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Objectives
The purpose of this brief is to provide the Maritime Industry and the Security Stakeholders with:
Major maritime security incident summary and analysis for the time period 13 – 18 Mar 2025
Threat assessment updates concerning military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
Overview of risk assessment and relevant information, in order to support operational planningand decision making
RECENT KEY DEVELOPMENTS
On Mar 13, Hamas stated it had received a proposal from mediators to restart ceasefire negotiations in the Gaza Strip, adding that it had accepted it and that it had agreed to release Israeli-American hostage Idan Alexander and the bodies of four other US-Israeli hostages remaining in Gaza.
On Mar 13, one of the PKK leaders, Cemil Bayik, stated that, it is currently impossible for PKK to hold a congress to decide on its dissolution due to continuous attacks by Turkish Air Force jets and UAVs. However, he also stated that a conference could take place if the conditions are safe and appropriate. The PKK, whose command has retreated into the mountains of northern Iraq, had responded favorably on Mar 1 to a call by its historic leader, Abdullah Öcalan, who has been detained for 26 years, to dismantle the movement and end four decades of guerrilla warfare.
Between Mar 11 and 13,conflict erupted in northern Ethiopia’s Tigray region that risks sparking another civil war in Ethiopia, which could, in turn, expand quickly to include Eritrea. Renewed conflict in Tigray or between Ethiopia and Eritrea would generate an economic, humanitarian, and security crisis that would have reverberations across Africa and even into Europe. External powers, such as Iran and Russia, have demonstrated interest in exploiting conflict in the region to consolidate their own influence around the Red Sea.
On Mar 13, according to a Conflict Armament Research (CAR) investigation on the Houthi Military Capabilities, reported that the Houthis have sought to obtain hydrogen fuel cells from unspecified Chinese suppliers to increase the range and payloads of their drones. CAR also reported that the range of hydrogenpowered drones is at least three times longer than other drones and that the Houthis could use hydrogen-powered drones to expand their range of attacks against Israel, commercial shipping, and US interests in the region.
On Mar 13, the Interim Syrian President Ahmed al Shara signed a draft constitution that initiates a five-year transition period. However, some of the articles in the constitution are written in such way that provides Shara the ability to consolidate his power over the Syrian state.
On Mar 13, a senior Turkish delegation met with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al-Shara in Damascus likely to discuss the SDF-interim government ceasefire agreement. The delegation included Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yasar Guler and the Chief of Intelligence (MIT) Ibrahim Kalin.
On Mar 13, the US sanctioned the Iranian Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad as part of the US “maximum pressure” campaign. The US also sanctioned 17 shipping companies and 13 vessels for facilitating Iranian oil exports to China “worth billions of dollars.”
On Mar 14, Iran, China, and Russia issued a joint statement on effectively condemning the US “maximum pressure” strategy vis-a-vis Iran. The statement came after a meeting of the Iranian, Chinese, and Russian deputy foreign ministers in Beijing.
On Mar 14, the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), rejected the draft constitution adopted by the Syrian President Ahmed al-Shara. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) similarly stated that the constitution was similar to that of the Bashar al -Assad regime’s and noted that the focus on Arab identity is a “de-facto falsification of Syria’s national and societal identity”.
On Mar 14, the spiritual Druze leader, Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri, denied reaching any agreement with the interim Syrian government. Hijri labeled the interim government as an “extremist” regime and condemned Prominent Druze militias and Suwayda Province residents for cooperating with it. In addition, hardline islamist and jihadist factions also denounced the new constitution and argued that key clauses were “un-Islamic.”
On Mar 14, the Hamas spokesman, Hazem Qassem, told AFP that Hamas is participating in meetings with mediators in Doha to overcome differences over the second phase of the cease fire agreement and demanded that the Israeli armed forces withdraw from the southern part of the Gaza Strip, accusing Israel of being bent on circumventing the terms of the ceasefire agreement.
On Mar 14 according to the Associated Press (AP), the US and Israel have contacted officials from Sudan, Somalia and the breakaway Somaliland region to discuss the possibility of using their territory to resettle Palestinians from Gaza. Sudanese officials said they rejected the U.S. proposal while Somali and Somaliland officials said they were not aware of any contacts.
On Mar 15 on his Truth Social platform, the US President Donald Trump announced US strikes against Yemen’s Houthi targets, citing pro-Iranian rebel attacks on ships in the Red Sea and warned that unless attacks on merchant ships and U.S. warships stop, “hell will fall on you and you’ll never have seen anything like this before.” He also stated that Houthi attacks on US ships will not be tolerated and that the US will use overwhelming lethal force until it achieves its goals. At the same time, he called on Iran to “immediately cease” support for “Houthi terrorists” and threatened that it could face consequences. The US strikes come days afterthe Houthis announced plans to resume attacks on Israeli ships sailing in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Bab al-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden, ending a ceasefire that began in January 2025 along with a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.
