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Objectives
The purpose of this brief is to provide the Maritime Industry and the Security Stakeholders with:
Major maritime security incident summary and analysis for the time period 05 – 12 Feb 2025
Threat assessment updates concerning military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
Overview of risk assessment and relevant information, in order to support operational planningand decision making.
RECENT KEY DEVELOPMENTS
On Feb 01, Syria’s Interim President Ahmed al-Shaara, accompanied by the Interim Minister of Foreign Affairs Asaad al-Shaibani met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), the kingdom’s de facto ruler, at al-Yamamah Palace in Riyadh and discussed ways to improve bilateral relations.
On Feb 04, the US President Donald J. Trump signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) restoring maximum pressure on the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, denying Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon, and countering Iran’s malign influence abroad.
On Feb 05,a US African Command (AFRICOM) delegation, led by, Lieutenant General John Brennan, the Deputy Commander of AFRICOM held meetings with Haftar and his son Saddam in Benghazi and afterwards with Al-Zoubi and Mahmoud Hamza in Tripoli. During the meetings Brennan presented a proposal to restructure the Libyan army by consolidating it within a specific period of time, starting within the next two months.
On Feb 06, Syrian interim government forces have deployed to areas north of Aleppo previously controlled by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), as armed factions have started to integrate into the new Syrian army and security apparatus.
On Feb 06, the Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to prepare a plan for the “voluntary departure” of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip. Katz said that the plan will include “special arrangements” for Gazans to relocate to “any country willing to receive them” via air, sea, or land.
On Feb 07, the interim Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra stated in an interview with the Washington Post that Syria is open to Russia retaining its air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria. Qasra is very likely referencing some form of economic relief to help improve Syria’s dire economic situation.
On Feb 08,Hamas released three male Israeli hostages in the central Gaza Strip. Israel, in exchange, released 183 Palestinian prisoners. However, the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office vowed that it would take unspecified “actions” in response to the frail and weak condition of the Israeli hostages.
On Feb 09, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry announced that Egypt will host an emergency Arab League summit on Feb 27 in Cairo to discuss the “new and dangerous developments”, following Trump’s statements on Gaza.
On Feb 09,the IDF completed its withdrawal from the Netzarim Corridor in the Gaza Strip as part of its obligations under the ceasefire agreement with Hamas.
On Feb 09, the Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara and Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad Shaibani met with Greek Foreign Affairs Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis in Damascus. During the meeting, the Greek Minister reiterated Greece’s support for Syria’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity and underlined the importance of respecting and observing International Law, including the International Law of the Sea.
On Feb 09, the Russian landing craft “Alexander Otrakovsky BDK” drove “Sparta”, “Sparta II” and the ship “General Skobelev” through the Straits of Gibraltar, after which they were followed by the landing craft “Ivan Gren” and the tanker “Yelnya”, while being shadowed by the British warship “Cutlass”. According to sources, President Vladimir Putin has ordered the return of missiles and ammunition back to Russia, after the loss of its military bases in Syria.
On Feb 10, theU.S. President Donald Trump announced on his social media that US air forces under his command, destroyed caves in Somalia used by ISIS terrorists as shelters. In his post, Trump said the targets of the attacks included senior ISIS attack planners who recruited and led fighters in Somalia. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, confirmed that the strikes were carried out by U.S. Africa Command and coordinated with the Somali government.
On Feb 10, Hamas stated that it would postpone the release of Israeli hostages, due to Israel’s ceasefire violations, which would be a violation of the ceasefire agreement.
On Feb 10, theUS President Donald Trump stated that the US will “build a permanent place” for Gazans outside the Gaza Strip. Trump added that he will negotiate with Jordan and Egypt to accept Gazan refugees, even though both countries have rejected the proposal.
On Feb 11, in a televised address the leader of the Houthis, Abdel Malik al-Houthi, launched an all-out attack on Donald Trump over the US president’s plan for the future of Gaza. He also stressed that “our fingers are a trigger” and threatened Israel and the US with new strikes if the ceasefire in Gaza, which has been extremely fragile for the past 24 hours, is not respected.
