid for them and have been waiting for them for a long time”. He had earlier written on the same subject on Truth Social: “many things ordered and paid for by Israel, but not sent by Biden, are now on their way!”.
On Jan 25 after the release by Hamas of four female Israeli soldiers as part of the second hostage release, Israel announced that it will prevent Palestinians from returning to the northern Gaza Strip because Hamas violated the ceasefire agreement. Israel accused Hamas of violating the ceasefire agreement by releasing female soldiers before female civilians. Israel announced that it will only fulfill its requirement to allow Palestinians to move to the northern part of the strip, once Hamas releases female civilian hostage Arbel Yehud, whom Israel expected to be released on Jan 25. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is holding Yehud in the Gaza Strip. A Hamas official said that Yehud is alive and will be released during the next hostage release on Feb 1. Israeli media reported that talks are underway to expedite Yehud’s release. In addition, a US National Security Council official told Axios news agency that the US is “continuing to push” for Yehud’s release “through negotiation channels.” On the same day Israel released 200 Palestinian prisoners, including 120 who were serving life sentences for killing Israelis into the West Bank, Egypt, and the Gaza Strip as part of the hostage-prisoner release.
On Jan 26, the US announced that Israel and Lebanon had extended the ceasefire in Lebanon for an additional 23 days. The ceasefire will now be in effect until Feb 18. Axiosreported that the Trump administration negotiated the extension with Israel and Lebanon over the past few days. The ceasefire will presumably require the IDF to withdraw from Lebanonby February 18. The LAF is also expected to backfill the IDF by this date.
On Jan 26, the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan met with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad to discuss Turkish and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) operations against the SDF in northern Syria. Fidan met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, President Abdul Latif al Rashid, and Foreign Affairs Minister Fuad Hussein. Fidan stated that Turkey, Iraq, and Syria must “combine all [their] resources” to “destroy” the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). During one of the meetings in Baghdad, the Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan asked his Iraqi counterpart, Fuad Hussein, for Baghdad to designate the Kurdish PKK as a terrorist organization. The Turkish foreign minister after his meeting with his Iraqi counterpart said that “the PKK terrorist organization violates Iraq’s sovereignty and poses a serious threat to its national security” and claimed that “the PKK targets Turkey, Iraq and Syria”. He also said that “for the future of our region and the prosperity of our peoples, we must wage a common fight against terrorism. We must combine all our means and eliminate both the Islamic State and the PKK. Our ultimate expectation of Iraq is to recognize as a terrorist organization the PKK, which has already outlawed it. In our talks today we addressed this issue”. In addition, the head of turkish diplomacy tried to mediate the restoration of the channels between Baghdad and Damascus.
On Jan 26, the French presidency announced that during a phone call between the two leaders, the President Emmanuel Macron asked Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to “withdraw his forces that are still present in Lebanon”.
On Jan 26, the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) head, Ibrahim Kalin, met with Syrian interim government officials in Damascus, likely to discuss issues of military coordination. Kalin met with HTS leader Ahmed al Shara, Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani, and Interim Intelligence Chief Anas Khattab.
On Jan 27, the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan stated that Ankara has told turkish-backed Syrian armed factions to integrate into the Syrian army. Fidan said there are over 80,000 members of factions “loyal” to Turkey in northern Syria and encouraged armed groups in southern Syria to do the same. Sources indicate that the integration of turkish-backed groups, including groups currently operating within the Syrian National Army (SNA), would enable Turkey to wield significant influence within Syria’s armed forces.
On Jan 27, according to Syrian sources the Southern Operations Room (SOR) has taken initial steps to assimilate into the interim Defense Ministry. SOR factions in Daraa Province, Syria will receive official identification cards and vehicle registration that identifies them as members of the “General Command of the Army and Armed Forces – Southern Operations”. However, it remains unclear how the interim government will structure the new “Southern Operations” under the General Command of the Army and Armed Forces.
On Jan 27, the European Union (EU) agreed to lift select sanctions on Syria for one year. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot announced that the EU would lift sanctions on the Syrian energy, financial, and transportation sectors and that the EU will implement the “roadmap” to lift sanctions as long as the interim Syrian government will sponsor an “inclusive political transition”. The EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said that EU foreign ministers agreed to suspend restrictions but noted that sanctions could be put back on if the HTS-led governments take the “wrong steps”.