Between Mar 15 and 17, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted a series of airstrikes targeting Houthi leaders and infrastructure in Yemen. The strikes were in response to the Houthi threats of recommencing their attack campaign on international shipping in support of Hamas. CENTCOM reportedly conducted around 50 strikes across 9 Yemeni provinces. These differ from previous US strikes under former President Joe Biden given that the recent strikes apart from military targets they directly targeted Houthi leadership. US National Security Adviser Michael Waltz stated that the strikes killed “multiple” Houthi leaders. The strikes killed senior Houthi leader Hassan Sharaf al Din and Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi’s bodyguard, according to Yemeni sources. The strikes which were extensive also targeted Houthi missile launchers, radars, air defense systems, and drone launch points.
On Mar 16, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander, Major General Hossein Salami, claimed on that Iran does not determine the “national or operational policies” of its proxies, in an effort to try to distance Iran from the Houthi attack campaign against international shipping in the aftermath of the US strikes. In addition, the head of Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards warned that Iran will respond to any attack, after US President’s Donald Trump warned Tehran to “immediately” cease any support for Yemen’s Houthi rebels.
On Mar 16, the Iranian armed forces released amplifying information on their latest precision guided ballistic missile called the “Etemad”, which has a range of 1,700 kilometers, referring to it as the “Israeli ballistic missile” that can reportedly hit key targets across Israel.
On Mar 16, the Houthi spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Sarea, stated that they will respond “to escalation with escalation.” During the same day he stated that Houthis conducted an attack with 4 missiles and 2 drones against the US aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman and its escort warships in the northern part of the Red Sea
On Mar 16, the Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell, provided amplifying information on the Houthi disruptive campaign noting that the Houthis “have attacked US warships 174 times and merchant ships 145 times since October 2023”.
On Mar 16 the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, stated that US military operations in Yemen would continue until the Houthis no longer had the ability to launch attacks on ships while the US is not discussing the possibility of ground operations at this time. He added that “in no way would the Houthis be able to strike at (international) shipping if Iran did not support them.”
On Mar 16 the US Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth, stated that the US will continue its “relentless” strikes in Yemen against the Houthis until the group ceases its military action targeting global shipping and US interests.
He also sent a warning to Tehran to stop supporting them.
On Mar 16, Russia’s Foreign Ministry Lavrov had a phone call with U.S. Foreign Minister Marco Rubio in which he underlined the need for an immediate cessation of the use of force by US against the Houthis in Yemen and the importance of all sides engaging in political dialogue in order to find a solution that will prevent further bloodshed.
On Mar 17, the Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz confirmed that an Israeli air strike had taken place in Damascus, stating that “Wherever a terrorist act is carried out against Israel, Islamist radical leader al-Jolani will see air force planes flying and hitting terrorist targets”, using the wartime name of Syria’s interim president Ahmad al-Shara. The IDF, for its part, stated that it carried out a strike “against a command center belonging to the Palestinian terrorist organization Islamic Jihad in Damascus”
On Mar 17, CENTCOM announced that airstrikes against Yemen’s Houthis continued overnight. The Houthi news agency Saba reported that one of the US strikes targeted “the Bajel area in Hodeidah governorate” and others targeted a steel plant in al-Salif district, in the same governorate.
On Mar 17, Turkey and the interim Syrian government begun reconstruction efforts on Menagh Airbase, Aleppo Province. Menagh Airbase is expected to host Turkish air defense systems and fighter jets when renovations are complete. The base will also serve as a hub for Turkish and Syrian joint military operations and exercises.
Mar 17, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted several airstrikes overnight in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli government spokesman David Menser, stated that these airstrikes were carried out “in full coordination” with Washington. In addition, the Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar, stated that Israel “has no choice but to continue military action” against Hamas to bring back hostages still held in the Gaza Strip. He also said that “Israel accepted proposals by US President Steve Whitkoff’s envoy to extend the ceasefire, but Hamas rejected them twice.
Mar 17, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted several airstrikes overnight in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli government spokesman David Menser, stated that these airstrikes were carried out “in full coordination” with Washington. In addition, the Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar, stated that Israel “has no choice but to continue military action” against Hamas to bring back hostages still held in the Gaza Strip. He also said that “Israel accepted proposals by US President Steve Whitkoff’s envoy to extend the ceasefire, but Hamas rejected them twice.
On Mar 17, the Houthis claimed that they had conducted a second attack with missiles and drones against the US aircraft carrier USS Harry S.Truman and its escort warships in the northern part of the Red Sea.
On Mar 18, in early morning hours the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted another series of airstrikes but at a greater volume against several sectors of the Gaza Strip which caused hundreds of civilian casualties and markedthe Israeli air force’s most extensive strikes since the fragile ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas took effect on Jan 19.
On Mar 18, Hamas announced that the head of Hamas’ government in the Gaza Strip, Essam al-Dalis, was killed in Israeli airstrikes along with four other leaders including the head of the interior ministry, General Mahmoud Abu Wafta. Meanwhile, the Palestinian enclave’s health ministry has announced a new death toll of at least 413 from Israel’s nightly bombardment of the Gaza Strip.