On Feb 11, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, after a security cabinet meeting which discussed the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, threatened to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip if Hamas fails to release Israeli hostages on February 15. He also added that “The army will return to fierce fighting until Hamas is definitively defeated“.There are currently 17 hostages, nine of whom are believed to be alive, while the rest are presumed dead. Israeli sources indicate that Israel will continue to abide by the ceasefire agreement with Hamas if the terrorist group releases the sixth group of hostages on Saturday 15th Feb 25 under the terms of the agreement.
On Feb 11, Israeli media reported that the US rejected an Israeli request to further extend the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement that requires the IDF to withdraw from Lebanon by February 18, which would enable the IDF to maintain current positions in Lebanon.
On Feb 11, the US President Donald Trump threatened Hamas to cancel the ceasefire and hell would break out in Gaza if the next hostages were not released by noon on Feb 15. “As far as I’m concerned, if all the hostages aren’t released by 12 noon on Saturday — I think it’s a good time — I say cancel everything and let hell break loose,” he said.
On Feb 11, the U.S. President Donald Trump, during a meeting with Jordan’s King Abdullah in the White House, reiterated his plan to seize Gaza, whose residents will be permanently relocated elsewhere, while Washington’s Arab allies, including Jordan, have voiced opposition to that prospect.
On Feb 11, Egypt’s foreign ministry said that Cairo aims to “present a comprehensive vision for the reconstruction” of the Gaza Strip, which will guarantee the stay of Palestinians in their homeland. Cairo “hopes to cooperate” with US President Donald Trump’s administration on the issue, although the latter has threatened to end all aid to Egypt and Jordan if they refuse to accept his plan for the United States to take “control” of the Gaza Strip and for Palestinians living there to be displaced in Egyptian and Jordanian territory.
On Feb 12, the Russian Navy General Staff sent the frigate “Admiral Golovko” to escort the flotilla of Russian warships and cargo ships on their passage through the English Channel and the territorial waters of Britain and France. Two large landing craft, “Ivan Gren” and “Alexander Otrakovsky”, capable of carrying a large amount of military equipment, were among the ships. The Russian flotilla, which is supposed to be heading to the Russian Baltic port of Baltiysk, after passing through the Strait of Gibraltar is heading north along the Portuguese coast.
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THREAT ASSESSMENT UPDATE:
Military operations – terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
Military Operations
The volatile state in Syria since Nov 2024, is added to the general military conflict and unrest that takes place in the Middle East region, affecting also the East Mediterranean Sea. Though the HTS has become the predominant group and fully controls the interim Syrian government, it is almost certain that conflicts between rival rebels’ factions will resume over the status in future Syria.
Syrian armed factions have started to integrate into the new Syrian army and security apparatus. It is unclear how extensive the integration of armed groups across Syria will be or the pace at which this integration will occur. It is also unclear to what extent groups that integrate into the Defense Ministry will subordinate themselves to largely HTS-dominated command structures.
Conflicts in the northern part of Syria between rival groups backed by Turkey, Turkish lead rebels and Kurdish militias as well as in the eastern part between HTS and other armed groups, are still ongoing. Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) continueto attack SDF positions along key ground lines of communication.
Overall, the ceasefire in Lebanon is still maintained and has even been extended for an additional 23 days, which means that the ceasefire will now be in effect until Feb 18. IDF forces continue from time to time to conduct minor strikes against selected targets within Southern Lebanon. It is expected that after the recent US rejection of an Israeli request to further extend the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement (which would enable the IDF to maintain current positions in Lebanon), the IDF will eventually withdraw from Lebanonby Feb 18 and that the LAF will backfill the IDF by this date.
After the implementation of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip on Jan 19, the IDF ceased their operations there and diverted their attention to operations in the West bank, against Hamas cells. These operations have increased in intensity over the last few days.
Overall, the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip is still maintained and already the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement is being discussed. However, recent Hamas postponement of the release of Israeli hostages and the subsequent Israeli reactions and threats along with the frail and weak condition of the Israeli hostages who were released, have made the ceasefire extremely fragile.
Both Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the Houthi movement which ceased military operations against Israel after the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, continue to uphold the cease fire and there have been no new attacks or incidents. Nevertheless, the recent Houthi threats against Israel and the US if the ceasefire in Gaza is not respected, is quite alarming.
Since Jan 19 there have been no US, UK or IAF airstrikes against Yemen.
A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks, have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia’s continuedaccess to its bases in Syria, reportedly failed. The location of the vessels off the coast of Portugal verifies that these ships were not bound for Libya.
Terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways
The reemergence of terrorists group associated with ISIS and Al Qaeda in Syria since Nov 2024, has enhanced the terrorist threat level across the East Mediterranean Sea. Nevertheless, the risk of open conflict between these groups and the HTS has recently forced certain groups to lay down their arms and join with HTS.
On Feb 10, the Islamic State launched an attack on military bases in northeastern Somalia’s Puntland state with motorbikes and cars, but government forces repelled the attackers and air strikes killed 70 of them. Puntland authorities announced in December that they had launched wide-ranging operations against Islamic State and a rival Islamist group, al-Shabaab, linked to al Qaeda.The Islamic State’s 700-1,500 militant branch in Somalia has grown stronger in recent years thanks to the arrival of foreign fighters and increased revenue. But it remains a small group compared to al-Shabaab, which controls large swathes of southern and central Somalia.
JMIC over the last weeks has received information from regional partners regarding pirate activity off the coast of Somalia and recommends merchant vessels to remain vigilant when transiting these waters and make necessary precautions according to Best Management Practices and industry guidelines, having armed guards onboard.
The US Defense Department is preparing plans for the withdrawal of US service members from Syria. However, no order has been given to proceed with the withdrawal at the time. A US withdrawal would severely undermine the counter-ISIS mission in Iraq and Syria and would create a vacuum that ISIS could exploit to reconstitute.
RISK ASSESSMENT
East Mediterranean Sea
The risk of attacks or incidents in the East Mediterranean Sea for the time being is assessed LOW with the exception of all Israeli ports and the Syrian Coastline. Any port call in Israel should be arranged after a direct contact with the Israeli authorities, while it is not clear whether there are still any Syrian authorities or if they fully represent the newly establish interim government.
Terrorist groups and other uncharted armed groups in northern and western Syria pose a threat to the region’s security environment and could potentially be dangerous for merchant shipping security along the Syrian coastline and ports.
Turkey is attempting on one hand to pacify the Kurdish populations on its southern territory and along its southern borders and on the other hand to occupy more Syrian territory under the pretext of creating a safe zone. It is assessed that SNA with Turkish Armed Forces support, will continue to assail SDF forces in the Kobani region and along the Tigris River and that these efforts could also be a precursor to a wider Turkish or Turkish-backed operation in Northern Syria, with the cooperation or support of the Syrian interim government.Turkey and HTS have coordinated their efforts to coerce the SDF to disarm and be integrated into the HTS-led defense apparatus since the fall of the Assad regime, but with no effect till now.
Turkey, HTS and Interim Syrian Government cooperation is constantly deepening and it is assessed that Turkey will attempt to incorporate Syria into its close allies, as it did with the West Libya GNA government, in order to increase its footprint in the region and pursue its geopolitical goals. It is assessed that Turkey’s secondary objective is to be awarded with the reconstruction of Syria in order for 2,5 million Syrian refugees to be established in northern Syria, and displace the local Kurdish populations.
It is assessed that the efforts of Turkey to project itself as a “regional power” in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), as well as East Africa either through political intervention or military presence, will be intensified over the next period.
Recent HTS-led interim government’s efforts in the southern and western parts of Syria to dissolve all former opposition forces and integrate them into the new Syrian Defense Ministry have begun bearing fruit. Nevertheless, conflicts in the northern part of Syria between rival groups backed by Turkey, Turkish lead rebels and Kurdish militias and especially the SDF and Druze community’s commitment to a vision of a “decentralized government system”, indicate that it will highly likely be impossible to finally reach to a lasting agreement on how to govern the country over the following months. There is risk for Syria to become another “failed state” in the MENA region, following the footsteps of Libya and Iraq.
The international community is beginning to engage with the Interim government in Syria and already sanctions to the previous regime are gradually being lifted. However, the EU and most countries remain uncertain and intend to wait for this government to show its true intentions on how to build and run the future Syrian State, and also on how they interact with other countries. Over the last two months, the interim Syrian Government has begun to successfully establish lines of communication and to reinvigorate diplomatic relations with Turkey, most Arab states, the US and EU. It is assessed that relations with Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are already at a high level, with the rest of the Arab states following at a lower level, while Egypt considers the HTS as a potential threat due to its ties with Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Syria’s interim President visits at Saudi Arabia on his first trip abroad and Turkey on his second, is assessed to be an indication of which the neighboring countries consider as holding the most prominent geopolitical role in the formation of the future Syria and also it is a signal to Iran that Syria’s alignment to its goals has ended.
It has become obvious that for the time being, US participation in the formation of the new Syria is not a priority for Trump and it is assessed that the US President will eventually withdraw any US forces that are currently stationed in Syria. A US withdrawal from Syria however, would very likely create opportunities for ISIS to rebuild itself in northeastern Syria in particular.
It is highly likely that in the near future, after an agreement with the Republic of Cyprus, US military forces will establish a strong footprint on Cyprus keeping a certain level of alert to intervene into the Middle East, if required.
It is assessed that the US President’s “bold” proposed plan for US to take control of the Gaza Strip in order to be rebuilt and the relocation of Palestinians to other Arab countries, even though at first hand has been rejected by many countries, will gradually in the long term begin to represent a possible solution to the geopolitical stalemate in the Middle East.
It is assessed that the SDF’s fight against Turkey and its proxies will render it unable to support US policy objectives in Syria. The SDF cannot conduct offensive operations against ISIS and other terrorist groups while contending with the threat from Turkey and its allies in Syria.
It is assessed that Israel will certainly have a pivotal role both in mitigating Turkey’s ambitions, influence and overall foothold in the new Syria, on behalf of US and generally in promoting US objectives in the region. Over the next period it is also expected that the influence of Saudi Arabia in Syria and the overall region, will be elevated, acting as a secondary pillar for US objectives and policies.
It has become clear that Russia has lost its bases in Syria for good. Over the last few days Russia has continued to extract by sea its remaining military assets. It is assessed for the time being, that Russia will move its forces from Syria back to Russia territory in order to reinforce the operations against Ukraine. However, it is expected that in the long-term Russia will try to establish a new naval and air base into an East Libya area (probably the Cyrenaica peninsula) controlled by General Haftar, in order to assure its presence in the Mediterranean Sea.
It is assessed that further Israeli efforts to neutralize Syria as a potential threat and to establish a safe zone during the next weeks, could lead to a new escalation in tensions between Israel and Turkey over the future of Syria, since their interests are colliding. It is highly likely that the US will try to play a mediator role to improve the relations between Turkey and Israel, avoiding any further tensions.
In Lebanon over the next period, it is assessed that Hezbollah military will be gradually but steadily evicted by the Lebanese army, while the uphold of the ceasefire agreement, which has been renewed till Feb 18, will provide the future base for Israel to come to terms with the new Lebanon leadership. Hezbollah requires time to rebuild and is unlikely to resume significant operations against Israeli forces in Lebanon over the next weeks. It is doubtful that Hezbollah will be able to reconstitute a significant portion of its military capabilities during the 60-day ceasefire period.
Hamas will likely use the first phase of the ceasefire in Gaza and the return of Gazians to Northern Gaza to reorganize and replenish its forces and move cells around the Gaza Strip without Israeli retaliation. It is assessed that Hamas can only achieve limited reorganization and will be unable to regenerate itself during this period or to seriously impede the IDF if the ceasefire collapses. Nevertheless, the return of Gazans to the northern Gaza Strip will make it difficult for the IDF to conduct operations with the same intensity as it did before the ceasefire.
While the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas has been in place since January 19, it remains particularly fragile. Hamas has threatened to postpone the release of Israeli hostages, scheduled for Feb 15, arguing that Israel has violated the ceasefire agreement. It is assessed that Hamas with the recent postponement of the release of Israeli hostages likely seeks to retain leverage in part because it believes that retaining the hostages will be key to put pressure on Israel and the US to move forward with the second phase of negotiations. Hamas may calculate that by retaining the hostages, it can increase domestic Israeli pressure on the Israeli government to continue negotiations and reach a permanent ceasefire. Hamas would be able to use these remaining hostages to pressure Netanyahu to negotiate again in the future. This negotiating strategy seeks to save Hamas as an organization rather than defend Palestinians or Gaza. Hamas has repeatedly presented itself as the defender of the Palestinian people and as the government of Gaza. Hamas, were it negotiating as a government or as a defender of its people, would seek to exchange the hostages in return for a stop to the fighting and the release of humanitarian aid in order to help Palestinians. Hamas is using the hostages as leverage to secure its own survival; however, it is assessed that ultimately it will lead to its down fall and eviction from the Gaza Strip.
On the other hand, in case of a new postponement of hostage release by Hamas, theIsraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the full support of the US, will almost certainly order the IDF to resume military operations in the Gaza Strip with severe reprecautions for the whole region and it will provide the Houthi with the pretext to resume its attacks against Israel and merchant shipping in the Red Sea and Golf of Aden.
In the West Bank it is assessed that the IDF will resume efforts against Hamas cells and will increase operations both in volume and intensity within Jenin refugee camp.
It is assessed that in the future we could witness an escalation in tensions in Libya between Libyan parties, Turkey and Russia, which may lead to a new round of armed conflict that could threaten merchant shipping.
Suez Canal – Northern Red Sea
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Suez Canal and the Northern Red Sea for the time being is assessed LOW.
Cessation of kinetic retaliations between Yemen and Israel due to the ceasefire in Gaza has significantly decreased concern for collateral damage on merchant vessels in the vicinity of Eilat port and while transiting the Gulf of Aqaba.
The risk of attacks or incidents in Eilat port for non-Israeli vessels is assessed LOW provided that there will be no problems or incidents in implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, nor any attacks against the Houthis in Yemen. In case of renewed hostilities between Israel and the Houthis, due to recent Hamas deviations from the ceasefire agreements, the risk of attacks or incidents against merchant vessels will automatically revert to HIGH.
The risk for merchant shipping transiting the Gulf of Aqaba if they are heading for Jordanian, Egyptian or Saudi Arabian ports and with no Israeli, US or UK ties, is assessed to be LOW, since the Houthis are avoiding to attack any Arab state port in the region.
Numerous shipping agencies indicate that there has been a small increase in the number of merchant vessels which transited through the Suez Canal with 987 vessels from Dec 2024 rising to 1.033vessels for Jan 2025 and that the trend is to slowly increase. It is assessed, provided there will be no more future Hamas deviations from the ceasefire agreements and that there will be not issues with the implementation of the second phase of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, that by late Feb 2025 there will be a substantial increase in the volume of ships transiting the region.
Over the next period, Steve Whitkoff’s, President’s Trump appointed Middle East envoy, largely credited with the success of concluding the ceasefire agreement, returns to the region in order to pursue the next three US goals which will reshape geopolitically the region. First to end the war in Gaza, second to bring an end to Hamas and Hezbollah and third to complete the “Abraham Accords”, Trump’s work. In this context, Saudi Arabia is upgraded to the highest degree, as the leading power of the Arab world, which, in addition to contributing to the control and reconstruction of Gaza in synergy with other Arab states, should participate in the Abraham Agreement. It is no coincidence that amidst the persistent turmoil in Gaza, an ambitious vision conceived over six decades ago has resurfaced, sparking debates on regional geopolitics and economic strategy. Recently the Ben Gurion Canal project has re-emerged as a significant topic, a proposal in the 1960s by Israel to connect the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea through the southern end of the Gulf of Aqaba. Named in homage to Israel’s founder, the Ben Gurion Canal project (with a staggering estimated cost of 100bn $) envisions a monumental waterway connecting Eilat on the Red Sea to Ashkelon on the Mediterranean Sea. This ambitious initiative aims to provide a strategic alternative to the Suez Canal, potentially transforming global maritime trade and reshaping regional dynamics. In addition to its strategic maritime benefits, the Ben Gurion Canal could enhance regional connectivity, integrating with the Abraham Accords and fostering economic ties between Israel and Gulf nations. The proposed route of the Ben Gurion Canal has also raised concerns about its impact on Gaza and the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some analysts suggest that Israel’s recent military actions in Gaza may be partly motivated by strategic considerations related to the canal project. The displacement of Palestinians and the devastation in Gaza could potentially facilitate the canal’s construction through the territory, although such plans remain highly controversial and speculative.
Bab-el-Mandeb Straits – Southern Rea Sea
The southernmost part of the Rea Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait are still assessed to be the most hazardous areas for international shipping, with no significant incident occurring during last period.
After the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement the risk of attacks or incidents against non-Israeli ships is assessed LOW provided that there will be no problems or incidents in implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, nor any attacks against the Houthis in Yemen.
In case of renewed hostilities between Israel and the Houthis due to deviations from the ceasefire agreements, the risk of attacks or incidents against merchant vessels will automatically revert to HIGH.
Despite the recent de-escalation, it is assessed that the Houthis will continue to monitor vessels with multiple layers of indirect associations to Israel, US or UK in order to be targeted and attacked at a short notice, if the situation escalates again. Maritime industry stakeholders should take into account such associations when conducting threat and risk assessments.
It is assessed that the US and UK airstrike campaign against Yemen will continue to be paused while the naval units of the USN and the RN along with the warships of international/EU maritime Operations “PROSPERITY GUARDIAN” and “ASPIDES”, will continue patrolling the area on high readiness.
Gulf of Aden
The eastern part of the Gulf of Aden is still assessed to be the one of the most hazardous areas for international shipping, with no significant incident occurring during last period.
After the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement the risk of attacks or incidents against non-Israeli ships is assessed LOW, provided that there will be no problems or incidents in implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement nor any attacks against the Houthis in Yemen.
For the rest part of the Gulf of Aden the risk of attacks or incidents is assessed LOW.
It is assessed that the naval units of the USN and the RN along with the warships of international maritime Operation “PROSPERITY GUARDIAN” and “EU ASPIDES” will continue patrolling the area in high readiness.
Recent information from regional partners regarding pirate activity off the coast of Somalia is assessed to be alarming and should move the shipping industry to enhance its security posture.
Arabian Sea – Gulf of Oman
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman for the time being is assessed LOW.
Hormuz Strait – Persian Gulf
The risk of attacks or incidents at the Hormuz Straits and the Persian Gulf for the time being is assessed LOW.
Nevertheless, the announcement and uncertainties arising from the reactivation of the “Maximum Pressure Campaign” by the US could escalate tensions in the region and potentially lead to incidents impacting the maritime environment.
OVERALL ASSESSMENT
Since Jan 19, 2025 and the pause of the Houthis’ disruptive campaign against merchant shipping in the Red Sea, the stalemate in maritime security and freedom of navigation for merchant shipping in the region has been gradually lifted. It is assessed that as the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas is proceeding and vessels and infrastructure remain untargeted, improved stability is expected.
However, this pause in the disruption of the flow of merchant shipping through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea is quite precarious and should not be deemed rigid and solid in the mid or long term. It is assessed that even minor deviations from the ceasefire agreement could lead to hostilities, which would subsequently prompt the Houthis to again direct threats and attacks against international shipping at a short notice. In addition, the matter of upholding and implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement by all key players in the region smoothly and without any problems or incidents, is a huge challenge on its own.
It is assessed that the recent Houthi statements will discourage global firms and ship-owners to reenter in volume the Red Sea at all types of ships and cargos and over the next months, but still already there has been an increase in the overall number of ships (especially container ships) transiting through the Suez Canal.
The current situation around the seas of the Arabic Peninsula will continue the weeks to come to create risks for the shipping industry and will deter vessels other than container ships to cross the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.
It is assessed that in the short term, Houthis will resume with their campaign against Israeli merchant shipping in the Red Sea through invoking their pretext of supporting the Palestinian struggle and forcing Israel to uphold the agreements.
It is also assessed that the risk of entering Israeli ports is now LOW since the Houthis pledged to stop attacking Israeli territory.
The matter of returning the flow of merchant shipping through the region to its previous volume which is linked with the progression of efforts in maintaining the overall stability and security in the region, will be determined over the next days and weeks.
Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944373465) can support your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and provide assistance in decision making by producing tailored made assessments upon request on ports in the region, on routes, on cargos and specific merchant vessels.
You can refer to our previous Threat & Risk assessment analysis briefs for more information and background analysis on the events and situation in the region.
Viewers can also read the immediate previous report:
