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Objectives
The purpose of this brief is to provide the Maritime Industry and the Security Stakeholders with:
Major maritime security incident summary and analysis for the time period 12 – 17 Dec 2024
Threat assessment updates concerning military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
Overview of risk assessment and relevant information,in order to support operational planningand decision making.
RECENT KEY DEVELOPMENTS
On Dec 12 and 13, the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken discussed the situation in Syria with senior Turkish and Iraqi in Ankara. Mr Blinken met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan respectively, in an attempt to persuade Turkey not to move against the Kurdish-controlled, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria.
On Dec 12, the Houthis conducted two separate drone attacks targeting Ashkelon and the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area. According to the IDF one drone, which was likely launched from Yemen, was intercepted near Eilat, Israel.
On Dec 12, the fierce standoff between Somalia and Ethiopia appears to be ending as the two countries reached an agreement after talks hosted by Turkey. The dispute between the two neighboring countries relates to Somaliland, a region of Somalia that has declared independence for decades (without being internationally recognized).
On Dec 13, the Houthis claimed a separate, combined drone attack with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeting an unspecified “vital target” in southern Israel.
On Dec 13, Wall Street Journal reported that even the option of a military strike against nuclear facilities is now viewed as a serious possibility by some members of D. Trump’s transition team.
On Dec 13, Kremlin newswireTASS reported that Russia is evacuating elements of its forces in Syria while continuing negotiations with select Syrian groups about Russia’s longer-term military presence in the country. Sources indicate that Russia is currently negotiating with new Syrian “authorities” about maintaining Russia’s military presence at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus.
On Dec 13, the IDF continued to operate in the Israel-Syria disengagement zone and on the Israel-Syria border. The Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced that he ordered the IDF to prepare to stay on Syrian Mt. Hermon during the coming months.
On Dec 14, Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani, stated that Israel used Iran as a “pretext” to enter Syria but he added that HTS has no intention of entering into conflict with Israel.
On Dec 14, the IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi claimed that the IDF has no intention of interfering in Syrian domestic affairs or “ruling” Syria and that the IDF is only operating in Syria to ensure the safety of Israel.
On Dec 14, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke with U.S. President-elect Donald Trump about developments in Syria and the latest push to secure the release of Israeli and foreign hostages held by Hamas in Gaza. After the meeting Netanyahu stated that Israel has no interest in the conflict with Syria and that Israeli actions in Syria were aimed at “deterring potential threats from Syria and preventing terrorist elements from taking control near its borders”.
On Dec 14 and 15, the United States, UN, EU, Turkey, and various Arab states met in Jordan in order to discuss supporting the political process in Syria. The US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and the foreign ministers of Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia agreed on unspecified “joint principles” for recognizing a future Syrian government. Mr Blinken stressed that the transition process must be “Syrian-led” and stated that the US has already engaged in “direct talks” with HTS in order to promote a set of “governing principles” to HTS, ensuring that human rights are upheld and extremism will be rejected.
Between Dec 14 and 17, the HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani, in an effort to consolidate political and security power under HTS over the rest of armed groups in a post-Assad Syrian government, continued to integrate HTS allies into the interim Syrian Salvation Government and secured control over key civil and security services.
Between Dec 14-16, more than a hundred Israeli airstrikes targeted Syrian military facilities across Syria.
On Dec 15, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group arrived in the Middle East. CENTCOM stated that the strike group moved intoCENTCOM’s area of responsibility to ensure regional stability and security, but did not specify the exact location of the naval force.
On Dec 15, the Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said that Syria’s threats to Israel remain despite the moderate tone of the rebel leadership that ousted President Bashar al-Assad a week ago, and that his country’s military moves aim to deter security threats emanating from Syria.
On Dec 15, Israel’s government approved a plan to expand Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights it holds. Additionally Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that he will continue to be committed for their development and colonization.
On Dec 16, the HTS leader Ahmed al Shara (aka Abu Mohammad al Jolani) and the Syrian caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed al Bashir met with UN Special Envoy to Syria Geir Pedersen in Damascus, to discuss a Syrian political transition within the framework of UNSCR 2254. During the meeting it was noted that the two Syrians did not promise to implement key elements of the UNSCR 2254 and that they attempted to change the resolution’s guidance in order to better suite Syria’s “new reality.” HTS leader Ahmad Shara (Jolani) also noted that Syria is not ready for elections, and the interim government has so far failed to outline any process for generating a constitution.