On Mar 18, the White House confirmed that there had been consultation between Israel’s government and that of US President Donald Trump before Israeli strikes against Hamas targets in the Gaza Strip. In addition, the spokesman for the U.S. presidency’s National Security Council, Brian Hughes, stated that “Hamas could have released the hostages to extend the ceasefire, but it chose denial and war”.
On Mar 18, several countries made strong statements condemning the Israeli attacks against Gaza including Egypt, Jordan, Iran and Turkey.
On Mar 18, the US President Donald Trump stated on Truth Social that Iran would be held responsible and face “devastating” consequences for any new attacks by Yemen’s Houthis. “Every shot fired by the Houthis will, from now on, be seen as a shot from Iran’s weapons and leadership, and Iran will be held responsible and will suffer the consequences, and these consequences will be devastating!”. The hundreds of attacks launched by the Houthis, vicious mobsters and thugs from Yemen, hated by the Yemeni people, all come from Iran and are orchestrated by Iran”. Tehran dictates every “act and behavior” of the Houthis, providing them with “weapons, money, highly sophisticated military equipment, and even intelligence” he added
On Mar 18, the Houthi rebels claimed “they had launched a new offensive, the third in a row, against the US aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman in the northern Red Sea with two cruise missiles and two drones” and also “targeted a US destroyer with a cruise missile and two drones”.
On Mar 18, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it had intercepted a ballistic missile fired from Yemen by the Houthis. This is the first missile launched from Yemen against Israel since the start of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip on Jan 19. It came hours after the Israeli army launched a barrage of strikes in the Gaza strip
On Mar 18, the Palestinian Authority called for international action to stop Israeli bombardment of the Gaza Strip, according to statements by the presidency and the office of the Palestinian Authority prime minister based in Ramallah.
On Mar 18, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that on Mar 17 night it struck “military targets” in southern Syria, including “command centers and military facilities”.
On Mar 18, according to Gazan and Saudi media, Abu Hamza the spokesman for the armed branch of the Islamic Jihad group, the notorious Al Quds Brigades, was killed during Israel’s bombing. Abu Hamza – who always made public the group’s statements under cover – was considered one of the most hard-line members of Islamic Jihad and reportedly played an active role in the Oct 7, 2023 attack.
On Mar 18, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) ordered Gaza’s population to evacuate from border areas after a night of heavy strikes. This evacuation order applies “specifically” to the areas of Beit Hanoun (north), Hirbet Huza’a, Abasan al-Kabira and Abasan al-Jadida (south), which are “zones of dangerous fighting”.
On Mar 18, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Defense Minister Katz ordered the IDF to take “vigorous action” against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. In his statement, Netanyahu cited that Hamas repeatedly refused to release the remaining hostages and rejected proposals made by the Israeli side in indirect negotiations.
Military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
Military Operations
Red Sea – Yemen
Following the recent Houthis threats to resume attacks on Israeli ships sailing in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Bab al-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden that would end the ceasefire which began in Jan 19 along with a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, the US President Donald Trump ordered the commence of extensive airstrikes against Houthi infrastructure, military assets and leadership in Yemen. These preemptive attacks were executed even before the Houthis had implemented their threats, which highlights Trumps determination and will to deal decisively with the threat targeting merchant shipping in the region and to reaffirm the freedom of navigation in the Suez canal and the Red Sea.
Apart from the volume and intensity of these airstrikes, the fact that the US targeted for the first time the Houthi leadership itself, marks a new approach to the overall military campaign against the Houthis. It is quite obvious that Trump intents to neutralize the Houthis once and for all not only as a threat to global shipping but also as a proxy of Iran the results of which could affect the US geopolitical goals in the region.
So as of Mar 15, the cease fire in the Red Sea and the surrounding areas has essentially ended. Those areas are once again perilous for merchant shipping with US forces in the region attempting to destroy the Houthi capability of conducting sea denial operations, but without any plans for ground assault yet. It is assessed that over the next weeks these operations will continue with the support of UK and IAF forces unless the Houthis military advanced capabilities are totally destroyed or they were forced to renounced their allegiance to Iran and end their pretext support on Hamas and Gaza.
Gaza-Israel
During the previous period both Israel and Hamas were reluctant in proceeding to the second phase of the agreement, with Israel seeking to extent the first phase in order to secure the release of all hostages and bodies and the complete demilitarization of the Gaza Strip. Hamas on its side, rejected the notion of disarming and leaving Gaza while using the hostages as leverage for the upcoming negotiations. Following the recent stall in negotiations on the second phase of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas and Israel’s failed attempts to force its terms prior to proceeding the next phase, the Israeli government ordered the recommence of military operations against Hamas in Gaza. This came in the form of numerous airstrikes and artillery barrage that targeted military objectives and Hamas leadership in Gaza. In addition, Gazans were given orders to evacuate certain areas in Gaza which also indicates that IDF ground forces are about to engage also over the next days.
The extended first phase of the ceasefire agreement and the overall ceasefire in Gaza, has ended. It is estimated that over the next weeks there will be no return to negotiations with Israel trying to destroy the military capabilities of Hamas and to force it to accept Israeli terms concerning the return of all remaining hostages and the demilitarization of Gaza.
It has been confirmed that prior to US strikes on Houthis in Yemen as well as Israel’s renewed attacks on Hamas in Gaza and the consequential ending of all ceasefire agreements, there had been consultation and deliberation between the Israeli government and that of US President Donald Trump. It is assessed that over the next weeks the combined US and Israeli military efforts to neutralize the last remaining proxies of Iran in the region and at the same time deter Iran from actively interfering, will be intensified.
The Houthis in retaliation have already unsuccessfully attacked US warships in the Red Sea and Israeli territory with the use of ballistic missiles and drones. There have been no attacks or incidents against any merchant vessel or port yet; nevertheless, the Houthi will almost certainly recommence their disruptive campaign over the next days.
The IDF are continuing their operations in the West Bank, against Hamas cells. These operations have increased in intensity over the last few weeks. It is assessed that Israel will push forward its efforts in dislodging Hamas from the West Bank by force.
Syria
The current status in Syria is added to the general military conflict and unrest that takes place in the Middle East region, affecting also the East Mediterranean Sea.
During the past week there has been a new outbreak of violence, the worst since Dec 2024, which threatened Syria’s stability in an already fragile transition period. The new escalation of violence and targeted purges in the west of Syria have once again instilled a climate of fear and unrest not only among religious and other minorities in the country, but also among moderate Muslims themselves, who in no way want a new civil war.
It is assessed that former Assad loyalists, Alawite militias and Hezbollah forces still in Syria, instructed and supported by Iran, provoked the clashes aimed at crippling the Syrian Interim Government’s efforts to establish control over Syria and to stir unrest upon minorities within Syria. These insurrection groups were finally defeated and dispersed after extensive military operations conducted by HTS forces and affiliated military groups friendly to the Syrian Interim government. However, the atrocities committed by these forces during the suppression operations against insurgents in western Syria, have indicated that the HTS has not abandoned its recent jihadist past and have raised legitimate questions about whether al-Sharaa and his transitional government are capable and willing to “disengage” the extreme terrorist so quickly and easily, and lead Syria to a more stable future. Still, it is assessed that following the conclusion of interim government clearing operations, insurgent cells still remain active in western Syria and will highly likely pose a threat to the Syrian interim government efforts.
The HTS has become the predominant group and fully controls the interim Syrian government and the new Syrian Armed Forces. Most of the Syrian armed factions have started or have agreed to dissolve and integrate into the new Syrian army and security apparatus. It is unclear how extensive the dissolve and integration of armed groups across Syria, yet the pace at which this integration occurs, has increased over the last days with the SDF which control one third of Syrian territory and part of the Druze militia being the largest of these factions. It is also unclear to what extent these groups will subordinate themselves to largely HTS-dominated command structures.
The agreement between Ahmed al-Sharaa and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) chief Mazloum Abdi, brokered by the United States, marks a turning point for Syria’s unity since the fall of the Assad regime in Dec 2024. The agreement is formally part of a broader effort by interim President al-Sharaa to integrate Kurdish structures into the central state which includes the integration of all SDF political and military institutions into Syrian state structures.
The Syrian government’s simultaneous but separate agreements with Druze militias in southern Syria and the SDF in northeastern Syria, indicate its willingness to grant concessions to minority groups under specific conditions. These agreements lay the foundation for future negotiations over how the SDF and Druze militias will integrate into the interim government and the degree of autonomy the SDF and Druze militias will retain in their respective territories. However already there are difficulties with certain parties within the Kurds and the Druze openly disapproving these agreements.
Conflict between the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish and Turkish-backed forces in northern Syria has reemerged after a small ceasefire between Mar 01 and 07. It is assessed that Turkey, after successfully pacifying the PKK threat within its borders, will increase its efforts to remove the SDF threat from its southern borders by forcing it to totally dissolve and integrate to the new Syrian military.
The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)attacks on the SDF, suggests that Syrian interim government has limited control over the SNA and indicates that either it has not yet integrated the SNA factions as individuals or it has allowed SNA factions to integrate into the Defense Ministry as blocs. The SNA units will therefore seem to remain loyal to their respective political leaders and Turkey and not necessarily follow the Syrian Defense Ministry chain of command.
The IDF have also begun conducting attacks against Hamas and theIslamic Jihad group in Syria in an effort to neutralize these threats even in Syrian territory and in defiance of the new Syrian Interim Government which is considered to be hostile towards Israel due to its Islamic and jihadist background. In addition, Israel continuous military operations in southern Syria in order to secure and enforce a buffer zone.
