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Home Marine InsuranceBribery and Corruption SEA GUARDIAN Threat & Risk Assessment 25 June to 10 July 2025

SEA GUARDIAN Threat & Risk Assessment 25 June to 10 July 2025

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John (Ioannis) Pavlopoulos, President Sea Guardian SG Ltd., Vice Admiral (ret.) H.N. , Honorary Commander in Chief of the Hellenic Fleet , Former Military Representative of Greece to the NATO and EU 

Brief Update No 25/15 Date: 10 July 2025

​​ STATEMENT

This document has been approved for distribution by Sea Guardian S.G Ltd / Operations Department. The provided Intel and Information derive from open sources, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) and United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), respective Web Pages and products retrofit the company’s Strategic / Operational and Security situational awareness processes for risks and threat assessment/impact to the Security of Maritime operations. All rights reserved, “no part of this Risk assessment may be reproduced in an form (electronical, mechanical, paper or other means) without written permission by Sea Guardian SG Ltd” which maintain the rights for personal data of this document writers. Under no Circumstances can Sea Guardian SG Ltd be held responsible for any loss or damage caused by a reader’s reliance on information obtained by this Assessment, especially on its firms, company’s management or individual decision-making.

Objectives

To provide in a 15-day cycle, the maritime industry and Security Stakeholders or Shareholders with:

  • Major maritime security incident summary and analysis in Geo-strategic frame for Operational Security and Security of shipping for the period 25 June – 10 July, 2025.
  • Threat assessment updates concerning military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways, ships fired and crew loses.
  • Overview of risk assessment and relevant information, in order to support operational planning and decision as well as the needs for assuredness (impact for insurance or Special security needs) after threats and risks Analysis.

SEA GUARDIAN, pursues innovative approach by analyzing the Maritime Security in accordance with international standards and a certain frame of Geo-policy. Security assessment deals not only with the risks but also with the threats, as well as­ international security gaps, in order to maintain our clients well informed.

Risk Management | Sea Guardian Ltd Security Consultancy | Sea Guardian Ltd

RECENT KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • On June 25, the World Bank announced on Wednesday that its Board of Executive Directors approved a $146 million grant from the International Development Association (IDA) to help restore reliable and affordable electricity supply in Syria and support the country’s broader economic recovery. The grant is part of the Syria Emergency Electricity Project, aiming to rehabilitate critical transmission lines and power substations damaged by conflict, while also providing technical assistance to strengthen the country’s electricity sector and institutional capacity.
  • On June 26, Iranian authorities have carried out a wave of arrests and multiple executions of persons suspected of links to Israeli intelligence agencies, in the wake of the recent war between the two countries. It comes after what officials describe as an unprecedented infiltration of Iranian security services by Israeli agents.
  • On June 27, at least one person has been killed and more than a dozen others were wounded in Israeli air attacks on southern Lebanon, the Lebanese health ministry announced, as the Israeli military struck sites linked to the armed group Hezbollah. In a report, Lebanon’s state-run National News Agency said that a woman and 13 other people were targeted in an air raid hitting a residential apartment building in Nabatieh, while seven others were wounded during the air raids on the outskirts of the city.


On June 27, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has revealed that authorities in eastern Libya spent approximately 60 billion Libyan dinars in 2024 without including this expenditure in the official financial statements. In a report published on the 26th, the IMF stated that the high level of spending, coupled with the shutdown of oil fields due to the conflict, shifted the country’s fiscal position from a projected surplus to a significant deficit. The report noted that the absence of a unified budget and the sharp increase in public spending, prompted the Central Bank of Libya to devalue the dinar by about 15% towards the US dollar.

  • On June 29, with the Iran-Israel war opening up a new road for the Mideast, Syria and Lebanon need to reach peace agreements with Israel, the U.S. special envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack, said. “President (Ahmed) al-Sharaa has indicated that he doesn’t hate Israel… and that he wants peace on that border. I think that the same will happen with Lebanon. It’s a necessity to have an agreement with Israel,” Barrack said, in an interview with Turkey’s state news agency Anadolu.
  • On June 30, United States President Donald Trump signed an executive order to dismantle a web of sanctions against Syria, a move that will likely unlock investments in the country more than six months after the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad. Trump’s decree on Monday offers sanction relief to “entities critical to Syria’s development, the operation of its government, and the rebuilding of the country’s social fabric”, the US Treasury said in a statement.


On July 01, Prime Minister of Lebanon Nawaf Salam met with a delegation from UNIFIL led by the Force Commander Major General Diodato Abagnara, to discuss the security situation in South Lebanon and the ongoing efforts to implement the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. The talks focused on strengthening cooperation between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army, particularly through increased coordination and joint operations aimed a stabilizing the volatile border region. Salam confirmed that Lebanon has formally requested the UN to renew UNIFIL’s mandate for an additional year, extending through August 31, 2026. The request aligns with the Lebanese government’s decision issued on May 14, 2025.