On Jan 27, the IDF withdrew from the Netzarim Corridor to allow Gazans to return to the northern Gaza Strip via established routes after Hamas fulfilled outstanding obligations under the ceasefire agreement. Hamas agreed to release a female civilian hostage held by Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) after the IDF prevented Palestinians from returning to the northern Gaza Strip on Jan 25 and 26. The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office announced that Hamas would release the hostage and two additional Israeli hostages on January 30.
On Jan 27, Iraqi media reported that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Ansar Allah al Awfiya leader Ali al Fatlawi, stated that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will not disarm or dissolve themselves so long as US forces remain in Iraq. This came as an answer to Iraqi government media campaign to promote the restriction of weapons to the state.
On Jan 27, David Menser, an Israeli government spokesman announced that 8 of the Israeli hostages due to be released in the coming weeks in the first phase of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip are dead and that Hamas gave some further clues as to
who is dead and who is alive. This means that of the 26 hostages agreed to be returned to their country in the first phase of the deal, only 18 are still alive.
On Jan 27 according to sources, Turkish officials appear to believe that a planned call by imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm, would pressure the SDF into an agreement to disarm and integrate into the HTS-led interim government. However, the same sources indicate that the turkish theory that the disarmament of the PKK would cause the SDF to disarm and integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry, directly conflicts with how the SDF views its future in the Syrian government and northeastern Syria.
Between Jan 22 and 28, the Russian military continued to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. Commercially available satellite imagery collected by Planet Labs PBC from January 18 and 27, shows that the Russian military loaded equipment onto the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships at Tartus and that the Sparta II ship left the port while the Sparta remained.
On Jan 28 according to Kurdish sources, a Kurdish SDF Council delegation met with Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri in Suwayda Province, Syria. The officials discussed on how to create a “new Syria that is inclusive of all”. They also agreed that armed groups must hand over their weapons to the Syrian state “after the formation of a comprehensive transitional government” and after fighting has completely stopped across Syria. However, these sources also indicate that the SDF and Druze community’s vision of a “decentralized system” directly conflicts with HTS’s previous calls for a unified Syria under one central government and the rejection of federal entities.
On Jan 28 according to Russian news agencies, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and President Vladimir Putin’s special envoy for Syria, Alexander Lavrentyev, met in Damascus with Syrian leader Ahmad al-Sarah and Syrian Foreign Minister Assad al-Shibani for the first time since the fall of Bashar al-Assad, as Moscow seeks to keep its two military bases in Syria. After the meeting Bogdanov said he hoped “Russian interests will not be harmed” and explained that the status of Russian bases “is not changing” and that Russia is “ready to contribute to stabilizing the situation”. On the other hand, the new Syrian authorities stated that the discussions “focused on important issues, notably respect for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and underlined that restoration of relations must take into account the mistakes of the past, respect the will of the Syrian people and serve their interests”.
On Jan 28, Gazan civilians continued to return to the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF reported that “tens of thousands” of Gazans returned to the northern Gaza Strip after the IDF withdrew from the Netzarim Corridor on Jan 27.
On Jan 28 the Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, visited the newly established IDF position on Mount Hermon and stated that the Israeli army – which seized strategically important territory in southern Syria after the fall of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime – will remain atop Mount Hermon indefinitely. He stressed that Israel would not allow what he called “hostile forces” to settle in southern Syria. Israel’s military move inside Syrian territory has been criticized by some countries and the UN as a violation of international agreements, which has called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces.
On Jan 29, Hamas sources told AFP that the entry of aid into Gaza was slowing from Israel, warning that this could have consequences for the hostages’ release as provided for by the ceasefire agreement. Another source said Hamas had asked mediators Qatar and Egypt to intervene “to force
the occupying forces to abide by the agreement and avoid creating crises. Israeli authorities dismissed the accusations by Hamas officials as “fake news.”.