Lebanon
Overall, the ceasefire in Lebanon was maintained even though from time-to-time IDF forces had conducted minor strikes against selected targets within Southern Lebanon. The IDF has withdrawaled from Southern Lebanonwith the exception of 5 specific key outposts and the LAF has backfilled the IDF previous held positions. Hezbollah’s military capabilities and assets in Lebanon remain low and there is no indication of resurgence. In addition, the Lebanese government’s intention to enforce a state monopoly on arms will not only inhibit the rearming of Hezbollah but will gradually lead to the eviction of this organization from Lebanon.
Sudan-Eritrea
A violent power struggle in northern Ethiopia’s Tigray region risks sparking another civil war in Ethiopia, which could, in turn, expand quickly to include Eritrea. Renewed conflict in Tigray or between Ethiopia and Eritrea would generate an economic, humanitarian, and security crisis that would have reverberations across Africa and even into Europe.
The Sudanese Civil War between the two opponent factions consisting of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is added to the general military conflict and unrest that takes place in the East Africa region, affecting also the security of the Red Sea. Currently the RSF is trying to counter SAF advances toward western Sudan by attacking an SAF-controlled state capital on a major highway into Darfur.
External powers, such as Iran and Russia, have demonstrated interest in exploiting conflict in the region to consolidate their own influence around the Red Sea. Salafi-jihadi groups would benefit from such crises as well, given that it would produce a wall of instability across Africa, stretching from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa.
Terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
The reemergence of terrorists group associated with ISIS and Al Qaeda in Syria since Nov 2024, has enhanced the terrorist threat level across the East Mediterranean Sea. Nevertheless, the risk of open conflict between these groups and the HTS has recently forced certain groups to lay down their arms and join with HTS.
JMIC over the last weeks has received information from regional partners regarding pirate activity off the coast of Somalia and recommends merchant vessels to remain vigilant when transiting these waters and make necessary precautions according to Best Management Practices and industry guidelines, having armed guards onboard.
RISK ASSESSMENT
East Mediterranean Sea
The risk of attacks or incidents in the East Mediterranean Sea after last week’s events for the time being is assessed LOW with the exception of Israeli, US and UK ships and the Syrian Coastline where the risk is MODERATE and Israeli ports where the risk is HIGH.
Even though that the ceasefire with the Houthis has ended, apart from Israeli territory, they have not yet threatened to conduct attacks against shipping in the East Mediterranean. However, in case of further threats in which they declare that they will expand their area of operations, the risk of attacks or incidents against all merchant vessels in Southeastern part of the Mediterranean will automatically revert to MODERATE.
In addition, the end of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas has also increased the risk of attacks or incidents along the Israeli coastline and ports.
Any port call in Israel should be arranged after a direct contact with the Israeli authorities, while it is not clear whether there are still any Syrian authorities or if they fully represent the newly establish interim government.
Merchant vessels that participate in any way in Russian exports against established sanctions are in danger of being targeted and attacked with limpet mines or other sabotage devices. In addition, an escalation in attacks against merchant shipping around Ukrainian ports and territorial waters is expected over the following period. It is assessed that these threats and attacks will stop only after a ceasefire in Ukraine has been firmly established.
The emerging insurgency in coastal Syria and the terrorist groups and other uncharted armed groups in northern and western part of the country, pose a threat to the region’s security environment and could potentially be dangerous for merchant shipping security along the Syrian coastline and ports.
Established factions in northern and western Libya pose a threat to the region’s maritime security and could potentially be dangerous for merchant shipping security along the Libya coastline and ports.
Israel – Hamas conflict
The extended first phase of the ceasefire agreement and the overall ceasefire in Gaza ended on Mar 18. Israel attacked numerous military Hamas targets in Gaza after recent stall in negotiations on the second phase of the ceasefire agreement when Israeli attempts failed to force it’s terms on Hamas prior to proceeding the next phase.
It assessed that over the next period Israel will resume its military operations trying to destroy the military capabilities of Hamas in order to be able to enter future negotiations on even favorable terms. Eventually it is highly likely that Israeli efforts to secure the release of all hostages and bodies prior and to raise the issue of Hamas eviction in order to complete the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, prior to commencing negotiations on a new ceasefire agreement, will prevail. In addition, it is expected that the countries mediating indirect negotiations will again intervene in order to achieve a new ceasefire but they will be equally forced to adjust to the new reality.
It is certain that the US fully supported, if not prompted, Israel to end the ceasefire and to pursue its’ goals by the use of force in order to achieve better terms in future negotiations as part of the overall US plan.
In addition, theIsraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the full support of the US has ordered the IDF to resume and intensify military operations in the West Bank in order to pacify remaining Hamas and Islamic Jihad cells.
Taking all these into account, it is assessed that the US President’s “bold” proposed plan for US to take control of the Gaza Strip in order to be rebuilt and the relocation of Palestinians to other Arab countries, even though it has been rejected by most of the Arab countries, is gradually moving forward as the only solution to the geopolitical stalemate in the Middle East. It is also assessed that the Trump administration will find little difficulty in applying the “required” pressure to the Arab states and especially to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan in order to advance US goals in the region.