  • On July 01, it was stated that Eritrea is rebuilding its army and still destabilizing its neighbors, particularly Ethiopia, following a 2018 decision to lift an arms embargo, according to a report by an American rights monitor. The small country of around 3.5 million people in the Horn of Africa is sometimes nicknamed the “North Korea of Africa” after three decades of iron-fisted rule by President Isaias Afwerki.
  • On July 01, it was stated in Libya news media that an oil tanker sailing under the Marshall Islands flag was damaged by an explosion off the coast of Libya, according to the vessel’s operator. The VILAMOURA was enroute from Zueitina port to Gibraltar on June 27, when the blast occurred in the engine room, a spokesperson for TMS Tankers told Reuters. No injuries were reported, and there was no oil spill. The vessel has being towed towards Greece, and arrived July 2nd.
  • On July 02, it was stated that the Palestinian group Hamas says it is studying new proposals for a temporary ceasefire in Gaza, but insisted it is seeking an agreement that would bring an end to Israel’s war. Hamas said in a statement that it had received proposals from the mediators and is holding talks with them to “bridge gaps” in order to return to the negotiating table and try to reach a ceasefire agreement.
  • On July 02, Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a law suspending cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), amid growing tensions between Tehran and the UN nuclear watchdog, following Israeli and US attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities last month. “Masoud Pezeshkian promulgated the law suspending cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency,” Iranian state TV reported on Wednesday.
  • On July 03, an article in Geopolitical Monitor underlined Iran’s importance to the Russian Federation stemming from geography and ideology. The country forms a natural barrier against Western influence along Russia’s weak southern border, and the Islamic Republic has long stood as a counterweight to NATO expansion in the area. Iran has also been a window into the Middle East and Eurasia, allowing Russia goal to spread its power and influence across these vital regions. If the United States were to enact regime change in Iran and install a pro-Western government, Russia would not only lose a key ally in the region, but would also be strategically surrounded from the south, putting important Russian interests in the Caspian Sea, Central Asia, and the Caucasus at risk.
  • On July 03, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and allied troops have placed Sudan’s northern border region near Egypt on high alert, as the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) make significant advances after seizing control of the strategic border triangle with Libya and Egypt. The development signals a new phase in the regionalization of Sudan’s ongoing conflict. It has heightened tensions not only with Egypt (one of SAF’s key allies) but also with Libyan forces loyal to General Khalifa Haftar, who has been accused of supporting the RSF’s advance. Although the RSF has lost vast territories in the center of the country following SAF’s recapture of Khartoum, al-Jazira and Sennar states, this recent gain is considered crucial. Sources indicate that the RSF is now preparing to announce a parallel government in Western Sudan. The contested triangle area is also believed to be the site of unreported clashes between SAF and RSF over control of gold mines, critical supply routes and smuggling corridors that serve both logistics and trade.
  • On July 03, Ethiopia says it has completed buildinga mega-dam on the Blue Nile that has long been a source of tension with Egypt and Sudan. Launched in 2011 with a $4bn (£2.9bn) budget, the dam is Africa’s biggest hydro-electric plant, and a major source of pride for Ethiopians. Ethiopia sees the dam as vital to meeting its energy needs but Egypt and Sudan see it as threatening their water supply from the Nile.
  • On July 03, the United States imposed sanctions against a business network that smuggles Iranian oil disguised as Iraqi oil, as well as sanctions targeting a Hezbollah-controlled financial institution, the Treasury Department said. The network of companies run by Iraqi businessman Salim Ahmed Said has been buying and shipping billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian oil disguised as, or blended with, Iraqi oil since at least 2020, the department said in statement.
  • On July 04, Geopolitical Monitor has stated that since the start of 2024, France and Turkey, two NATO allies with a long history of both partnership and rivalry, have found themselves navigating a complex web of tensions and pragmatic cooperation. Their relationship, shaped by divergent interests in Libya, disputes over visas, evolving trade dynamics, and recurring religious controversies, remains a barometer for broader European and Mediterranean geopolitics. Drawing on recent investigations and analysis from leading Western outlets, this article unpacks the drivers of ongoing friction and the cautious steps toward dialogue having emerged over the past 18 months
  • On July 04, it was published that Syria was willing to cooperate with the United States to reimplement the 1974 disengagement agreement with Israel, which created a UN-patrolled buffer zone separating the two countries’ forces. In a statement following a phone call with his US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Asaad Al-Shaibani expressed Syria’s “aspiration to cooperate with the United States to return to the 1974 disengagement agreement.”
  • On July 04, it was stated that Sudanese and South Sudanese crude oil exports now account for around 14% of all Red Sea shipments. The cargoes of Dar and Nile blends produced largely in South Sudan and moved via pipelines to port facilities in Sudan, are expected to be a boon for aframax and suezmax tankers on regional trades, Signal Ocean said.
  • On July 04, it was stated that in Togo a 17-year-old, held for five days at different police stations, with only a sachet of water to drink per day. A man, attacked by a group of soldiers to the point where he lost consciousness. Men and women, abducted by unidentified attackers. These are some of the alleged mistreatments that protesters in Togo have experienced at the hands of security forces according to testimonies collected by Amnesty International. The organization has called on Togo to end the “excessive and unnecessary” use of force against protesters, Amnesty said on Thursday.
  • On July 04, a team of inspectors from the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog have left Iran, following Tehran’s decision to suspend cooperation with the organization after the 12-day conflict with Israel and the United States. In a statement posted on X that day, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said its employees would return to its headquarters in Vienna, Austria.
  • On July 05, it was published that Israel has carried out four drone attacks on towns in southern Lebanon, resulting in a death and several injured, in the latest wave of near-daily Israeli violations of the November ceasefire between Israel and the Lebanese group Hezbollah. An “Israeli enemy drone attack on a vehicle” in the Saf al-Hawa area in the city of Bint Jbeil “killed one person and wounded two others”, Lebanon’s Ministry of Public Health said in a statement.


On July 06, the Greek-owned commercial vessel MAGIC SEAS has come under attack in the Red Sea after small boats fired rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons towards the ship. According to UKMTO the incident took place 51 nautical miles southwest of the Yemeni port of Hodeidah.


On July 06, a senior officer in Hamas’s security forces has told the BBC that the Palestinian armed group has lost about 80% of its control over the Gaza Strip and that armed clans are filling the void. The Lieutenant Colonel said Hamas’s command and control system has collapsed due to months of Israeli strikes that have devastated the group’s political, military and security leadership.