On Jan 29 the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with Hamas leader Mohammed Ismail Darwish in Ankara. The meeting was also attended by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin, as well as other Hamas officials. The Turkish president has repeatedly stated that Hamas is not a terrorist organization and blames the situation in the Gaza Strip on Israel saying that “I have repeatedly said that Hamas is not a terrorist organization and that it is a political party. I say it again. As a political party, it fights for the rights it will get”.
On Jan 29, the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, in his first public response to US President Donald Trump’s call in Cairo to take residents of the Gaza Strip, stated that he will not participate in the displacement of Palestinians, an “act of injustice”, that would threaten Egypt’s security.
On Jan 29, according to Syrian news agency Sana during a meeting between Jean-Pierre Lacroix, UN Blue Helmets chief and the Syrian Foreign and Defense Ministers Asaad al-Haibani and Murhaf Abu Qasra, the new Syrian leadership called for Israel’s withdrawal from Syrian territory it has occupied since the fall of Bashar al-Assad regime. The Syrian authorities “stressed that Syria is ready to cooperate fully with the UN” and that they are ready to deploy Syrian forces back to the Golan, provided that Israeli forces withdraw immediately.
On Jan 29, Israeli news agencies reported that according to information conveyed by the White House to Israel US President Donald Trump is planning thewithdrawal of approximately 2,000 American soldiers from Syria. The plan for the withdrawal wasdiscussed with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a phone call and is expected to be reviewed on February 4 during their meeting.
On Jan 29, state news agency SANA reported that Syria’s de facto leader Ahmed al-Sharah is temporarily assuming the country’s presidency “for the transition phase”. The new president will be tasked with forming a transitional legislative council that will operate during this transition period until the country’s new constitution is adopted, while also representing it on the international stage. The decision was taken at a meeting in Damascus on Jan 27 between the commanders of the armed groups that fought alongside Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to overthrow Bashar al-Assad. It was also decided that all armed organizations will be disbanded, dissolved and will merge into state institutions. The army is also being disbanded and will be reconstituted on a national basis. It also announced the dissolution of the Baath Party, which had ruled Syria for more than 60 years.
On Jan 29, the Israeli Prime Minister’s office announced that US President Donald Trump has invited Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to meet him at the White House. The meeting is
scheduled for Feb 4, the Prime Minister’s Office said, adding that Netanyahu is the first foreign leader to receive such an invitation during Trump’s second term.
On Jan 29, the small jihadist group Hurras al-Din, a Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, announced its dissolution online today, explaining that its dissolution was decided “in light of developments” in Syria. The group, which is on the U.S. list of “terrorist organizations,” said its dissolution was made “by decision of al-Qaeda’s general command”. Al Qaeda has not announced who took over its leadership following the death of its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in a U.S. strike in 2022. Hurras al-Din, which for the first time declares itself an “al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria”, was based in the mountainous zones of northwestern Syria, with territory considered a rebel stronghold. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, it “announced its dissolution in order not to get involved in an armed conflict with HTS”.
Military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
Military Operations
The volatile state in Syria since Nov 2024, is added to the general military conflict and unrest that takes place in the Middle East region, affecting also the East Mediterranean Sea. Though the HTS has become the predominant group, it is almost certain that conflicts between rival rebels’ factions will resume over the status in future Syria.
Conflicts in the northern part of Syria between rival groups backed by Turkey, Turkish lead rebels and Kurdish militias as well as in the eastern part between HTS and other armed groups, are still ongoing. Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) continueto attack SDF positions along key ground lines of communication.
Overall, the ceasefire in Lebanon is still maintained and has even been extended for an additional 23 days, which means that the ceasefire will now be in effect until Feb 18. IDF forces continue from time to time conduct minor strikes against selected targets within Southern Lebanon. It is expected that the IDF will withdraw from Lebanonby February 18 and that the LAF will backfill the IDF by this date.
After the implementation of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip on Jan 19, the IDF ceased their operations there and diverted their attention to operations in the West bank against Hamas cells within Jenin refugee camp. These operations have increased in intensity over the last few days.
Both Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthi movement which ceased military operations against Israel after the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip continue to uphold the cease fire and there have been no new attacks or incidents.
Since Jan 19 there have been no US, UK or IAF airstrikes against Yemen.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy is currently conducting the “Great Prophet 19” exercise in the Persian Gulf. The IRGC Navy launched “Ghaem” and “Almas” missiles, which it claims are AI-guided, from Mohajer-6 and Ababil-5 drones. The exercise includes “Navab” air defense missile launches, ballistic missile tests, and IRGC commandos conducting land and sea operations. The IRGC Navy during the exercise unveiled the “Kowsar-222” air defense missile while the IRCG Aerospace Force has deployed a super-heavy drone for the first time, the Shahed-149, also known as “Gaza”. This drone features a wingspan of 22 meters and a takeoff weight of 3,100 kilograms. According to Iran’s Press TV, the drone boasts a flight endurance of 35 hours and a flight speed of 350 kilometers per hour. Initially unveiled in May 2021, the Gaza drone has a payload capacity of at least 500 kilograms, enabling it to carry up to 13 bombs. It has a range of 1,000 kilometers and an operational radius of 4,000 kilometers.
On Jan 22 according to the Financial Times, two Iranian cargo vessels carrying a large amount of chemical precursor for solid missile propellant will travel from China to Iran over the next few weeks. The FT reported the Iranian-flagged ships, the Golbon and the Jairan, are expected to carry more than 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate, which is used to make ammonium perchlorate, the main ingredient for solid propellant for missiles. Sources indicate that the sodium perchlorate could produce 960 tons of ammonium perchlorate, enough to make 1,300 tons of propellant, which could fuel 260 mid-range Iranian missiles.
On Jan 27 according to Reuters the IRCG Central Headquarters Deputy Coordinator, Ali Shamdani, stated that Iran had purchased Su-35 fighter jets from Russia. Shamdani did not elaborate on how many Su-35 fighter jets or whether they had arrived in Iran.
On Jan 29 a Bayraktar Akinci drone which was equipped with MAM-L high precision laser guided rockets was shot down by Haftar forces 15 km west of the Al-Ajilat region in northwestern Libya. This drone is one of Turkey’s most advanced unmanned aerial vehicles and has recently been sold to the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) forces. Throughout the Libyan civil war, many Bayraktar TB2 drones have been downed. However, the Akinci’s destruction marks the first recorded instance of losing this type of wide-body drone in Libya. According to sources this marks a clear violation of the cease fire agreement currently in effect in Libya, which prohibits to parties and other countries to acquire sophisticated military equipment, which constitutes a clear violation of UNSC resolution 2769(2025) for the arms embargo in Libya.
Terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
The reemergence of terrorists group associated with ISIS and Al Qaeda in Syria since Nov 2024, has enhanced the terrorist threat level across East Mediterranean Sea. Nevertheless, the US, UK and French efforts in destroying potential terrorist targets and infrastructure in Syria have equally increased. In addition, the risk of open conflict between these groups and the HTS has recently forced certain groups to lay down their arms and join with HTS.
Weapons smuggling has almost certainly persisted throughout the US naval action in the Red Sea. The Houthis more often rely upon overland transport and small dhows that are difficult to intercept, however.
Between Jan 14-16 a national training focused on enhancing port facility security was completed in Aden, Yemen, as part of the EU-funded Regional Program for Maritime Security in the Red Sea Area (Red Sea Project). The training, led by the IMO, was aiming at ongoing threats to maritime security in the region, such as terrorism, piracy and transnational crime.
On Jan 18, during early hours the Greek own M/V SEACHARM (IMO Nr. 9773765) while transiting in the vicinity of Alexandretta port, Turkey, was struck by an unidentified object near the sea line. There was no explosion and the damage was minor with a round breach in one of the water ballast segments in the aft. The ship was deemed seaworthy and was recalled to the port of Piraeus. Hellenic Republic authorities are investigating the incident and are examining fragments of this object that were found within the ship’s compartment that was breached.
RISK ASSESSMENT
East Mediterranean Sea
The risk of attacks or incidents in the East Mediterranean Sea for the time being is assessed LOW with the exception of all Israeli ports and the Syrian Coastline. Any port call in Israel should be arranged after a direct contact with the Israeli authorities, while it is not clear whether there are still any Syrian authorities or if they fully represent the newly establish government. However, the recent incident in the Alexandretta area, which has not been determined yet if it was an accident during a failed test of a weapon or a USV-UUV, a terrorist attack, or a just a random collision at sea, is alarming and needs to be thoroughly investigated.
Terrorist groups and other uncharted armed groups in northern and western Syria pose a threat to the region’s security environment and could potentially be dangerous for merchant shipping security along the Syrian coastline and ports.
Turkey is attempting on one hand to pacify the Kurdish populations on its southern territory and along its southern borders and on the other hand to occupy more Syrian territory under the pretext of creating a safe zone. It is assessed that SNA with Turkish Armed Forces support will continue to assail SDF forces in the Kobani region and along the Tigris River and that these efforts could also be a precursor to a wider Turkish or Turkish-backed operation in Northern Syria, with the cooperation or support of the Syrian interim government. Ankara has repeatedly insisted that the U.S.-backed Kurdish militia has to be disbanded, arguing that it has no place in Syria’s future. Turkey considers the Kurdish PYD faction and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as an extension of the Kurdish PKK group, linking them both to terrorism. Turkey and HTS have coordinated their efforts to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into the HTS-led defense apparatus since the fall of the Assad regime, but with no effect till now. On the other hand, the SDF is trying to secure an agreement with the interim Syrian government which will include the SDF joining the Syrian Defense Ministry as a “military bloc” and establishing a “decentralized” administration in the SDF held territory. It assessed that in the near future it is highly unlikely that there will be any type of agreement allowing the maintaining of SDF forces “autonomy”.
Turkey, HTS and Interim Syrian Government cooperation is constantly deepening and it is assessed that Turkey will attempt to incorporate Syria into its close allies, as it did with the West Libya GNA government, in order to increase its footprint in the region and pursue its geopolitical goals. It is assessed that Turkey’s secondary objective is to be awarded with the reconstruction of Syria in order for 2,5 million Syrian refugees to be established in northern Syria, in order to displace the local Kurdish populations.
It is assessed that the efforts of Turkey to project itself as a “regional power” in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), as well as East Africa, either through political intervention or military presence will be intensified over the next period.
Though recent HTS-led interim government’s efforts in the southern and western parts of Syria to dissolve all former opposition forces and integrate them into the new Syrian Defense Ministry have begun bearing fruit. Conflicts in the northern part of Syria between rival groups backed by Turkey, Turkish lead rebels and Kurdish militias and especially the SDF and Druze community’s commitment to a vision of a “decentralized government system” indicate that it will highly likely be impossible to finally reach to a lasting agreement on how to govern the country over the following months. There is risk for Syria to become another “failed state” in the MENA region, following the footsteps of Libya and Iraq.
The new Syrian leadership of HTS is under the microscope of the international community and Syrians themselves who want to see whether it will show respect for human rights, the treatment of minorities in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country, and the future of the semi-autonomous Kurdish regions of northern Syria. During the last period, the interim Syrian Government has begun to successfully establish lines of communication and to reinvigorate diplomatic relations with Turkey, most Arab states, the US and EU. It is assessed that relations with Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are already at a high level, with the rest of the Arab states following at a lower level, while Egypt considers the HTS as a potential threat due to its ties with Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood. The international community is beginning to engage with the Interim government in Syria and already sanctions to the previous regime are gradually being lifted. However, the EU and most countries remain uncertain and intend to wait for this government to show their true intentions on how to build and run the future Syrian State and also on how they interact with other countries.
For the US establishing channels of communication with the new Syrian de facto government under HTS leader Ahmed al Shara, trying to determine whether they will keep their promises of unity and moderation, is assessed to be a priority. However, ISIS or other terrorist group reemerging through this turmoil is a daunting possibility that requires constant vigilance and even though, Trump has openly declared that he does not want the US to be fully involved with the forming of future Syria. It is assessed that the US President, even if he may withdraw any US forces that are currently in Syria, he will eventually be forced at the least to support and secure the SDF against SNA and Turkish aggression and to take action against any terrorist groups that might arise. It is highly likely that in the near future, the US military forces will establish a strong footprint on Cyprus island keeping a certain level of alert to intervene into the Middle East, if required.