Syria
Recent HTS-led interim government’s efforts in the northern, southern and eastern parts of Syria to dissolve former opposition forces and integrate them into the new Syrian Defense Ministry have so far proved successful and have increased its political power. However, it is unclear what effect the rejection of the draft constitution that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara approved by Kurds and Druzes will have on ongoing efforts to integrate the SDF and the Druze militia into the interim Syrian government armed forces.
Nevertheless, the recent insurgent activity in western Syria and the ensuing conflict that led to severe casualties amongst civilian population between March 6 and 10, has been a significant blow to Syria’s interim President, Ahmed al-Sharah efforts to consolidate his power and derailed his effort to reunite Syria, lead the country to a more stable future and to reassure the international community over his jihadist-radical Islamic past.
It is assessed that the recent insurgent activity in western Syria was highly likely ignited by Iran which seeks to exacerbate sectarian tensions in Syria and to try to destabilize the Syrian interim government in order for Hezbollah to reemerge in Syria, to mitigate Turkey’s influence in the country and derail Turkish regional policy. Iran and Turkey’s opposing interests and policies in Syria and other parts of the region could increase fissures in the Iran-Turkey relationship.
The interim government will need to take concrete action, including charging, prosecuting, and sentencing perpetrators of sectarian violence, in order to demonstrate that the state is willing and able to protect minority communities. Insurgent cells that remain active in western Syria following the conclusion of interim government clearing operations, are threatening the efforts for a unified new Syria under HTS dominance.
There is still risk for Syria to become another “failed state” in the MENA region, following the footsteps of Libya and Iraq.
The international community is already engaging and interacting with the Interim government in Syria and sanctions are gradually being lifted. However, in view of recent event in western Syria, the EU and most countries remain uncertain and intend to wait for this government to show its true intentions on how to build and run the future Syrian State, and also on how it will interact with other countries. Over the last two months, the interim Syrian Government has successfully established lines of communication and reinvigorated diplomatic relations with Turkey, most Arab states, the US and EU. It is assessed that relations with Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are already at a high level, with the rest of the Arab states following at a lower level. Egypt considers HTS as a potential threat due to its ties with Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood and has reluctantly invited Syria back to the Arab League Council in an effort to remove Syria from Turkey’s foothold and align it with Arab Nations interests.
For the time being, although US participation in the formation of the new Syria is not a priority for Trump, it is assessed that the US President will not withdraw any US forces currently stationed in Syria in order to reassure SDF.
Over the next period Turkey having achieved to pacify the Kurdish populations within its borders and to bring an end to a 40-year conflict, will continue to pacify all surrounding Kurdish populations (which Turkey reviews as part of the PKK) in Syria, Iraq and Iran, in order to achieve its strategic objective of removing any possibility of establishing a state or a self governed semi-autonomous areas of Kurdish origin to its borders.
Over the last days Turkey and HTS coordinated efforts to coerce the SDF to disarm and be integrated into the HTS-led defense apparatus, have led to a historic agreement with of SDF leadership. The recent insurgency in coastal Syria likely influenced the terms that Shara was willing to compromise on and forced him to concede from his previously held position regarding terms of military and political integration, leading to a deal beneficial to SDF and not in line with Turkey’s original plans.
It is assessed that SNA and Turkish Armed Forces in Northern Syria will continue to assail the SDF forces in greater intensity and volume over the next period in an effort to achieve some territorial gains and to force them to fully dissolve and to be integrated into the HTS-led defense apparatus, contrary to the recent Syrian-SDF agreement.
Turkey, HTS and Interim Syrian Government cooperation is constantly deepening and it is assessed that Turkey has already incorporated Syria into its close allies, as it did with the West Libya GNA government. Turkish construction of Menagh Airbase in Aleppo district, may hamper negotiations between the Kurdish parties and the interim Syrian government as Turkey continues airstrikes on SDF positions in Syria.
It is assessed that the efforts of Turkey to project itself as a “regional power” in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), as well as East Africa either through political intervention or military presence, have proved rather successful and are expected to be intensified over the next period.
Israel will certainly have a pivotal role both in mitigating Turkey’s ambitions, influence and overall foothold in the new Syria on behalf of US, and generally in promoting US objectives in the region. At the same time Israel has recently assumed a hostile posture against the Syrian Interim Government.
It is assessed that further Israeli efforts to neutralize Syria as a potential threat, to defend the friendly Druze community and to establish a safe zone during the next weeks, could lead to a new escalation in tensions between Israel and Turkey over the future of Syria, since their interests are colliding. It is highly likely that the US will try to play a mediator role to improve the relations between Turkey and Israel, avoiding any further tensions.
Over the next period it is also expected that the influence of Saudi Arabia in Syria and the overall region will increase, acting as a secondary pillar for the US objectives and policies.
It is unclear if Russia has lost its bases in Syria for good. It is assessed that for the time being, Russia will maintain a minimum number of forces in Syria after having moved many fighting units back to Russia. However, it is expected that in the long-term Russia will try to establish a new naval and air base into the Mediterranean basin (either in East Libya, Tunisia or Algeria) as well as in Sudan, in order to assure its presence in those regions.
Lebanon
In Lebanon over the next period, it is assessed that Hezbollah military will be gradually but steadily evicted by the Lebanese army (LAF) which has backfilled IDF previous held positions, according to the agreement that followed the ceasefire period which ended on Feb 18. The agreement which permits IDF to maintain control of 5 key outposts within Lebanon will provide the future base for Israel to come to terms with the new Lebanon leadership. Hezbollah requires time and support from Iran to rebuild and reorganize. It is assessed that under current circumstances in the region it is highly unlikely in the near future for Hezbollah to regain its military capabilities, or to assume significant operations against Israeli forces in Lebanon and Syria, or against Israeli territory.
Suez Canal – Northern Red Sea
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Suez Canal and the Northern Red Sea for the time being is assessed MODERATE for non-Israeli vessels and HIGH for Israeli and US vessels.
The recently renewed Houthi attacks against USN warships and threats on forthcoming attacks against Israel and US-UK merchant shipping in the Red Sea have significantly increased risk for attacks, incidents or collateral damage on merchant vessels with the threat level being elevated to HIGH in the vicinity of Eilat port and while transiting the Gulf of Aqaba with Eilat being the port of call.
The risk for merchant shipping transiting the Gulf of Aqaba if vessels are heading for Jordanian, Egyptian or Saudi Arabian ports and with no Israeli, US or UK ties, is assessed to be MODERATE, since the Houthis are avoiding to attack any Arab state port in the region.
During last week, the International Community witnessed once more the sheer determination and absolute resolve of the US President Donald Trump in promoting and implementing his plans on the future of Gaza and the Freedom of Navigation in the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. Both these issues, in order to be solved require the removal from the equation of Hamas and the Houthis serving as Iran’s proxies.
The stall in negotiations on the second phase of the ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel and Hamas rejection of Israel’s additional terms prior to proceeding the next phase in conjunction with the recent Houthis threats of resuming attacks on merchant ships sailing in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Bab al-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden, forced Trump to spring into action in order to set in motion his overall plan for the new status quo in the region.
With his Mar 15 announcement, the US President clearly defined his priorities and objectives concerning the Houthis. First to ensure freedom of movement for all US naval and air assets in the region which promote and secure US interests and goals in the region. Secondly to restore the Freedom of Navigation for the international merchant shipping which over the past months inflicted a huge cost to the shipping industry and the overall global trade and commerce. Third to eliminate or at least neutralize one of Iran’s last proxies in the region that hampers US geopolitical goals.
In contrast to the previous attempts during the Biden administration, this time the US is fully committed in dealing with the Houthi threat and their disruptive campaign, intending to use all necessary means and force level to achieve its objectives. It is assessed that the new military tactic of targeting the Houthi leadership and command structure and apparatus, following Israel’s footsteps in dealing with Hezbollah and Hamas, will highly likely produce the similar results in a matter of weeks.
In addition, the US direct threats against Iran and the fact that it is openly declared to be responsible and accountable for any Houthi misconduct, will highly likely deter Iran from further supporting them with military equipment and training, targeting information and funding. Taking into consideration Iran’s current vulnerable state after the Israeli attack on Oct 2024 which disrupted Iran’s ability to produce solid-propellant ballistic missiles and neutralized its most advanced air defense assets, along with the loss of Hezbollah in Lebanon and especially in Syria and Hamas weakened state, it is almost certain that it will not be able to aid its proxies. Already the Iranian leadership has issued statements in which they are distancing themselves from the Houthis.
It is assessed that both the preemptive US attacks against the Houthis and the Israeli attacks against Hamas are fully aligned with the overall US plan of diminishing Iran’s foothold in the Middle East region in order to reshape the security environment in the Middle East.
The Houthi statements on forthcoming attacks against Israel and US-UK merchant shipping highlight the threat that they continue to pose to global commerce around strategic maritime routes.It is assessed that over the next period they will attack Israeli and US-UK vessels, which will likely include vessels that are traveling to and from Israel or affiliated with Israeli and US entities.
Even though there has been has been a small increase in the number of merchant vessels which transited through the Suez Canal during the last two months, it is assessed that in view of the recent events, there will be a dramatic decrease in the volume of ships transiting the region for as long as the Houthis continue their disruptive campaign.
Bab-el-Mandeb Straits – Southern Rea Sea
The southernmost part of the Rea Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait are still assessed to be the most hazardous areas for international shipping, with no significant incident or attack occurring during last period.
The recently renewed Houthi attacks against USN warships and threats on forthcoming attacks against Israel and US-UK merchant shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits, the risk of attacks or incidents against non-Israeli and non-US-UK ships is assessed MODERATE and against Israeli and US-UK ships have reverted to HIGH.
In view of the recent escalation, it is highly likely assessed that the Houthis will target vessels with multiple layers of indirect associations to Israel, US or UK in order to be attacked at a short notice. Maritime industry stakeholders should take into account such associations when conducting threat and risk assessments.
It is assessed that the US and UK airstrike campaign against the Houthis will resume and intensify over the following weeks, while the naval units of the USN and the RN along with the warships of international/EU maritime Operations “PROSPERITY GUARDIAN” and “ASPIDES”, will continue patrolling the area on high readiness.
Recent intelligence on turmoil in Sudan-Ethiopia and Eritrea is assessed to be alarming and should move the shipping industry to enhance its security posture while transiting or visiting ports along in this coastline.
Gulf of Aden
The eastern part of the Gulf of Aden is still assessed to be the one of the most hazardous areas for international shipping, with no significant incident occurring during last period.
The recently renewed Houthi attacks against USN warships and threats on forthcoming attacks against Israel and US-UK merchant shipping in the Gulf of Aden, the risk of attacks or incidents against non-Israeli-US-UK ships is assessed MODERATE and against Israeli-US-UK ships have reverted to HIGH.
For the rest part of the Gulf of Aden the risk of attacks or incidents against non-Israeli-US-UK ships is assessed LOW and against Israeli-US-UK ships have reverted to MODERATE.
It is assessed that the naval units of the USN and the RN along with the warships of international maritime Operation “PROSPERITY GUARDIAN” and “EU ASPIDES” will continue patrolling the area in high readiness.
Recent information from regional partners regarding piracy activity off the coast of Somalia is assessed to be alarming and should move the shipping industry to enhance its security posture.
Arabian Sea – Gulf of Oman
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman for the time being is assessed LOW.
Hormuz Straits – Persian Gulf
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Hormuz Straits and the Persian Gulf for the time being is assessed LOW.
Nevertheless, the announcement and uncertainties arising from the reactivation of the “Maximum Pressure Campaign” towards Iran by the US, could escalate tensions in the region and potentially lead to incidents impacting the maritime environment. The specific issue needs a close monitoring of the situation.
OVERALL ASSESSMENT
Over the last two months there have been constant shifts in the geopolitical situation and security environment in the Middle East region at an unpresented speed and rate most of which has to do with US President’s Donald Trump “unorthodox way” in dealings with foreign policy issues and overwhelming “battle rhythm” in comparison to most heads of states worldwide.
Already the US President has actively begun to implement the next three US goals that will reshape geopolitically the region. First to end the war in Gaza, second to bring an end to the Houthis, Hamas and Hezbollah and third to complete the “Abraham Accords” which he considers to be his own vision and work. In this context, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Russia will be used as leverage in order to push the Arab Countries and Iran along with its proxies to settle with US objectives and goals for the region.
For the first time since the beginning of the Red Sea Crisis on Oct 2023, the US has taken decisive action against the Houthis that could end the threat against the maritime security in the region and reestablish the Freedom of Navigation.
Over the next period the US will undoubtedly increase their efforts in putting an end to the Israeli-Hamas-Palestinian Authority conflict over the Gaza Strip and will try to establish a lasting solution that will bring peace and stability in the region, before turning its full attention to Iran and its remaining proxies.
Syria has begun to reemerge as a sovereign state in the region but still the way ahead is full of uncertainty. There is still risk for Syria to become another “failed state” in the MENA region, following the footsteps of Libya and Iraq. In this case it is highly likely that Syria will break into three distinctive regions-states. One to the northern and western region under HTS and SNA backed by Turkey, a second in the eastern region under SDF and a third in the southwestern region under the Druze backed by Israel.
Turkey has finally achieved in its goal to pacify the PKK threat and to demolish Kurdish Independence aspirations within its borders. However, the next step of pacifying every other Kurdish organization and militia in its neighboring countries and especially in Syria, is rather challenging.
Over the last period the respective foothold of both Turkey and Israel over Syria has increased bringing ever closer these two countries in a possible standoff over supremacy in the region. In contrast Iran has made a failed last attempt to reassert its foothold in Syria.
Within the last week, the stalemate in maritime security and freedom of navigation for merchant shipping in the Red Sea has reemerged cancelling previous notions of possible return to normality. Therefore, it is assessedthat for the following weeks there is no chance for improved regional stability and there will be a severe decrease in maritime security and volume of maritime traffic.
It is assessed that over the next period, the Houthis will highly likely attack Israeli and US-UK vessels, which will likely include vessels that are traveling to and from Israel or affiliated with Israeli entities. Therefore, the risk of attacks is assessed to have reverted to HIGH.
It is assessed that the recent course of events will deter global firms and ship-owners to re-enter in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal at all types of ships and cargos.
It is also assessed that the risk of entering Israeli ports is now HIGH.
The matter of returning the flow of merchant shipping through the region to its previous volume which is linked with the progression of US efforts in maintaining the overall stability and security in the region will be determined over the next weeks or months.
Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944373465) cansupport your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and provide assistance in decision making by producingtailored made assessments upon requeston ports in the region, on routes, on cargos and specific merchant vessels. You can refer to our previous Threat & Risk assessment analysis briefs for more information and background analysis on the events and situation in the region.
Viewers can also see here below last week’s report:
