Piracy in Somali Basin by Diaplous Group

Threat Landscape 2024 & 2025

November 10, 2025
The purpose of this document is to deliver a structured, side-by-side comparison of piracy and armed robbery incidents in the Somali Basin across 2024–2025, aligning each case by position, incident type, development, and outcome, while adding comparable fields such as vessel profile, presence or absence of privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP), approach patterns, mothership usage, and the mitigation measures applied. It consolidates verified events from recognized maritime authorities and naval sources into a unified analytical table and cross-year timeline, enabling clear trend analysis. The narrative distills operational insights that support voyage security decision making, resource planning, and crew briefings, and it frames practical recommendations consistent with BMP MS 2025.

RISK OVERVIEW

Risk Overview Somali Basin activity across 2024–2025 shows an organized, offshore-capable threat, with seized dhows repurposed as motherships to sustain skiff operations far beyond coastal patrol envelopes. In 2024, long-range cases such as MV ABDULLAH’s hijack and ransom release and the MV BASILISK boarding underscored extended reach at ~380–600 nm off Somalia.

In 2025, early-year dhow seizures around Eyl enabled offshore staging, while the 02–06 November cluster, MV INTERTUNA TRES and MV SPAR APUS approaches, MT STOLT SAGALAND attempted boarding, and the 06 November MT HELLAS APHRODITE boarding ~560 nm SE of Eyl, demonstrated sustained deep-sea intent with small arms and, in some cases, RPGs. On 07 November 2025, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA reported the liberation of MT HELLAS APHRODITE and noted an additional attempted approach reported in the area, confirming an active operating picture.

Where privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) were embarked, skiff approaches were disrupted or defeated, where boardings occurred, disciplined citadel procedures preserved crew safety until naval response, patterns visible in the MT STOLT SAGALAND attempted boarding on 03 November and the MT HELLAS APHRODITE case respectively.

Threat drivers:

• Mothership enablement: Captured or coerced dhows provide fuel, provisions, and lift for multiple sorties, pushing risk far offshore and partially decoupling operations from coastal weather and patrol cycles. The suspected use of a hijacked dhow platform recurs in recent reporting.
• Opportunistic target selection: Lower freeboard, reduced speed, and predictable routing outside group traffic remain the principal attractors in merchant profiles observed in both years.
• Short escalation ladder: Contacts can progress rapidly from distant shadowing to close approach, warning fire, and ladder attempts, with a nearby mothership compressing decision time.
• Communications gaps: Late or unclear initial reports and delayed SSAS activation lengthen naval cueing timelines.

Key exposure factors:

• Low freeboard, speed deficits, and predictable tracks along known Somali Basin lanes.
• No PCASP on board and insufficient readiness for rapid citadel entry.
• Active motherships enabling multiple, near-simultaneous skiff approaches beyond 500 nm from shore.
• Night or low-visibility transits that degrade detection and identification of small craft.

Proven risk reductions:

• Security posture: Embark PCASP with clear rules of engagement, use early challenge, speed increases, and deliberate maneuvers to maximize CPA and keep skiffs in turbulent wake.
• Procedures and drills: Conduct pre-sail briefings and short-notice citadel drills, maintain a rehearsed internal comms plan to compress decision time under pressure.
• Reporting and coordination: Report immediately and unambiguously to UKMTO and MSCIO, maintain proactive updates, apply disciplined AIS and VHF practices to support domain awareness and faster naval cueing.
• Hardening and layout: Maintain barriers and control likely access points, secure ladders and bridge wings to buy critical minutes against boarding attempts.

30–60 day outlook:

• With mothership activity persisting and this week’s deep-sea events validated, open-ocean routes are expected to remain at elevated risk.
• Naval presence shortens dhow retention time and disrupts staging, but pirate groups continue to reconstitute small craft and exploit windows between patrol cycles.
• Near-term risk remains heightened, especially for vessels without PCASP, operating at lower speeds, or following predictable tracks. As seas moderate seasonally, skiff operating windows may widen along long-range axes.
• The most exposed profiles are low-freeboard tankers and bulkers on solitary passages 300–700 nm off Puntland without enhanced watchkeeping or rehearsed citadel timelines. The November 07 resolution of MT HELLAS APHRODITE alongside a reported additional approach reinforces that the threat picture is active and adaptive rather than episodic.

Operational implications and recommendations:

• Plan the transit as a mission, not a passage: Avoid predictability, build speed cushions for maneuver, schedule high-exposure legs for maximum daylight coverage where feasible.
• Raise the defensive baseline: Prefer PCASP on Somali Basin legs, sustain layered hardening, brief bridge teams on CPA-maximizing maneuvers and skiff-separation techniques.
• Compress the response timeline: Treat every approach as real until disproved, report to UKMTO and MSCIO immediately, trigger SSAS early on boarding cues, execute rapid, rehearsed citadel entry.
• Sustain readiness: Verify door discipline, internal comms, and a shared trigger lexicon between bridge and engine room, keep a concise “contact card” template ready for rapid transmission.

Taken together, these measures materially reduce the probability of a successful boarding and mitigate the consequences if attackers gain temporary access, aligning day-to-day practice with BMP MS 2025 and reinforcing crew safety across the high-risk open-ocean lanes.

Off Somalia 2024 – 2025 Incident Comparison

Off Somalia 2024 – 2025 Incidents Comparison

Common Grounds:

• All incidents fit a mothership-and-skiff playbook projected well offshore along established deep-water routes, with seized dhows in the Eyl–Garmaal–Durdura arc repurposed briefly as motherships and then abandoned under pressure.
• The pattern is two-track across the period: in 2024, long-range merchant hijacks and boardings re-established reach hundreds of nautical miles from shore, while in 2025 early-year dhow seizures enabled offshore staging and a November cluster confirmed deep-sea persistence, including one confirmed merchant boarding.
• Contact sequences are broadly consistent, from distant shadowing or loitering to closure at 15–25 kts by one or two skiffs, display of ladders or weapons, and rapid decision points on the bridge. Where PCASP were embarked, skiffs broke off early or were deterred by warning fire.
• Where boardings occurred, disciplined citadel entry preserved crew safety and stabilized the situation until naval cueing. Night and early-morning windows recur, exploiting reduced detection and reaction times. Comms discipline, early UKMTO and MSCIO reporting, and coherent bridge, engine room coordination repeatedly correlate with better outcomes.

Alternative perspectives to be considered:

• Some dhow seizures meet the legal and factual profile of armed robbery at sea rather than piracy, with short retention and theft of fuel, supplies, or skiffs. Fishing activity, gear rendezvous, or non-piracy loitering can mimic mothership signatures on low-AIS density days. In practice, skiff behavior, ladder carriage, approach speed, and persistent closure at range are stronger indicators than AIS identity alone.
• Reporting artifacts matter, since delayed or incomplete narratives can overstate or understate severity, while language gaps may misclassify approaches versus attempts. Monsoon suppression nearshore does not neutralize far-offshore risk once a mothership is established. Cross-year, 2024 merchant hijacks show that detention for ransom remains possible when opportunity and logistics align, whereas 2025 dhow cases indicate short retention cycles and logistic use. Naval presence reduces dhow retention time, yet gaps between patrol cycles still allow opportunistic sorties.

Comparative metrics 2024–2025:

• Hijacks of dhows or fishing vessels: 3, all in 2025 (AL NAJMA No.481, SAYTUUN-2, AL-HIDAYA).
• Merchant ship hijackings (completed): 2 in 2024 (MV RUEN release after multi-month detention, MV ABDULLAH ransom release after ~one month).
• Merchant boardings: 3 total, two in 2024 (LILA NORFOLK, BASILISK) and one in 2025 (HELLAS APHRODITE).
• Attempted boardings: 1 in 2025 (STOLT SAGALAND, attack repelled).
• Approaches or suspicious close contacts: 2 in 2025 (INTERTUNA TRES, SPAR APUS).
• Mothership involvement: Identified across multiple cases, including ISSAMOHAMADI-type links in November 2025

• Weapons reported: Small arms across several events, RPGs confirmed in the 06 Nov 2025 boarding.
• PCASP presence: Embarked on STOLT SAGALAND in 2025 with successful defense, absent on HELLAS APHRODITE, 2024 cases variably unreported with decisive naval intervention on LILA NORFOLK.
• Crew outcomes: All dhow crews released safe in 2025, merchant crews safe across the listed cases with one injury to the Master on BASILISK in 2024.
• Range bands from the Puntland coast: Merchant contacts commonly ~300–700 nm offshore in 2025, dhow seizures ~10–25 nm of Eyl, and 2024 merchant hijacks or boardings ~370–600 nm.
• Time-of-day pattern: Predominantly dawn and daylight closures offshore, night activity for dhow seizures inshore.
• Intervention timelines: Dhow retention typically under a week in 2025, merchant hijack detention ranged from weeks to a few months in 2024.

Diaplous Recommendations

Operational implications and recommendations 2024–2025:

• Voyage planning and routing: Treat Somali Basin crossings as mission profiles, not routine passages. Avoid predictable great-circle tracks where practicable, build speed cushions for maneuver, plan high-exposure legs for maximum daylight coverage, and use grouping effects when schedules allow, especially across the 300–700 nm band off Puntland.
• Watchkeeping and reporting: Maintain layered visual and radar watch with clear challenge cues. Report early and unambiguously to UKMTO and MSCIO, keep continuous updates during any approach. Manage AIS prudently in line with current guidance, maintain disciplined VHF use, and log all CPA-influencing maneuvers to support later analysis and naval cueing.
• Security posture and hardening: Prefer privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) on Somali Basin legs. Maintain barrier integrity at likely access points, control ladders, secure bridge wings, and prepare water-curtain or wake-disruption tactics. Stage emergency gear for rapid use without compromising citadel entry.
• Maneuver and engine-order doctrine: On skiff declaration, increase to maximum safe speed and execute early, deliberate course alterations that maximize CPA and place skiffs in turbulent wake. Avoid late, reactive zig-zags that waste sea room and reduce separation time.
• Citadel readiness and communications: Rehearse short-notice citadel drills, verify door discipline, internal comms, and SSAS triggers. Use a shared trigger lexicon between bridge and engine room to compress decision time. Keep a concise “contact card” ready with position, course, speed, skiff count, weapons sighted, and any mothership bearing.
• Intelligence and deconfliction: Track active mothership cues and dhow identifiers circulating in advisories. Treat any AIS-tagged dhow with ISSAMOHAMADI-type signatures as a potential mothership until disproved. Cross-check naval warnings before entering clustering boxes. Fold 2024 case lessons learned into briefings, since long-range merchant hijacks and boardings re-established offshore reach well before the 2025 cluster.

These measures align with BMP MS 2025 and with 2024–2025 incident dynamics, materially reducing both the probability of a successful boarding and the consequences if attackers gain temporary access.

Context note: Diaplous, in its 01 September 2022 White Paper “The Known Unknowns — Declassification of the Indian Ocean High Risk Area (HRA)“, cautioned that removing the HRA designation could be misinterpreted and lead to reduced vigilance and controls. The 2024–2025 operating picture, including multiple deep-sea approaches and a confirmed merchant boarding, tends to validate that assessment and underscores the need to maintain robust, layered security across the wider region.