On Dec 16, an Israeli military source told the Washington Post that Israel’s October 25 strike in Iran has significantly damaged Iran’s missile production capability, including its ability to export Iranian-made missiles to partners like Russia and the Houthis. It is believed that it caused Iran’s solid-fuel ballistic missile production to drop from two ballistic missiles a day to one missile per week.
On Dec 16, CENTCOM conducted in Syria airstrikes in previously regime-held areas in order to disrupt ISIS operations.
On Dec 16, a high ranked officer of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) controlling Deir ez Zor Province announced that Arab elements continue to defect from the SDF and “hundreds” of his fighters would join the HTS-led Military.
During Dec 16, Russia continued to negotiate with the interim Syrian government to maintain its military presence at the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus in Syria, but Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s recent appeals to HTS suggest that talks may have hit a snag. Russia continues to withdraw elements of its force grouping in Syria to the western coast amid reports that Moscow plans to fully withdraw within one month.
On Dec 16, the Houthi military spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Sarea claimed that the Houthis fired a Palestine 2 “hypersonic” ballistic missile targeting an Israeli military site in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area. According to the IDF, Israeli air defense systems intercepted a missile and a drone launched from Yemen before they entered Israeli airspace. Also Israeli naval units intercepted another drone over the Red Sea.
On Dec 16, HTS leader Ahmed al Shara announced that the HTS-led interim government will dissolve all former opposition forces and integrate them into the new Syrian Defense Ministry. This announcement, which Shara made after meeting with members of the Syrian Druze community and with leaders from several opposition groups under the SNA, is part of his effort to rebuild the Syrian Armed Forces. Syrian Interim Prime Minister Mohammad al Bashir has similarly described plans to cohere former opposition groups under the Defense Ministry.
On Dec 16, US and UK conducted an airstrike targeting a key Houthi command-and-control site in Sanaa, Yemen. Local Yemeni sources reported that the US-UK airstrike hit the al Arad complex, which hosts the Houthi-held Defense Ministry, and al Hafa base in Sanaa. US Central Command stated that the Houthis used the targeted site to coordinate attacks against US Navy and merchant vessels in the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
On Dec 16, according to AFP the Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that negotiations have “never been closer to an agreement” to free hostages held in the Gaza Strip, following the earlier release of hostages during the November 2023 ceasefire.
On Dec 16, U.S. President-elect Donald Trump said that Recep Tayyip Erdogan was behind the toppling of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and regime change in Syria, while noting that “Turkey holds the key to Syria’s future.”
On Dec 16, the IDF conducted several air strikes in the area around Tartus, Syria. Several key arm depots and ballistic and coastal missiles infrastructure was destroyed while a gigantic explosion was recorded.
During Dec 17, HTS leader Ahmed al Shara continued to portray HTS as a moderate force in his foreign engagements likely in order to cultivate foreign backing. Western media reported that Sharaa downplayed the possibility of imposing Islamic law on Syria and said that the government will “not deeply intrude on personal freedoms”. He also called on several governments to remove their terrorist designations for HTS, claiming that lifting the designations is necessary to rebuild Syria.
On Dec 17, the US-backed SDF and Turkish-backed SNA agreed to extend their temporary ceasefire in northeastern Syria “to the end of the week.”
On Dec 17, according the US Wall Street Journal, senior U.S. officials claimed that Turkey, the SNA and its allied militias are bolstering their forces along the border with Syria. There are specific indications that Turkey appears to be preparing to launch an offensive to capture SDF-held Syrian territory after the ceasefire expires.
On Dec 17, White House spokesman John Kirby said in an interview with Fox News that Israel and Hamas are getting closer and closer to reaching a ceasefire agreement in Gaza.
On Dec 17, according to Israeli media, there are indications that Israel and Saudi Arabia may attempt to normalize relations during the second phase of a ceasefire-hostage deal between Israel and Hamas. This report comes amid indications that Hamas has softened its maximalist position in talks with Israel.
Military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
Military Operations
The new front in northern Syria which opened on Nov 27, is added to the general military conflict and unrest that takes place in the middle east region, affecting also the East Mediterranean Sea. Though the Bashar al-Assad regime has fallen, it is highly almost certain that conflicts between rival rebels’ factions will resume over who will become the predominant force in future Syria.
Iran’s capacity to produce new ballistic missiles is unlikely to increase, given that it would take at least a year for Iran to acquire new solid fuel mixers from China to replace the Iranian mixers that Israel destroyed on October 25.
The recent airstrikes of IDF against Syrian targets seems to have a significant impact in the armament and arsenal left behind by the SAA. According to local sources, the main targets of the Israeli airstrikes were air defense and tactical missile systems of the Syrian army. The targets in Tartus included, among others, underground depots with missile batteries and ballistic missile launchers. According to experts, these infrastructures were used to assemble Iranian Fateh-110 missiles. In addition, the headquarters of the 107th Coastal Missile Defense Brigade in Tartus was hit. This base was completely destroyed and was by far the most important of the previous objectives. This Syrian brigade played a crucial role in Syria’s coastal defense, since it was armed with modern Russian K-300P Bastion systems. Bastion launchers launch powerful Russian missilesP-800 Oniks (Yakhont) with a range of 300 kilometers.
Terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
The reemergence of terrorists group associated with ISIS and Al Qaeda in Syria on Nov 27, has enhanced the terrorist threat level across East Mediterranean Sea.
RISK ASSESSMENT
The risk of attacks or incidents in the East Mediterranean Sea and Northern Red Sea for the time being is assessed LOW with the exception of all Israeli ports and the Syrian Coastline. Any port call should be arranged after a direct contact with the Israeli authorities, while it is not clear whether there are still any Syrian authorities or if they represent the newly establish government.
The Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the southernmost part of the Rea Sea and the eastern part of the Gulf of Aden are still assessed to be the most hazardous areas for international shipping, with no significant incident occurring during last period.
As targets of opportunity for the Houthis diminish due to the decrease of Marine Traffic through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, it is assessed that vessels with multiple layers of indirect associations to Israel, US or UK will be targeted ever more frequently. Maritime industry stakeholders should take into account such associations when conducting threat and risk assessments.
It is assessed that the US and UK airstrike campaign along with the naval USN and RN buildup in the area and the deployment of warships of international/EU maritime Operations “PROSPERITY GUARDIAN” and “ASPIDES”, have proved to be ineffective and have not mitigated enough the Houthi threat against merchant shipping, bringing the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits essentially under Houthi control, neutralizing the Suez Canal and imposing embargo to the port of Eilat (from south directions).
The fact that the Houthis are essentially in control of two out of eight major choke points for marine traffic worldwide (Suez Canal & Bab-el-Mandeb Straits), indicate that the international community so far has shown little effort to fully comprehend and counter their threat.
It is assessed that Iran’s and Russia’s support to the Houthis will decrease significantly due to recent setbacks in Syria and that the Houthi campaign of disrupting merchant shipping is now at risk, provided that the International Community will act more powerful and decisively the weeks to come.
Taking into consideration the recent intelligence on the results of Israel’s large-scale aerial attack on Iranian missile production sites on October 25, it is assessed that the decrease in Iranian ballistic missileproduction will make it difficult for Iran to conduct another large-scale missile attack targeting Israel and would presumably prevent Iran from supplying the Houthis with additional solid-fuel ballistic missiles.
The new rise of terrorist groups in northern Syria could potentially be dangerous for merchant shipping security along the Syrian coastline and ports and destabilizes the security environment in the region even further.
Conflict in the north of Syria between rival groups backed by Turkey, Turkish lead rebels and Kurdish militias, no matter the HTS-led interim government efforts to dissolve all former opposition forces and integrate them into the new Syrian Defense Ministry, indicates that it will highly likely be impossible to reach to an agreement on how to govern the country and that Syria will eventually become another “failed state” in the Middle East & North Africa region (MENA), following the footsteps of Libya and Iraq.
With the sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Iran’s foothold in the Middle East has been destroyed – first in Gaza, then in Lebanon, and now in Syria. It is assessed that, the “Axis of Resistance” in the Middle East, which consisted mainly of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah/Lebanon, Hamas and Houthi fighters and actively supported by Russia, has sustained a decisive blow and has now been broken.
Assad’s removal will have critical consequences for all of those allies. While Russia has lost its bridgehead in the Mediterranean Sea and access to Syrian ports and naval bases, Hezbollah and Iran have lost in Assad’s Syria a crucial pipeline for transporting weapons and materiel ashore towards Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis at Yemen. In addition, it is assessed that the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria will severely undermine any future Iranian efforts to rebuild Hezbollah and Hamas.
For the United States, ousting a leader backed by Moscow and Tehran is “a huge strategic move in the right direction,” as one official admitted. The United States has been seeking to replace Assad, through overt and covert means, since 2011. However, ISIS or other terrorist group reemerging through this turmoil is a daunting possibility that requires constant vigilance and even though Trump has openly declared that he does not want US to be involved with the forming of future Syria, he will eventually be forced to support the SDF against SNA and Turkish aggression and also to take action against any terrorist groups that might arise.
Turkey is undisputedly the regional player who benefited most. In the north of Syria, Turkey is attempting on one hand to definitively dismantle the Kurds on its southern border and on the other hand to occupy more Syrian territory under the pretext of a safe zone. It assessed that SNA with Turkish armed forces support will over the next days, assail SDF forces in the Kobani region. This development would confirm the goals of Turkey, which wishes to project itself as a “regional power” in the MENA region and East Africa, either through political intervention, or military.
Russia’s withdrawal from bases in northern Syria and its loss of influence in the country, will likely expose the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to continued Turkish attacks in northern Syria.Russia had previously opposed several prior Turkish attempts to capture SDF-controlled areas and prevented Turkish operations. The loss of Russia’s physical presence and influence in northern Syria means that the primary barrier against a Turkish or Turkish-backed operation to seize even more SDF-controlled areas – or a Turkish attempt to destroy the SDF outright – no longer exists.
It is assessed that Russia will attempt to move its forces from Syria into an East Libya area (probably the Cyrenaica peninsula) controlled by General Haftar, in order to establish a new naval and air base to assure its presence in the Mediterranean Sea.
It is assessed that the SDF’s fight against Turkey and its proxies will render it unable to support US policy objectives in Syria. The SDF cannot conduct offensive operations against ISIS and other terrorist groups while contending with the threat from Turkey and its allies in Syria.
Israel is assessed that has also greatly benefited by the fall of the allied to Iran Assad’s regime and that this will assist its efforts to mitigate the threat of Hezbollah in Lebanon, now that the main routes of supplies and support from Iran have been cut off. Nevertheless, over the next weeks we will almost certainly see a new escalation in tensions between Israel and Turkey over the future of Syria, since their interests are colliding.
US and IDF air strikes in former SAA arms depots and critical military assets is assessed to severely mitigate the risk of sophisticated and high tech ballistic and antiship missile equipment to fall to terrorist group’s hands.
It is assessed that the international community has not yet established a plan for how to engage with the transitional government in Syria and that most countries will wait for this mosaic of militias and armed groups to show their true intentions on how to build and run the future Syria.
The current situation around the seas of the Arabic Peninsula will continue the weeks to come to create risk for the shipping industry and will deter vessels to cross the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. However taking into consideration that the recent blows to Iran’s foothold in the Middle, first in Gaza, then in Lebanon, and now in Syria, Russia’s predicted loss of access to Syrian ports, airports and naval bases in the Mediterranean Sea and the advantageous military situation that has emerged for Israel, it is assessed that at the beginning of Feb 2025 the newly appointed Trump administration will spearhead an effort by the international community to finally counter the Houthis’ threat against merchant shipping. This will bring the last of Iran’s proxies to heel and will undoubtedly change the overall balances in the whole Middle East region, opening the way for the US and Israel to deal with Iran itself.
Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944373465) can support your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and provide assistance in decision making by producing tailored made assessments upon request on ports in the region, on routes, on cargos and specific merchant vessels.
You can refer to our Threat & Risk assessment analysis brief No 24/001//10 Sep 24 for more information and background analysis on the events and situation in the region.