It is assessed that the SDF’s fight against Turkey and its proxies will render it unable to support US policy objectives in Syria. The SDF cannot conduct offensive operations against ISIS and other terrorist groups while contending with the threat from Turkey and its allies in Syria.
It is assessed that Israel will certainly have a pivotal role both in mitigating Turkey’s ambitions, influence and overall foothold in the new Syria, on behalf of US and generally in promoting US objectives in the region.
Relations between Russia and the interim Syrian government have proved problematic and have not improved despite Russian efforts. After the recent events concerning the Syrian annulation of the treaty which granted Russia a long-term military presence in Tartus, the demand for the immediate withdrawal of Russian military assets and the recent meeting, it has become clear that Russia has lost its bases in Syria for good. Over the last few days Russia has been granted leave by the Syrian Interim government to extract by sea its remaining military assets. It is assessed that Russia will move its forces from Syria into an East Libya area (probably the Cyrenaica peninsula) controlled by General Haftar, in order to establish a new naval and air base to assure its presence in the Mediterranean Sea.
It is assessed that further Israeli efforts to neutralize Syria as a potential threat and to establish a safe zone during the next weeks could lead to a new escalation in tensions between Israel and Turkey over the future of Syria, since their interests are colliding. It is highly likely that the US will try to play a mediator role to improve the relations between Turkey and Israel, avoiding any further tensions.
In Lebanon over the next period, it is assessed that Hezbollah military will be gradually but steadily evicted by the Lebanese army, while the uphold of the ceasefire agreement which has been renewed till Feb 15 will provide the future base for Israel to come to terms with the new Lebanon leadership. Hezbollah requires time to rebuild and is unlikely to resume significant operations against Israeli forces in Lebanon over the next weeks. It is doubtful that Hezbollah will be able to reconstitute a significant portion of its military capabilities during the 60-day ceasefire period.
Hamas will likely use the first phase of the ceasefire in Gaza and the return of Gazians to Northern Gaza to reorganize and replenish its forces and move cells around the Gaza Strip without Israeli retaliation. It is assessed that Hamas can only achieve limited reorganization and will be unable to regenerate itself during this period or to seriously impede the IDF if the ceasefire collapses. Nevertheless, the return of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip will make it difficult for the IDF to conduct operations with the same intensity as it did before the ceasefire.
It is assessed that the Palestinian Authority (PA) will seek to lead post-war governance in the Gaza Strip, but this will almost certainly require a military confrontation with Hamas. IDF operations have destroyed Hamas as a military organization, but small Hamas cells will remain capable of resisting a PA takeover after the IDF leaves.
In the west bank it is assessed that IDF will focus its main efforts against Hamas cells and will increase operations both in volume and intensity within Jenin refugee camp.
It is assessed that in the future we could witness an escalation in tensions in Libya between Libyan parties, Turkey and Russia, which may lead to a new round of armed conflict that could threaten merchant shipping.
Suez Canal – Northern Red Sea
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Suez Canal and the Northern Red Sea for the time being is assessed LOW.
Cessation of kinetic retaliations between Yemen and Israel due to the ceasefire in Gaza has significantly decreased concern for collateral damage on merchant vessels in the vicinity of Eilat port and while transiting the Gulf of Aqaba.
The risk of attacks or incidents in Eilat port for non-Israeli vessels is assessed LOW provided that there will be no problems or incidents in implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, nor any
attacks against the Houthis in Yemen. In case of renewed hostilities between Israel and the Houthis due to deviations from the ceasefire agreements the risk of attacks or incidents against Merchant vessels will automatically revert to HIGH.
The risk for merchant shipping transiting the Gulf of Aqaba if they are heading for Jordanian, Egyptian or Saudi Arabian ports and with no Israeli, US or UK ties is assessed to be LOW, since the Houthis are avoiding to attack any Arab state port in the region.
Bab-el-Mandeb Straits – Southern Rea Sea
The southernmost part of the Rea Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait are still assessed to be the most hazardous areas for international shipping, with no significant incident occurring during last period.
After the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement the risk of attacks or incidents against non-Israeli ships is assessed LOW provided that there will be no problems or incidents in implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, nor any attacks against the Houthis in Yemen.
In case of renewed hostilities between Israel and the Houthis due to deviations from the ceasefire agreements, the risk of attacks or incidents against merchant vessels will automatically revert to HIGH.
Despite the recent de-escalation, it is assessed that the Houthis will continue to monitor vessels with multiple layers of indirect associations to Israel, US or UK in order to be targeted and attacked at a short notice, if the situation escalates again. Maritime industry stakeholders should take into account such associations when conducting threat and risk assessments.
It is assessed that the US and UK airstrike campaign against Yemen will be paused while the naval units of the USN and the RN along with the warships of international/EU maritime Operations “PROSPERITY GUARDIAN” and “ASPIDES”, will remain in the area in high readiness.
Gulf of Aden
The eastern part of the Gulf of Aden is still assessed to be the one of the most hazardous areas for international shipping, with no significant incident occurring during last period.
After the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement the risk of attacks or incidents against non-Israeli ships is assessed LOW, provided that there will be no problems or incidents in implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement nor any attacks against the Houthis in Yemen.
For the rest part of the Gulf of Aden the risk of attacks or incidents is assessed LOW.
It is assessed that the naval units of the USN and the RN along with the warships of international maritime Operation “PROSPERITY GUARDIAN” and “EU ASPIDES” will remain in the area in high readiness.
Arabian Sea – Gulf of Oman
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman for the time being is assessed LOW.
Hormuz Strait – Persian Gulf
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Hormuz Straits and the Persian Gulf for the time being is assessed LOW.
It is assessed that over the next period Iran will likely attempt to regenerate its ballistic missile production capabilities, which at this time are limited due to last Nov IDF airstrikes, and replenish its missile stock.
Overall Assessment
The change in US presidency with Donald Trump assuming duties, the recent escalation of efforts by the International Community against the Houthi threat in the form of US-UK-coalition decisive airstrikes and the adoption of another UNSC Resolution, the advantageous military situation that has emerged for Israel against Iran and it’s proxies, the total loss of the Iranian and Russian foothold in Syria and finally the ceasefire agreement between Israel and HAMAS at Gaza which will also includes the exchange of hostages and still stands, are the major factors which finally forced the Houthis to cease their disruptive campaign against merchant shipping in the Red Sea and therefore breaking the almost year and a half stalemate in maritime security and freedom of navigation for merchant shipping in the region.
However, this sudden pause in the disruption of the flow of merchant shipping through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea is quite precarious and should not be deemed rigid and solid in the mid or long term. It is
assessed that even minor deviations from the ceasefire agreement could lead to hostilities, which would subsequently prompt the Houthis to again direct threats and attacks against international shipping at a short notice. In addition, the matter of upholding and implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement by all key players in the region smoothly and without any problems or incidents, is a huge challenge on its own.
It is assessed that the recent Houthi statements won’t be enough to encourage global firms and ship-owners to reenter in volume the Red Sea at all types of ships and cargos and over the next days but still there will be an increase in the overall number of ships and especially container ships transiting through the Suez Canal.
The current situation around the seas of the Arabic Peninsula will continue the weeks to come to create risks for the shipping industry and will deter vessels other than container ships to cross the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.
The matter of returning the flow of merchant shipping through the region to its previous volume which is linked with the progression of efforts in maintaining the overall stability and security in the region, will be determined over the next months.
It is assessed that in the short term the Houthis will resume with their campaign against Israeli merchant shipping in the Red Sea through invoking their pretext of supporting the Palestinian struggle and forcing Israel to uphold the agreements.
It is also assessed that the risk of entering Israeli ports is now LOW since the Houthis pledged to stop attacking Israeli territory.
Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944373465) can support your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and provide assistance in decision making by producing tailored made assessments upon request on ports in the region, on routes, on cargos and specific merchant vessels.
You can refer to our Threat & Risk assessment analysis brief No 24/001//10 Sep 24 for more information and background analysis on the events and situation in the region.