  • On July 07, United States President Donald Trump has unveiled steep tariffs on more than a dozen countries as he ratchets up his pressure campaign aimed at winning concessions on trade. Trump’s latest trade threats put 14 countries including key US allies Japan and South Korea, on notice that they will face tariffs of 25 to 40 percent from August 1, unless they take more US exports and boost manufacturing in the US.
  • On July 07, at least eleven people have been killed during anti-government protests in Kenya and 567 arrested, police said. Police opened fire on demonstrators, and earlier Dr Aron Sikuku, a medic at Eagle Nursing Home on the outskirts of Nairobi, told the BBC the bodies of two people who died of gunshot wounds had been brought to the facility. He said hundreds of protesters had gathered outside his hospital demanding to take away the bodies. The demonstrations mark the 35th anniversary of the historic Saba Saba – meaning “seven-seven” – protests of 7 July 1990, which launched Kenya’s push for multi-party democracy.
  • On July 08, a senior United States envoy has praised the Lebanese government’s response to a US proposal aimed at disarming Hezbollah amid Israel’s continued military presence in the country. Thomas Barrack, an adviser to US President Donald Trump who serves as Washington’s ambassador to Turkiye and special envoy for Syria, returned to Beirut on Monday after delivering the US proposal during a June 19 visit. The plan called for the Shia Lebanese group Hezbollah to fully disarm within four months in exchange for a halt to Israeli air strikes and the full withdrawal of Israel’s military from the five positions it continues to occupy in southern Lebanon.
  • On July 08, it was published in media (SEA GUARDIAN was aware by the time it happened on July 07), that a new Houthi attack in the Red Sea has caused shock, this time targeting the Greek-owned vessel ETERNITY C under Liberian flag. According to the latest information, at least four crew-members have lost their lives till today. These were crew members trapped in the engine room, while two others were injured — one of whom was a Russian suffered an amputation (staying onboard while sinking). The intensity of the assault immobilized the ship and left the crew in a state of panic. Both the bridge and the engine room were completely destroyed by the Houthi strikes. The three SEA GUARDIAN armed-guards kept the Houthis’ skiffs away for at least 24h exchange fire, with no ships responding to the mayday of the Master. The crew consisted of 22 members (21 Philippinos and 1 Russian) and 3 SEA GUARDIAN guards, were obliged to abandon the ship July 8 after a second attack that was sinking the vessel. The very last that jumped into the sea were the Captain of the vessel and the Team Leader of SEA GUARDIAN. A Search and Rescue operation was launched immediately by the shipping company, hiring a private vessel, as there were no warships of the international maritime operations PROSPERITY GUARDIAN and ASPIDES in the area to support. Till today 10 out of 21 persons were saved at sea, while there are rumors that another 6 were saved by the Houthis and brought to Yemen. The SAR operation by a private company is ongoing.
  • On July 09, it has been stated that the death toll from antigovernment protests in Kenya has surged to at least 31 people, the country’s human rights commission said, with at least 107 others wounded during the nationwide marches. In a statement the National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) also reported two forced disappearances in the wake of Monday’s marches, which commemorated a 1990 uprising against undemocratic governance in the East African nation.
  • On July 09, Francesca Albanese, the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights situation in the Palestine, has hit out at countries that allowed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to fly over their airspace enroute to the United States, suggesting that they may have flouted their obligations under international law. Albanese said on Wednesday that the governments of Italy, France and Greece needed to explain why they provided “safe passage” to Netanyahu, who they were theoretically “obligated to arrest” as an internationally wanted suspect when he flew over their territory on his way to meet United States President Donald Trump for talks.
  • On July 09, the Prime Minister of Libya’s parallel government in the eastern region, Osama Hammad, has asked the interior ministers of Italy, Greece, and Malta, as well as the European Commissioner for Migration, to leave Libya after they arrived at Benina Airport in Benghazi last Tuesday, coming from the Tripoli. This request was made in a statement issued by the parallel government, describing what it called “violations” by the interior ministers of Italy, Greece, Malta, and the EU Commissioner for Migration, as published on the government’s Facebook page.

HE GEOPOLITICAL PROFILES & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

  • Geo-political / Geo-Strategic profile: The significant changes compared to the six-month profile assessment (you can see the previous SEAGUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT June 13) are the US effort to include IRAN in its sphere of influence and China’s inability to present a strong Geostrategic profile during the US attack on IRAN, only making a demarche to the UN, whose watchdog had published its report that Iran, despite being in negotiations with the US on its nuclear program, was continuing uranium enrichment, approximately ten days before the attack.
  • Geopolitical / Geo-economic Profile: There are no changes in the Geo-Economic Profile. President Trump, after announcing large import tariffs in recent months, has shown interest in making ad hoc deals for specific raw materials, such as China’s rare earths, and is now pressuring Japan to negotiate tariffs on imports to the US.
  • International Security / Strategic sector: Once the zones of influence are stabilized, security issues will follow the general international rules by which they are governed and the risks will be more limited in terms of geographical extent, but more multifocal, which means that we would have the spreading of malicious phenomenon. The dawn of a new era whenever it would come upon, it is going to be composed by criminality against international order as well as inter-ganging profile among uprising groups from several areas.
  • Global Maritime Security profile: The shipping industry will have to face individual threats which will be difficult to link to specific groups or actors and will need to adopt a new approach to risk minimization, taking appropriate measures and exploit the opportunities given by markets’ security specialists. A threat bordering on terrorism is emerging by the use of smarter weapons, with a disproportionate impact. It is estimated that these threats have an “asymmetric nature” due to their low profile but they have high impact on the target.

MARITIME SECURITY INCIDENTS: 25 June – 10 July 251

INCIDENT NoINCIDENT TypeINCIDENT TIMEINCIDENT DETAILS
25ADVISORYJuly 04Despite the reduction in reported threat levels inside the wider Gulf region, vessels are reminded that there remains a high threat of collateral damage to vessels visiting Houthi controlled ports in the event of any further strikes against targets in these port areas. All vessels are advised to exercise extreme caution in the vicinity of ports that have been subjected to previous strikes, and should consider carefully whether the risk of ongoing navigation/operations in those areas remains judicious.
26ATTACKJuly 06UKMTO has received a report of an incident 51NM southwest of Al Hudaydah, Yemen. The vessel has been engaged by multiple small vessels who have opened fire with small arms and self-propelled grenades. Armed Security Team have returned fire and situation is ongoing. Authorities are investigating. Vessels are advised to transit with caution and report any suspicious activity to UKMTO.
27ATTACKJuly 07UKMTO has received several 3rd party reports of an incident 51NM west of Al Hudaydah, Yemen. The vessel has been attacked by multiple rocket propelled grenades from small craft. Authorities are investigating. Vessels are advised to transit with caution and report any suspicious activity to UKMTO.

1 In accordance to JMIC and/or UKMTO sources

THREAT ASSESSMENT UPDATE:

Military Operations

Libya – Central Mediterranean

  • It is estimated that the absence of a unified Strategic Plan for the next day of Libya, which does not include its entire territory, combined with the conditions created by the rivalry, exacerbate the gap. For more detailed updates, you can refer to SEAGUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT SG LTD June 13, 2025 / Military Operations / Libya.
  • Until now, the rivalries and competition for control of the country continue with the main opponents being the HoR (Eastern Libya) and the GNA (Western Libya). General Haftar’s forces have also clashed on the border with Sudan with Sudanese and Egyptian forces. The division consists of Administrative division, Military division and Economic division, with the latter threatening the economic reconstruction of the country, the return of the population to normality, while creating conditions for criminality.
  • As the budgetary finances is concerned the situation in Libya is controversial as it has been described in previous Security assessments. The Central Bank seems to have no authority in the budget of East Libya, suffered from an incontrollable consuming of capitals. In East Libya there is the HoR (Parliament) which is supposed to be the approval authority for the budget, while the international recognized government of GNA which implements the annual budgetary program, is in Tripoli. As a result, the Central Bank tries to coordinate two different decision-making systems fighting each other. It is estimated that there is a high threat to the Libya monetary system which will get worse at the end of this summer.
  • On the other hand, as far as the shipping industry is concerned, it would find many opportunities to exploit through these conditions, while the mitigation of risks which are assumed, could be controlled with a wise security plan.
  • Triggers that will influence the escalation or de-escalation of the threat are: conflicts on the borders with Sudan, internal conflicts of military and militias, control of the ports, control of inflation, derailment of current transactions and fidelity of banknotes. For the risks see below in the risk assessment section of this current project.
  • For the players in Libya political arena see SEGUARDIAN SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT of June 25
  • Threat assessment due to “military actions” is upgraded from MEDIUM to HIGH.

Syria

  • The assessment that President al-Sarra will not react to Israel’s pursuit of decolonizing the borders of Southern Syria by destroying houses located near its borders, although justified by his actions to date, was also expressed in his statements naming Israel as a friendly country.
  • At the moment, the international community expects the interim government to restore calm in the country, led by the US, which, in addition to lifting sanctions against the country, also lifted sanctions against various economic entities at the end of last month.
  • The World Bank also approved aid/loans for the restoration of the electricity network, while at the same time it has been indirectly expressed that the Strategic goal pursued by the Western International community is the reconstruction of the country with a view to Syria not returning under the influence of Iran.
  • The areas where the country’s largest ports in the Mediterranean are located have been somewhat calm, there have been no atrocities against the population in recent months, although they are mainly inhabited by Druze and Alawites, whose militias have not joined HTS, yet.
  • Triggers that will influence the escalation or de-escalation of the threat are: avoidance of conflict with Israel, political integration of those who have been left out of the military integration plan (e.g. Alawites and a portion of the Druze), distribution of international aid and loans, course of reopening industrial activity (e.g. textile industry), and finally security in the main ports (Latakia and Tartus).
  • For more detailed information on the actors in the Syria, see the previous reports, SEA GUARDIAN SG LTD SECURITY ASSESSMENT March 18 2025, SEA GUARDIAN SG LTD SECURITY ASSESSMENT May 30, 2025, and SEA GUARDIAN SG LTD SECURITY ASSESSMENT June 13, 2025.
  • The threat assessment due to “military actions” is downgraded from MEDIUM to LOW.

Lebanon

  • The situation in Lebanon seems to have normalized due to the fact that Israel has not recently launched any extensive operation against Hezbollah, but the later has not reacted to the Israeli offensive operations at the beginning of last month. Israel continues to occupy the five outposts that still possesses after the withdrawal of its forces from the Lebanese border in May 2025. It is estimated that the Lebanese government will seek the existence of an international presence in the region and in particular UNIFIL, requesting an extension of its presence from the UN. Its aim, at least officially, is the stabilization of the sensitive areas in the south of the country bordering Israel. The most important trigger for further decline, however, will be the progress of the disarmament processes of the Palestinian enclaves on its territory, for which it has committed itself to Israel.
  • It is also estimated that Iran will not revert to supporting Hezbollah in the medium term, especially as long as the international community is negative about its actions to develop nuclear power. Nevertheless, any sudden escalation cannot be ruled out, even if we are in a period where there is a concerted effort to alleviate tensions. There is generally a decline in tensions and a downgrading of the threat.
  • Triggers that will influence the escalation or de-escalation of the threat are, the neutral zone on the border with Israel, the possible re-tightening of Hezbollah-Iran relations, the disarmament of Palestinian settlements, the possible reaction to the sporadic attacks of Israel and Israel’s stance on the Golan Heights in relation to the possible annexation.
  • The threat assessment due to “military actions” is MEDIUM.

Gaza-Israel

  • At present, the issue of the degree of demilitarization of the Strip cannot be assessed. The reason is that a backlash against the Israelis is accumulating, due to the humanitarian crisis, which has resulted in the non-continuation of any operation in this regard, with the result that atrocities against the population are frequent.
  • It is estimated that Israel will not back down from its pursuits even if this means that at some point it will have to completely evacuate the area from Palestinians. However, the main issue of the exchange of hostages / prisoners between Hamas and Israel does not seem to be progressing, which is essential for reaching a ceasefire agreement.
  • The threat of resurgence is daily, immediate and indefinite, especially after the end of Israel’s attack on Iran last month while US will continue to pursue its proposal for Gaza evacuation and population’s resettlement to other Arabic states.
  • Triggers that may escalate or de-escalate the threat are, the acceptance of a viable plan by both sides, Hamas’ understanding with Palestinian social groups, and the course of the humanitarian crisis.
  • The threat assessment due to military actions is downgraded to VERY LOW.

Sudan-EritreaEthiopia

  • The violent conflicts of the past months and the humanitarian crisis that has spread throughout the region between Sudan-Eritrea and Ethiopia, as well as interventions by third actors with economic and military aid, exacerbate the problems and predict a never-ending state of unrest.
  • Recent reports show that traditional external actors and states in the region have intervened in a way that reinforces uncertainty, supporting one side and the other at different periods.
  • The optimism for peace that was created at the end of May is losing ground with the rearmament of military units in the Tigray region. There are also signs of the crisis spreading to the North, following clashes between Sudanese militias and units of Haftar of Libya. Recently, there has been instability along the border with Kenya and a revolutionary predisposition towards the South of the Sudan-Eritrea-Ethiopia complex is being fueled, without forgetting neighboring Somalia with which the treat is spilled to all over the vicinity.
  • SEA GUARDIAN estimates that a generalization of instability will create threats that will dramatically increase the risks of crime and the possible concerns the medium-term future. According to reports, about 30 million people are below the poverty line and several humanitarian organizations, including the UN, have suspended their assistance to the countries in question. The civil war in Sudan has created a vast wave of migration flow of people through east Libya to the south costs of the island of Crete. Finally one of the most severe characteristics of this threat is “contagiousness”.
  • Triggers that will influence the escalation or de-escalation of the threat are: possible involvement of Kenya in the conflicts, fate of the RSF in relation to their possible deployment in Western Sudan, distribution of economic aid, economic stabilization of the Tigray region, restoration of oil transport networks to the ports, and political stabilization in all three states.
  • The threat assessment due to “military actions” is upgraded to MEDIUM from LOW, while the ports’ security at the most, in the Red Sea is maintained at HIGH.

RedSeaYemen

  • In general, Houthi attacks appeared to have been at a standstill until July 06, apart from some missiles fired at Israel. It is estimated that they continue to pose a threat to Israel and its interests, as well as to the interests of the US and the UK while there are signs of reforming their stance of their pause strongly attacking against international maritime industry. The issue is under close monitoring as the attack on the two merchant vessels on July 06 and 7, as was described in above corresponding section, shows a re-assume of the threat and hostility. The Red Sea continues to be the most dangerous sea line of communication affecting directly the global commerce.
  • However, the threat to shipping by other means, such as electronic harassment, harassment by armed vessels or a combination of these, are sources of risk for piracy or capture of ships, near the coast or in ports in the area they control. It is estimated that we have turned in a new page of the attacks in the area while the “likelihood” is influenced by a new model of attacking.
  • It is estimated that measures against piracy and any criminal activity must continue to be taken. SEA GUARDIAN once again estimates that reducing the presence of maritime forces in the area exposes merchant vessels to hostile threats. Shipping companies that support commerce through the Red Sea cannot be left helpless to face the para-military Houthis deadly threat, with only armed guards in board. The presence of naval forces from the Operations Prosperity Guardian and Aspides is of paramount importance especially when a vessel is under direct attack and requests immediate help or if there will be a need to launch a search and rescue operation to support seafarers of a sinking vessel. This situation will be analyzed in detail in the risk assessment section of this report.
  • Triggers that will influence the escalation or de-escalation of the threat are: intensity of Israeli counterattacks to sporadic attacks against it, further stance of Iran, Palestinians/Hamas/Hezbollah reactions and declarations and the possible collaboration with groups from other regions (e.g. Somalia) for crime against international shipping.

The threat assessment due to “military actions” is HIGH.

Israel – Iran / Northern Persian Gulf

  • In the event that the US does not launch a new attack on Iran, as various publications reported, situation will normalize. On the other hand, cancellation of Iran’s cooperation with the UN in controlling the nuclear program is a new source of re-attack.
  • Having signed an agreement with China on rare earths, the US has no intention of disrupting China’s energy supplier. On a geostrategic level, China and Russia were unable to assist Iran and the denunciation of the attack at the UN has no basis in fact, since the watchdog of the UN committee a week before the US attack and while the US and Iran were formally in negotiations, gave the alibi for the attack by publicly declaring that, despite all the negotiations Iran is continuing uranium enrichment more intensively.
  • The new “triggers” that could create escalation beyond the cancellation of the legal majority for cooperation with the UN in the control of the nuclear program are: Cyber-attack on critical oil infrastructure linked to the Houthis or Iran, direct operation or attack against Iran with the participation of the US, Israel and the Gulf states, and finally the deadlock in the UN peace talks on Yemen.
  • Threat assessment due to “military actions” against merchant vessels is downgraded to LOW.

Terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways

  • The previous SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT has emphasized that pirate groups have not lost their capabilities. It is also emphasized once again that the attacks on merchant ships occurred in the first half of 2025, had several incidents of captivity. Additionally, it was highlighted that …. “The threat of scattered terrorist groups in the Central (as in Libya) and Eastern Mediterranean (as in Syria, Lebanon) may not constitute an immediate danger to shipping, but their existence in itself always implies the possibility of a sudden criminal action and must be taken seriously as a “threat factor”.
  • There are triggers which would provide warnings for an escalation or de-escalation of the threat/risk level which are as follows:

a. Military/Paramilitary and militias actions in the borderline of terrorism:

– Proliferation of weapons and tactics used not only by Houthi’s but also other military/paramilitary forces in the previous years against shipping, with the scope to demolish shipping track-routes.

– Upheaval of other states by states or political groups, and policies over the control of certain countries.

– Reaction on a new era due to a change of political parties being on states’ leadership or states’ domination.

– Change of geopolitical influenced zones by super-powers or area-powers.

b. The piracy / cargo theft / smuggling / stowaways:

– Unbalanced share of countries’ annual budgets or international aid.

– Upraising of opportunities covered by the blanket of war the previous period.

– Returning on usual trends for the accumulation of money to reimburse political and domination aims for controlling countries’ administration.

– Use of force through more modernized systems and tactics for destroying, smuggling, demolition of shipping track-routes or/and snatching of others’ contracts of shipping.

SEA GUARDIAN SG LTD advises its clients to consider continuous and careful monitoring of the flow of events and their evolution, as often the trends of traditional threats (e.g. piracy) are covered by the flow of conflict events related to military actions and may surface suddenly and apparently without warning.

RISK ASSESSMENT

Gulf of Guinea

  • Due to the political-military instability of recent months, the threat due to “military actions” is assessed MEDIUM.
  • SEA GUARDIAN advises the shipping industry to treat the Gulf of Guinea as a whole. The three previous security assessments have listed the sources of risk and their form in the region.
  • Instability is created by the following factors in the respective countries:
  • Ivory Coast: Instability in this country mainly stems from political conflicts, but crime is not easily controlled, resulting in attacks against shipping mainly near its coasts.
  • Togo-Benin: It is unclear whether there is organized maritime control in these two countries. The crime presented by the various groups is very aggressive, while there are indications that they can operate far from their coasts.
  • Nigeria: A state in deep recession due to conflicts, which however has several sources of raw materials and hydrocarbons. It is plagued by internal armed conflicts while at the same time, the country has the ability to provide with its official authorities’ Maritime Security. France also has nuclear facilities in Nigeria which in the near future may constitute an issue of conflict with France in the region.
  • Equatorial Guinea: A state which recently had weak support from the UN to stand in the region. However, the maritime crime presented by the various groups is aggressive and seems to have a scope of action that reaches the territorial waters of neighboring Nigeria.
  • Nevertheless, the mitigation of risks is quite well studied and can be implemented. Cooperation with the official authorities is at a very good level through experienced security agents, while instability includes the impact on the general security environment and not directly on Shipping.

The risk of incidents for “attempts for piracy” is LOW / for “piracy, smuggling”, is downgraded to LOW due to the reduction of aggressive criminality rate / while for “electronic harassment of Nautical aids” is “NER” (Non-Existing Report).

Central Mediterranean Sea – Libya

  • The current situation in Libya presents uncertainty and risk, consisting of the general risk of military/paramilitary actions, the monetary risk of payments and the risk within the ports. Instability and violence in Libya are likely to continue as it struggles to achieve consensus on a new constitution.
  • There are no real effective security forces under a central government control, so foreign diplomatic and other assets remain exposed, even in the major cities of Benghazi and Tripoli. Militias from different interests engage in frequent battles and the main risk of violence to merchant shipping, is from collateral damage. The hot spots of such paramilitary battles are Tripoli, Benghazi, Zawiya, Sebha, Sirte, Kufra and Bani Walid.
  • These actions may also include actions against merchant ships, using time-delay mines and even offensive air/sea drones. The existence of ISIL (ISIS LIBYA) in the Gulf of Sirte also contributes to this risk. The tanker explosion last week is part of a series of attacks that have taken place since the beginning of this year.
  • A number of companies are included in a list of those supporting the war in Ukraine, while the Ukrainian authorities have included Greek-owned companies on the list of the Russian “shadow fleet”, an expression that prevailed after 2023.
  • The risk within the ports includes acts of theft, difficulty in loading and possible sabotage. Implementation of measures provided by the ISPS code for level 2 is necessary and the presence of armed guards is not prohibited, provided that prior agreement has been reached with the local port security authorities on case by case basis.
  • It is estimated that the East Libya Government will try to reimburse its deficiencies with the enhancement of oil exports. This is advised by IMF while the West Libya company will continue to harass the East Libya ports regularity. But the way ahead is keenly contested due to the harass of East Libya oil exports returns, as deficiency to the Libya monetary system. SEA GUARDIAN estimates that in the context of rivalries in Libya, several actors are given suitable ground to carry out such actions and therefore the targeting of Greek-owned ships is included in the list of possible soft targets.
  • SEA GUARDIAN advises the Shipping Industry to exhaust the possibilities offered by security companies using their personnel and equipment which will mitigate the risks remarkable. It also advises the Shipping Industry to re-approach Maritime security with a new method specifying what it must protect and what it must insure, based on cost effectiveness.
  • It is estimated that the Shipping Industry, when it decides to have as a port call generally Libyan ports, in order to mitigate risks, must take measures itself at least for the issues it can control, in consultation with the security authorities of each port.
  • The risk of incidents for “attempts for piracy” is LOW / for “Hijacking, opening fire” MEDIUM due to the threats inside the ports, especially of east Libya / while for “electronic harassment of Nautical aids” is “NER”.

East Mediterranean Sea

  • Due to the limitation of conflicts appearance in wide areas on its coast, the threat assessment is MEDIUM.
  • The Eastern Mediterranean generally seems to be entering a phase of recession. The factors that will decide on a more general peace are the lifting of sanctions on Syria and the financing of the interim government for the reconstruction and stabilization of economic life as well as the emerging Israel-Hamas agreement and the isolation of Hezbollah from Israeli territories.
  • The situation in Israel as a factor in stabilizing or destabilizing the Anatolian (Eastern part) Mediterranean is examined in the relevant paragraph.
  • The US seems to be keenly interested in the existence of peace in the Anatolian Mediterranean since this is linked to peace in other regions, not only Iraq but also Yemen (Houthi).
  • Finally, commercial ships involved in any way in the export of Russian oil despite the sanctions that have been put in place have been targeted in the recent past (these specific threats require separate and specific analysis).
  • The risk of incidents for “attempts for piracy” is “VERY LOW”/ for “Hijacking, opening fire” is “NER” / while for “electronic harassment of Nautical aids” is “NER”.

Syria

  • It is estimated that the two major Syrian ports will become safer if the situation remains calm. As there are no latest atrocities against the local population, the Syrian-Israeli climate remains calm and the Palestinian communities on the Israel-Syria-Lebanon border remain calm and outside the influence of Hamas and Hezbollah, situation in Syria seems to be improving.
  • From the Israeli side, there do not seem to be any other aspirations beyond those already expressed for the creation of a neutral zone on its borders with Syria. However, the risks in the region still remain high and the approach to its ports must be done with caution, taking into account that the conditions for peace or the execution of reactions by the various groups have not been specified. It should always be taken into account that ISIS is present in the region, despite the existence of an integrated part of them into the HTS.
  • The reconstruction of the electricity net is in the direction of the country’s stabilization. At the same time the source of a risk arises from the way in which any third party external assistance for the reconstruction will be distributed.
  • For a more detailed update on the initial situation in Syria, at the beginning of the previous semester, see SEA GUARDIAN SG LTD SECURITY ASSESSMENT March 2025.

On the coasts of Syria, the risk for “attempts for piracy” is “LOW” / for “Hijacking, opening fire” is “NER” / and for “electronic harassment of maritime aids” “NER”.

Lebanon

  • Due to clashes between Hezbollah and possibly Hamas groups, the threat assessment for “hostile actions” is MEDIUM.
  • The decline in fighting, the achievement of Israel’s objectives and the international presence, are factors that are easing the tense situation in Lebanon and will soon make the approach to its ports safer. However, the risk of some sudden action by various groups must always be considered.
  • It is estimated that although the general climate is already in recession, it contains risks that are not visible and concern terrorist acts or destruction/hostage of targets.
  • On the coasts of Lebanon there is no risk of “attempts for piracy” “NER” / for “Hijacking, opening fire” is MEDIUM / while for “electronic harassment of maritime aids” is “NER”.

Israel – Hamasconflict

  • The threat assessment due to “military actions” is MEDIUM because of the conflicts around the humanitarian aids posts, at the most. Nevertheless, Israeli operations related to Hamas are now in areas far from the coasts.

Distribution of humanitarian aid in the area is very difficult and there are many cases where both sides accuse each other of attacks. NGOs are accusing Israeli forces for opening fire on crowds, especially in areas near the checkpoints they have set up.

  • It is estimated that the created conditions, whether accidental or intentional, favor the US President’s plan for the US to take control of the Gaza Strip with the aim of rebuilding and relocating Palestinians to other Arab countries. This however, does not enjoy the support of the entire Arab world, at least for now.
  • The conflict is entering a new phase with the distribution of humanitarian aid and the aggression of the crowd against the Israelis who are monitoring the area as a central point of rivalry.

Suez Canal – Northern Red Sea

  • The threat assessment due to “Israel-Iran conflict” has been returned from VERY LOW to LOW, while for ships approaching Jordanian ports from the south remains MEDIUM, with a tendency to become HIGH.

The consolidation of a sense of security for the use of the Red Sea and by extension the Suez takes time and the possible confidence in its use has certainly been hindered by the 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel. The Houthis attacks on 6th and 7th of July against two merchant vessels along with the absence of Naval Forces of the West constitute a severe degradation of the security environment that is further traumatizing the “trust” of the shipping companies in the Red Sea, the main vein of international trade for decades.

  • After the two attacks by Houthi in Red Sea, it is estimated that the risks now concern a mixture of military/para-military actions and traditional threats against Shipping difficult to be mitigated without Naval forces assistance. The previous report has given in detail what the presence of Naval forces is providing in the region. The risk now comes from the possible abandonment of Houthi consensus to stop attack the shipping.
  • In the last week of June, an increase in the crossing of the Red Sea was observed, notable compared to the increase from the area of ​​the tip of the Cape of Good Hope. Any conclusions at present should be drawn comparatively although they do not constitute evidence for the restoration of trust and traffic on the Red Sea.
  • Due to the safety of navigation, off the coasts of Syria and Lebanon, in the Suez Canal and in the Northern Red Sea, the risk of incidents for “attempted piracy” is VERY LOW / for “hijacking, opening fire” is “NER” / while for “electronic harassment of Nautical aids” is “NER” while the overall assessment is LOW.

Bab-el-Mandeb Straits – Southern Rea Sea

  • Threat assessment due to «actions of war» is considered MEDIUM from VERY LOW, while specifically for the northern region of the straits close to the vicinity of Houthi’s activities has been analyzed in another section (Red Sea-Yemen).
  • The straits have dual threat/risk as it has been mentioned in previous Security Assessment due to the possible existence of military/paramilitary actions and piracy from Houthis and piracy from other groups (for example Somalians). SEA GUARDIAN study and monitor the incidents in the terms of the methods and weapons are used even if there are not assured signs of a remarkable escalation in attacking. The presence of naval missions, as described in the previous Security Assessment, in the region will continue to exist but as the military commands had been reassured by the Houthis’ declaration to cease attacks on shipping, their naval units in the region had been reduced. However, the risks of piracy, isolated attacks and the new threat of electronic harassment, as well as the possibility of cyber-warfare, must be addressed with a new planning approach as it has been proved that the shipping companies and Maritime security remained on the scene alone for which the SEA GUARDIAN had warned in the previous month Security assessments.
  • The restoration of oil transport networks in Sudanese ports will increase the need for maritime transport and therefore the risks in the region should be taken into account. Merchant vessels in the region should take their own measures since the ongoing conflicts dictate increased preparedness against acts bordering on terrorism and acts of traditional piracy, robbery and hostage-taking. The entire Southern Red Sea region and Gulf of Aden are still high-risk areas from any threat.
  • Due to the unstable situations in Middle East and the Northern Red Sea (Sudan-Eritrean-Ethiopia) as well as the Houthi’s uncertainty, the risk of incidents of “attempts for piracy” is HIGH / for “Hijacking, opening fire” is HIGH / while for “electronic harassment of Nautical aids” is “LOW”.

Gulf of Aden – Somalia

  • The threat assessment due to “hostile acts” returns to MEDIUM from VERY LOW caused by the incident of July 06 and 07 as the incidents influences the threat of the whole area. The response of Israel to the execution of sporadic missile attacks against it and shipping would create uncertain results in relation to escalation or de-escalation of the threats.
  • Beyond the direct military confrontation, the risks due to the broader ideological landscape remain. The war in the Middle East is not limited to the battlefields, as it fuels violent extremism. The extension of the conflict accumulates negative energy that can lead to extremism and actions bordering on terrorism. Saudi Arabia and several countries in the Persian Gulf categorically reject such an outcome.
  • The risk of incidents for “attempts for piracy” is VERY LOW / for “Hijacking, opening fire” HIGH / while for “electronic harassment of Nautical aids” is “NER”, mainly due to the current absence of interference incidents. A possibility for a sudden incident was and is larking on the sky. SEA GUARDIAN advice Shipping taking measures against piracy.

Arabian Sea – Gulf of Oman

  • Threat assessment due to «actions of war» is considered MEDIUM.
  • The presence of naval forces, as described in the previous Security Assessment, in the region will continue to exist but as the military commands had been reassured by the Houthis’ declaration to cease attacks on shipping, their naval units in the region had been reduced. However, the risks of piracy, isolated attacks and the new threat of electronic harassment, as well as the possibility of cyber-warfare, must be addressed with a new planning approach as it has been proved that the shipping companies and Maritime security remained on the scene alone for which the SEAGUARDIAN had warned in the previous month Security assessments.
  • In the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman, the risk of incidents for “attempts for piracy” is VERY LOW / for “Hijacking, opening fire” is VERY LOW / while for “electronic harassment of Nautical aids” is LOW, not due to the non-existence of the threats but mainly due to the current low-rate of incidents. Even if the overall assessment is LOW a refreshing on the knowledge over the Navigational aids use, is needed.

Hormuz Straits – Persian Gulf

Threat assessment due to «actions of war» is downgraded to LOW from MEDIUM.

  • The previous security assessment has listed the Naval forces operating in the area as well as the information and operations centers that monitor it. The possibility of using sea mines and explosive welding devices is a common threat against military and commercial ships, difficult to deal with. These are either used as a threat (e.g. to close areas/straits), or to destroy/cause damage, they are difficult to deal with and present an insidious form. Once again, SEA GUARDIAN advises the exploitation of the countermeasures available to Maritime Security companies, as they are the only way to take measures, in addition to insurance for compensation for possible damages.
  • As after the cessation of the Iran-Israel conflict, risk premiums are declining, investing in ship security with additional protection and control measures is cost effective. SEA GUARDIAN advises the use of teams and equipment from Maritime Security companies, as their personnel have the skills, experience and knowledge to provide assistance not only in basic Security tasks but also in similar risks that indirectly threaten the Safety of ships, such as GNSS interference.
  • In the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, the risk of incidents for “attempts for piracy” is MEDIUM due to the uncertainty of the situation even there is no incidents in near past / for “Hijacking, opening fire” is “NER” / while for “electronic harassment of Nautical aids” is “MEDIUM” due to the conjunction with the attempt of small boats with armed crew to board ships pretending official services who claim inspection rights, promoting the use of any help against traditional threats except from the threat of war.

Malacca Straits

  • The most important points in the geographical area of ​​the Straits of Malacca (Straits of Malacca and Singapore) continue to be Pulau Karimun, near the eastern entrance to the Straits of Malacca, Pulau Cula, near the Phillip Channel at the southernmost corner of the Straits Traffic Separation Scheme, and Tanjung Tondong, near the eastern entrance to the Singapore Straits, targeting mainly slow-moving cargo ships in the eastbound lane.
  • Although these attacks are not classified as classic piracy, the measures to deal with them are similar. All attacks are of the raid type, with a planned departure, aggressors do not usually take hostages, they leave with whatever can be easily and quickly transported, while attacking anyone who resists or tries to hinder them, once they have boarded the ship. However, the rate of attempts compared to the rate of success in boarding is somewhat lower than in the Gulf of Guinea. During this period, incidents are reduced, presumably due to the Southern winter.
  • The risk of incidents for “attempted piracy / maritime crime” is downgraded from VERY HIGH to HIGH / for “Hijacking, opening fire” is “VERY LOW” not due to the absence of a threat, but mainly the tendency not ships to be captured, but simply to rob / while for “electronic harassment of Nautical aids” is “NER”.

Piracy – Boarding conditions, kidnapping, firing, electronic harassment

  • In recent months, a new threat has emerged, mainly in the Persian Gulf / Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman and the Southern Red Sea, which is related to the risks arising from GNSS jamming. The result of an incorrect shipping route is not a security issue, while unauthorized access to satellite navigation systems is. For this reason, the issue is being closely monitored. As there are cases of ships being approached by vessels with armed crews who pretend to be official control services and request boarding, the risk of possible piracy or ship capture is high.
  • The factors that mitigate the risks are:

– A careful analysis of the risks in the area, in the context of the general existing or imminent threat.

– The existence of a security team, based not only on the frequency of threats that have been recorded so far but also on the impact that the manifestation of a risk could have.

– The reappraisal of security issues based on the entire spectrum and capabilities of protection and control systems.

– The pursuit of permanent cooperation with specialized maritime security service providers.

– The examination of the presence of an armed or unarmed security team on board the ship and in ports where this is possible.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT – CONSULTING

  • SEA GUARDIAN, in its overall assessment of the previous SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT June 25, has, among other things, mentioned the significance of the US decisions to ban citizens of specific countries from entering the US, the possibility of conflicts spreading as in the case of Sudan-Eritrea-Ethiopia to Libya and Kenya, the spread of the threat of electronic harassment, the reactivation of the Houthis’ attacks in the Red Sea and the consequences of the Iran-Israel war.
  • While we have entered the second month of the quarter for which the SCA offered a discount on Suez Canal transit to commercial shipping, traffic has not recovered. This is due not only to the Houthi attacks on Shipping last year and recently on July 06 and 7, but also to the recent Iran-Israel conflict.
  • Threats in the near future tend to become asymmetric, due to the low profile in execution and the high impact that the result has, often leading to wrong decisions which can lead to the loss of shipping lanes and the shrinkage of Shipping activity for specific companies. A change in the approach to dealing with threats with appropriate handling becomes imperative. SEGUARDIAN advises to reconsider the ratio of costs for protection measures, with the cost of insurance in order to achieve the best result given that the capabilities of Maritime security companies are not limited to the presence of armed guards on ships. The risks are now scattered in many places and are multi-focal and multifaceted.
  • After the agreement between US and China for the export/import of “rare earths” in US under specific regulation, it seems that US approaches the world market on a case-by-case basis pursuing not a wide cooperation in everything but on what is crucial “raw material” for their industry. On the other hand, China is difficult to avoid cooperating with the biggest market of its “rare earths”. Shipping industry will follow the implementation of this agreement in order to provide transportation capability while any other restrictions for China shipping approach to the US remain unchanged. US and Tramp will continue to pursue the case-by-case approach with each country assumed as precious ally for US interests after having jeopardized the international normality by the announcement extending taxes of imports in USA in previous months.
  • The immigration itself doesn’t seem a direct threat to the Maritime industry but to some extend creates a threat of illegal actions and the shipping could be used for the implementation of such an action. But, in conjunction with the humanitarian crisis in several areas could push ordinary people to react with violence. Additionally, gives a good argument to several groups for illegal actions worldwide. As more as people died in pursuing the receipt of humanitarian aids so much the sorrow is accumulated and the possibility of sudden reactions is heightened, especially in places where the international aid is withdrawn.
  • GNSS interference even its rate has been reduced we ought to continue considering it as threat for our routes’ planning.
  • Cyber-attacks are not a new threat but their extension seems to be widen adding a new dimension in the threat which is that the networking systems will be suffered in the near future. It is estimated that a wise approach is needed not only due to the threat itself but also due to the cyber-capabilities expansion and widening by the development of IoS (Internet of Services), substituting the previous IoT (Internet of Tools).
  • The re-emergence of cyber-attacks, in conjunction with electronic harassment creates a threat environment in which it is often difficult to find its source. It is estimated that the idea of ​​a permanent deployment of armed or unarmed groups on recurring chartered voyages (line chartered or voyage chartered) would not be far from the reality created by the “uncertainty” in International Security (see above-mentioned in the Geopolitical assessment section). SEA GUARDIAN advises the shipping industry to take measures not only at sea but also during the ships port-calls, especially those analyzed herein and when the ISPS code Level advocates.

Usefull links for military actions and picture of piracy attacks in:ACLED and IMB/ICC.

Usefull documents and manuals for GNSS interference:

/1/G1082 Ed2.1 An Overview of AIS June 2016

/2/ EUROCONTROL Guidelines on a Process for Civil and Military GNSS Interference Testing

/3/ Global Navigation Satellite System GNSS Radio Frequency Interference

/4/ ICAO GNSS RFI MITIGATION PLAN

ANNEX: The Red Sea / Gulf of Aden tailor-made resolution of automated results from SEAGUARDIAN Security Risk Assessment tool monitoring the situation, provided to its clents for support its decision-making in operations.


Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944373465) can support your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and provide assistance in decision making by producing tailor-made assessments upon request on ports in the region, on routes, on cargos and specific merchant vessels. You can refer to our previous Threat & Risk assessment analysis briefs for more information and background analysis on the events and situation in the region.


Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944373465) can support your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and provide assistance in decision making by producing tailor-made assessments upon request on ports in the region, on routes, on cargos and specific merchant vessels. You can refer to our previous Threat & Risk assessment analysis briefs for more information and background analysis on the events and situation in the region.

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VIEWERS CAN READ ALSO THE PREVIOUS REPORT (13 TO 27 JUNE 2025) HEREBELOW:

https://allaboutshipping.co.uk/2025/06/26/sea-guardian-threat-risk-assessment-13-to-27-june-2025/

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