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Home Associations SEA GUARDIAN Threat & Risk Assessment 30 September to 14 October 2025

SEA GUARDIAN Threat & Risk Assessment 30 September to 14 October 2025

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John (Ioannis) Pavlopoulos, President Sea Guardian SG Ltd., Vice Admiral (ret.) H.N., Honorary Commander in Chief of the Hellenic Fleet , Former Military Representative of Greece to the NATO and EU 

THREAT & RISK ASSESSMENT BRIEF UPDATE

​​ Brief Update No 25/21 Date: 16 October 2025

​​ STATEMENT

This document has been approved for distribution by SEA GUARDIAN S.G. Ltd / Operations Department. The provided Intel and Information derive from open sources, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) and the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) respective Web Pages and products retrofit the company’s Strategic / Operational and Security situational awareness processes, for risks and threat assessment/impact to the Security of Maritime Operations. All rights reserved, “no part of this risk assessment may be reproduced in any form (electronical, mechanical, paper or other means) without written permission by SEA GUARDIAN S.G. Ltd which maintains the rights for personal data of this document writers. Under no Circumstances can SEA GUARDIAN S.G. Ltd be held responsible for any loss or damage caused by a reader’s reliance on information obtained by this assessment, especially on its firms, company’s management or individual decision-making.

Objectives

To provide in a 15-day cycle, the maritime industry and Security Stake or Shareholders with:

  • Major maritime security incident summary and analysis in Geo-strategic frame for Operational Security and Security of shipping for the period 30 September – 14 October, 2025.
  • Threat assessment updates concerning military operations – terrorism – piracy and cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways, ships fired and crew loses.
  • Overview of risk assessment and relevant information, in order to support strategic & operational planning and decision making, as well as the needs for assuredness (impact for insurance or special security needs) after threats and risks Analysis.
  • SEA GUARDIAN, pursues innovative approach by analyzing Maritime Security in accordance with international standards and a certain frame of Geo-policy. Security assessment deals not only with the risks but also with the threats and­ international security gaps, in order to maintain our clients well informed.

Risk Management | Sea Guardian Ltd Security Consultancy | Sea Guardian Ltd

Political / Strategic-Operational Intel/Info collection “app’s chart snap”

  • SEA GUARDIAN have organized and aligned info/intel collection with the procedures of threats /level production and Security assessments in SEAGUARDIAN SECURITY areas as it is shown in the next chart and cited in it webpage:

Make a call or e-mail us for a free trial period: E: intelsec@sguardian.com  CY: +357 25 351125 | GR: +30 210 9703322 info@sguardian.com   | www.sguardian.com Sea Guardian SG Ltd Intel & Security

RECENT KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • On September 30, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has warned that the situation at the Zaporizhianuclear power plant is “critical” as the facility has been without power for seven days. “It has been seven days now. There has never been anything like this before,” Zelenskyy said in his nightly address. One of the diesel generators providing emergency power to the plant is no longer working, a week after external power lines went down. “Russian shelling has cut the plant off from the electricity network,” the Ukrainian leader said. “This is a threat to everyone. No terrorist in the world has ever dared to do with a nuclear power plant what Russia is doing now.”
  • On October 01, chairperson of the Suez Canal Authority (SCA), Osama Rabie,has called on global shipping leader MAERSK to gradually resume transits through the Suez Canal, underscoring the waterway’s central role as a vital artery for international commerce and a long-standing partner for major shipping lines. The appeal was made during Rabie’s meeting with the Danish Ambassador to Cairo, Lars Bo Møller, who was joined by a high-level delegation and the SCA Vice Chairperson Ashraf Atwa, at the Authority’s headquarters in Ismailia. The discussions focused on strengthening cooperation and exploring new avenues for joint development.
  • On October 02, it was stated that the U.S. relationship with the small Persian Gulf country of Qatar entered new territory this week. By executive order, President Donald Trump offered Qatar security guarantees – including a commitment to quickly respond to acts of “foreign aggression” – a level of support usually reserved for Washington’s closest allies. The text of the order is explicit. “The United States shall regard any armed attack on the territory, sovereignty, or critical infrastructure of the State of Qatar as a threat to the peace and security of the United States”, it reads. “In the event of such an attack, the United States shall take all lawful and appropriate measures – including diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military – to defend the interests of the United States and of the State of Qatar and to restore peace and stability”.
  • On October 02, a tanker from Russia’s “shadow fleet” detained by the French navy was heading towards the Suez Canal with its captain back on board, according to data from maritime websites and a source close to the case. The Boracay, blacklisted by the European Union for being part of Russia’s sanctions-busting “shadow fleet” of ageing oil tankers, has been linked to mysterious drone flights over Denmark last month.
  • On October 02, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) said that they have eliminated a number of foreign fighters – including Colombians and Ukrainians – fighting alongside the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the besieged Darfur city of El Fasher. According to a statement from the army’s 6th Infantry Division, the fatalities occurred during a “special operation” in Al-Karama Square, where the foreign fighters attempted to take high-rise residential buildings. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) said that among those killed were “drone engineers” and snipers.
  • On October 02, Nigeria has boosted daily crude oil output to between 1.7 million and 1.83 million barrels and the number of active drilling rigs from 31 in January to 50 by July, as reforms under President Bola Tinubu begin to unlock investment in the petroleum sector. The Minister of State for Petroleum Resources (Oil), Senator Heineken Lokpobiri, announced the figures during a keynote address at Africa Energy Week in Cape Town, delivered on behalf of the president.
  • On October 02, two engineers were killed when an Israeli drone strike hit their car on the Khardali road, a key route linking the Nabatieh and Marjayoun districts across the Litani River in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Ministry of Health said the latest escalation of cross-border attacks killed two people and wounded another. Hezbollah-affiliated outlets identified the dead as engineers Ahmed Saad and Mustafa Rizk, who were working with the group’s Jihad Al-Bina foundation. The Lebanese Order of Engineers said in a statement that the two killed “were carrying out their professional and national duty” as they were heading to the Khiam area to assess the damage left by last year’s war with Israel.
  • On October 03, two days after a magnitude 6.9 earthquake struck her hometown in the central Philippines, Arguel Estalicas said she still feels dizzy every time she stands up. The earthquake shook the northern coast of Cebu, one of the country’s most populous islands, on the night of September 30, jolting many out of their sleep. It killed at least 68 people and wounded more than 500 others, as homes, buildings and churches collapsed and roads cracked.
  • On October 03, the collapse of a ceasefire between Yemen’s Houthi group and the United States has put global shipping routes back in the spotlight. According to S&P Global Market Intelligence, the Houthi decision “maintains severe risks for all vessels in transit” through the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and western Indian Ocean – regardless of flag or ownership. On September 30, the Houthis announced they were ending a truce agreed in May 2025 and would resume targeting U.S.-linked assets.
  • On October 04, Iran has executed six fighters accused of waging armed attacks in the southwestern province of Khuzestan, according to state media, as the country continues its accelerated executions of people it says have ties to Israel following the 12-day June conflict with Israel and the United States. “The death sentence for six separatist terrorist elements, who in recent years had carried out a series of armed operations and bombings targeting security in Khuzestan province, was carried out at dawn today,” the judiciary said on its Mizan website on Saturday.
  • On October 04,Taipei and Tokyo have long enjoyed warm relations that are cultural, political and economic – but these ties must now be deepened and expanded to meet regional threats. Once cautious to avoid provoking Beijing, Tokyo now increasingly sees Taiwan’s fate as central to its own security. A conflict in the strait would have immediate spillover effects on the Japanese archipelago, giving China a strategic position to advance its claims on the Senkaku Islands.
  • On October 05, Polish and allied air defence systems have been deployed to secure the country’s airspace, its military said, as Russia launched new deadly air strikes on neighbouring Ukraine. The latest deployment comes as the transatlantic security bloc NATO steps up its air patrols across the region in response to suspected Russian airspace incursions and drone sightings in several member states.
  • On October 05, anti-government protesters on October 04, clashed with police as they attempted to storm the presidential palace in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, BBC reported. Security forces used water cannons and pepper spray to disperse the crowd, the report stated, adding that they have arrested five people so far. The demonstration coincided with local elections that the main opposition parties are boycotting amid a sweeping crackdown on dissent.
  • On October 05, explosions and heavy gunfire could be heard in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, after militants attacked a prison near the presidential palace, ending several months of relative calm. State media reported that the militants used a vehicle disguised as those used by the unit’s security forces, and that soldiers repelled the attack and killed several militants. The incident came just hours after the government lifted roadblocks that had been in place across the city for years, saying security had improved.
  • On October 05, the CEO of Ukrainian Railways, Oleksandr Pertsovsky, announced y that Russia has escalated its airstrike campaign targeting the Ukrainian railway network, aiming to cut off frontline communities as winter approaches. Pertsovsky also cautioned that Russian drone attacks are growing more accurate, posing greater challenges for Ukraine’s defense efforts. On the same day, Russian drones struck two passenger trains in Ukraine’s northeastern Sumy region, resulting in one fatality and injuring dozens, as reported by Ukrainian authorities.
  • On October 05, the Ministry of National Defense tracked nine Chinese military aircraft and six naval vessels around Taiwan between 6 a.m. on Saturday and 6 a.m. on Sunday. Two of the nine People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft reportedly crossed the Taiwan Strait median line in the country’s northern Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), according to the MND. In response, Taiwan deployed aircraft and naval ships as well as coastal-based missile systems to monitor PLA activity.
  • On October 05, representatives of the High Council of State (HCS) and the House of Representatives (HoR) met on Saturday at HCS headquarters in Tripoli, Libya, following a previous meeting held in Benghazi regarding the appointment of sovereign positions and institution unification. The meeting was attended by Abdullah Juwan, Al-Ajili Abu-Sadayil, Mona Koukla, and Othman Madhkur from the High Council of State (West Libya), and Adnan Al-Shaab and Al-Mahdi Al-Awar from the House of Representatives (East Libya). During the meeting, they discussed finalizing and agreeing on possible mechanisms to resolve this issue in a manner that serves the nation’s interests and achieves the desired national consensus.
  • On October 06, the amount of oil sailing the world’s oceans on tankers jumped again as production from key producers is ramping up around the globe. The total amount of oil in transit climbed to the 1.2 billion barrels, according to Vortexa data, the highest since at least 2016. If ships carrying oil but not moving are added, the figure is the highest since 2020, when a global pandemic ravaged demand and traders stored barrels on everything from giant supertankers to tiny barges.
  • On October 06, Pope Leo XIV has drawn the ire of the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement after delivering a Sunday message urging Catholics worldwide to welcome and care for immigrants – just days after denouncing former President Donald Trump’s immigration policies as cruel. Trump wants mass deportations: 8 in 10 Americans say immigration is a ‘good thing’. On September 30, Pope Leo criticized the Trump administration’s immigration policies, raising concerns about whether they aligned with the Catholic Church’s pro-life values – remarks that sparked strong backlash from several prominent conservative Catholics.
  • On October 06, Head of the High Commission for People’s Assembly Elections, Mohammed Taha al-Ahmad, announced on that parliamentary elections were held in 50 electoral districts out of 62 across Syria, while voting was postponed in 12 districts located in the country’s northeast and in Suwayda Governorate in the south. In a statement to Syria TV, al-Ahmad said that preliminary results have been released in 49 districts, with results from the Samaan District in Aleppo expected to be announced in the coming hours.
  • On October 07, Syria’s government has declared a ceasefire between its security forces and Kurdish fighters in the northern city of Aleppo, after at least one person was killed and four people were injured in overnight violence. Murhaf Abu Qasra, Syria’s Minister of Defence, announced the ceasefire after meeting with Mazloum Abdi, the commander of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), saying the two sides had “agreed on a comprehensive ceasefire across all fronts and military positions in northern and northeastern Syria”.
  • On October 07, Nigeria has lost over 600,000 barrels of oil after a three-day nationwide strike over mass layoffs at the Dangote refinery disrupted production, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) has confirmed. NNPC upstream chief Bayo Ojulari said the walkout by the country’s main oil union made “optimum production almost impossible” as critical staff were absent from facilities. The strike resulted in a deferred production of about 200,000 barrels per day (bpd) over the period.
  • On October 07, over the past 12 months, at least 58,310 Israeli settlers have stormed Al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem, a 14 percent increase on the number the previous year, according to the Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs. It recorded the significant increase in incursions between Oct 02, 2024, and Sep 22 of this year. In recent weeks, hundreds of settlers have entered Al-Aqsa Mosque to mark various Jewish holidays, including Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur, and Sukkot, which began on Oct 06 and lasts for a week.


On October 07,
Yemen’s Iranian-backed Houthi rebels have detained nine employees of the United Nations
as part of a long-running crackdown on the organization, the U.N. said. The detentions bring the number of detained U.N. employees in Houthi-held territories in Yemen to 53 since 2021, U.N. spokesperson Stephane Dujarric said in a statement. No details about the circumstances or timing of the latest detentions were provided. Houthi officials did not respond to calls and messages seeking comment. The rebels have previously said that their crackdown on the U.N. and other international groups is linked to suspected members of an alleged espionage network.

  • On October 07, Oman and Belarus signed a mutual visa exemption agreement as part of Sultan Haitham bin Tariq’s official visit to Minsk, state news agency ONA reported. The signing ceremony was attended by Sultan Haitham and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. Under the agreement, citizens of both nations holding passports valid for at least six months will be exempt from visa requirements for entry, exit and transit, provided their stay does not exceed 30 consecutive days per visit or 90 days within a calendar year.
  • On October 07, Russia’s seaborne crude shipments held close to a 16-month high in the past four weeks, as Ukrainian drone strikes on refineries force the diversion of supplies to export terminals and strain their effective capacity. Four-week average shipments from the country’s ports were 3.57 million barrels a day up to Oct 05, according to vessel-tracking data compiled by Bloomberg, about 80,000 barrels a day below the highest since May 2024. The average provides a clearer picture of underlying trends than more volatile weekly figures.
  • On October 08, the EU has announced plans to hike tariffs on imported steel in a move the UK’s steel industry has said could be “perhaps the biggest crisis” it has ever faced. The commission has set out plans to cut the amount of steel that can be imported into the bloc by half – beyond which the new 50% tariffs will apply. The EU is the UK’s most important export destination for steel, worth nearly £3bn and representing 78% of steel products made in the UK for overseas markets. The commission has come under pressure from some member states and their steel industries, which have been struggling to compete with cheap imports from countries like China and Turkey.
  • On October 08, Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of preparing to wage war against it in collusion with an opposition grouping, in the latest sign of escalating tensions between the two neighbours over control of the Red Sea. Ethiopia’s accusation is contained in a letter sent by its Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos to UN chief Antonio Guterres, warning that the collusion had become “more evident over the past few months”. Ethiopia has been rallying support to regain access to the Red Sea, causing alarm in Eritrea as it took control of the coastline at independence in 1993.
  • On October 08, Economy Minister Kung Ming-hsin said Taiwan’s private oil refiners are prepared to stop buying Russian naphtha if the EU calls for it, Reuters reported. Taiwan joined Western allies in imposing sanctions on Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, but did not ban Russian energy imports. While state-owned enterprises stopped buying Russian oil last year, private companies remain free to source petrochemical feedstocks.
  • On October 09, in the early hours of Wednesday morning in Gaza issue, US President Donald Trump announced that Hamas and Israel had agreed on the first phase of his ceasefire and captive-exchange plan. In a post on his Truth Social platform, Trump stated: “ALL the hostages will be released very soon, and Israel will withdraw their troops to an agreed upon line.” The “agreed upon line” refers to a vague map shared by Trump on October 4, showing an initial Israeli withdrawal zone marked in yellow, later dubbed the “yellow line” by Trump officials.
  • On October 09, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has told his Azerbaijani counterpart that Moscow will compensate Azerbaijan for its part in accidentally downing an Azerbaijani passenger plane last year, which had damaged relations between the two countries. The Russian leader made the commitment while meeting with Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, 10 months after the Azerbaijani Airlines crash that killed 38 of the 67 people on board and strained ties between the neighbors.
  • On October 09, long queues have been snaking around petrol stations in Mali’s capital a month after militants from an al-Qaeda affiliate imposed a fuel blockade by attacking tankers on major highways. “Our business is at a standstill,” one motorbike taxi driver told the BBC, as many others pushed their vehicles to join the petrol lines amidst chaotic scenes in Bamako. Some of the garages forced to shut last week, paralyzing the city, have now reopened after more than 300 petrol tankers arrived under army escort from the Ivory Coast.
  • On October 10, the Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani said that his visit, the first to Lebanon by a senior leader of the fledgling government, demonstrated “a new Syrian approach towards Lebanon” that would “overcome the obstacles of the past”, alluding to the al-Assad clan’s decades-long control over Lebanese affairs.
  • On October 10, Police in Belgium have arrested three people suspected of plotting an attack on the country’s Prime Minister, Bart De Wever. The alleged plot was described by prosecutors as a “jihadist-inspired terrorist attack” on the PM and other politicians. Authorities found a suspected improvised explosive device and evidence the suspects were planning to use a drone during searches in Deurne, Antwerp, close to the PM’s private residence.
  • On October 10, up to 200 US troops already based in the Middle East will be moved to Israel to help monitor the ceasefire in Gaza, according to US officials. The US military will establish a multinational taskforce in Israel, known as a civil-military coordination center, which is likely to include troops from Egypt, Qatar, Turkey and the UAE, they said. One senior official said no US forces will enter Gaza, adding that the American role was to create a Joint Control Center which will “integrate” the multinational force going in.
  • On October 11, Chinese authorities have placed bounties on 18 Taiwanese military personnel accused of conducting psychological operations and spreading messages Beijing considers “separatist.” Police in the coastal city of Xiamen announced the rewards, offering up to $1,400 for information leading to the arrest of officers they described as core members of Taiwan’s psychological warfare division.
  • On October 11, President Donald Trump announced he would implement new 100% tariffs on imports from China starting next month in response to what he called “aggressive” moves by China, regarding export controls. In a social media post, Trump said the new tariffs would take effect on Nov 01. Trump said the move comes in response to China’s “extraordinarily aggressive position on trade” related to export controls. Trump’s announcement came a day after China imposed new restrictions on rare-earth minerals, key materials in the production of semiconductors used for everything from artificial intelligence to home appliances.
  • On October 12, it was published that as far a US government shutdown goes, this one has so far lacked the round-the-clock chaos of its predecessors. There have been no dramatic late-night clashes on the floors of the US Congress, no steep stock-market plunges driven by panicked investors, no prime-time presidential addresses from the Oval Office. Even the running clocks on cable-news chyrons have disappeared. But in the reality show that has replaced a properly functioning system of democratic governance, we are fast approaching the moment when a shutdown stops being a subject of political bluster and starts hurting US Americans.
  • On October 12, the Philippines has accused China of “deliberately” ramming a Philippine government vessel and causing minor damage near an island in a disputed area of the South China Sea. China, however, blamed the Philippines for the collision on Sunday, claiming the Philippine vessel had “dangerously approached” its ship.
  • On October 13, in an interview with Lloyd’s List and journalist Nigel Lawry, Mrs Melina Travlou, President of the Hellenic Shipowners Union, did not reject the IMO plan, but she underlined: “The Greek shipping community has a long-standing commitment to decarbonization on a global level of equal competition. In times of challenges and change, it is our unity – our shared vision – that has kept us moving forward. However, at this moment, I cannot help but feel deep concern and uncertainty about whether the greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for decarbonization by 2050 and the path chosen towards them are truly achievable. The entire shipping industry is experiencing the same growing sense of anxiety and doubt”.
  • On October 13, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said that Syria’s security is inseparable from that of Turkey, affirming Ankara’s continued commitment to supporting the Syrian people and strengthening coordination with Damascus. Fidan’s remarks came following a high-level security meeting held in Ankara, attended by Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler, National Intelligence head Ibrahim Kalin, and their Syrian counterparts – Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra, and intelligence chief Hussein al-Salameh.

MARITIME SECURITY INCIDENTS: September 30- October 14, 251

INCIDENT NoINCIDENT TypeINCIDENT TIMEINCIDENT DETAILS
UKMTO 034-25ADVISORY07 Oct 2025UKMTO has received numerous reports of GNSS interference from vessels in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, between 3 and 7 October 2025. This is a significant increase of reports compared with the same period in the previous week.












1 In accordance to JMIC and/or UKMTO sources

GEOPOLITICAL AWARENESS / ASSESSMENTS SECTIONS (CONTEXT TABLE)
VICINITY / AREA / DOMAINOVERALLTHREAT’s sectionsRISK’s sections
THE GEOPOLITICAL PROFILES & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (G3is)X
Libya – Central MediterraneanX
SyriaX
LebanonX
Gaza-IsraelX
Sudan-EritreaEthiopiaX
Red Sea – YemenX
Northern Persian Gulf / Iran-Israel conflictX
Russia – Ukraine / Black Sea NW partX
Baltic Sea / NE partX
Terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowawaysXX
Gulf of GuineaX
Central Mediterranean Sea – LibyaX
East Mediterranean SeaX
Suez Canal – Northern Red SeaX
Bab-el-Mandeb Straits – Southern Rea SeaX
Gulf of Aden – SomaliaX
Arabian Sea – Gulf of OmanX
Hormuz Straits – Persian GulfX
Malacca StraitsX
Black Sea / East PartX
Baltic Sea / West partX
Taiwan – Japan & South China SeasX
Piracy – Boarding conditions, kidnapping, firing, electronic harassmentXX
OVERALL ASSESSMENT – CONSULTINGX
ANNEXES TO “SECURITY ASSESSMENT”
ANNEX “A”: Overall Threats / Risks Level per SGUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSED AREAX
ANNEX “B”: Lessons Learned & Useful documents and manuals for GNSS interferenceX


THE GEOPOLITICAL PROFILES & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (G3is)

  • Geo-political / Geo-Strategic profile: There are no notable changes in the geopolitical arena. The situation remains the same as in the previous Security Assessment. The competition for control over areas of influence continues. Some theorists argue this will form the basis for a multi-polar geopolitical landscape in the 21st century but what it is for sure is that our world is being transformed. The 1rst phase of the ceasefire / peace agreement signed between Israel and Hamas under US President Tramps auspices on Monday October 13, will be thoroughly analyzed and assessed in the next 25/22 SEA GUARDIAN assessment.
  • Geopolitical / Geo-economic Profile: There are no significant changes in the geo-economic landscapes. Still, it seems China is taking advantage of rising tensions and threats to Western maritime interests. This involves both sea routes and the development of land paths and facilities at key locations along them. Reports, such as the one concerning the port of Piraeus, support SEA GUARDIAN’s assessment. SEA GUARDIAN in this Security Assessment gives the relation among the World economy, the resources values in each vicinity of the planet and the debt of countries to show the tendencies for expansion for countries pursuing to lower debt. Numbers show that Russia is exposed less in world debt than US and China in comparison to the value of their resources and this is a fundamental factor that influences the transportation chains in the future. As the world economy values 100 T and the natural resources of all the America continent values 114 T and the others’ continents values 175 T (leaving aside Australia which is a continent-state with 20 T), the situation addresses a huge change in Geo-Policy/Strategy terrain for the world stability to be maintained.
  • International Security / Strategic sector: There are no significant changes in this area. Once again, it is highlighted that cyber threats have become more global in nature and appear in more sophisticated forms. When combined with terrorist or piracy actions, they could pose a serious risk. With Russia assumed the UN Security Council presidency on October 1, this is likely to shift the UN Security Council’s agenda. SEA GUARDIAN waits for causative signs of this possible shift while the ceasefire in Middle East needs time to be implemented and prove whether it would influence positively the tensions in other areas, such as the threat derived from Houthis’ aggressivity.
  • Global Maritime Security profile: There are no significant changes in this area. It is noted that while maritime security risks in the Arabian Peninsula are linked to shipping disruptions or piracy, in the Black Sea and the Baltic -especially in the western part – risks also stem from underwater sources. Various military-level incidents confirm these threats. Overall, current risks involve targeting the reliability of not only the advanced navigation systems but also the shipping itself, using sophisticated methods for attacks (such as submarines, submarine drones, and diver
    teams), and the failure of several merchant ships to follow certification rules and procedures. SEA GUARDIAN evaluates that it is essential to prioritize threats and risks and assess the level of each threat in relation to the operational status of shipping lines, in order to design suitable security measures.

THREAT ASSESSMENT UPDATE:

Military Operations

Libya – Central Mediterranean

  • Despite the efforts of Libya’s High Council of State (HCS) and the House of Representatives (HoR) to work together and build a unified administration, political and institutional divisions continue between the eastern and western regions of the country. This division makes it hard to cooperate on important national issues like governance, resource management, and maritime matters.
  • At the same time, Libya’s Central Bank held a meeting with the National Committee for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. This meeting emphasized the dangers of delays in implementing new laws against money laundering and financing terrorism. Regionally, Libya is working to strengthen its connections with Tunisia and Algeria through a proposed Maghreb “troika”. This initiative aims to improve Libya’s international presence and provide a counterbalance to Egypt’s limited regional activities.
  • However, internal rivalries and broken governance structures remain significant challenges, leading to ongoing political tensions, occasional security incidents, and sluggish economic growth, especially in areas like taxation and coordination among institutions.
  • Triggers that will influence the escalation or de-escalation remain as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/15, July 10.

Syria

  • Syria entered a transitional phase after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. The interim government prepared for its first parliamentary elections amid ongoing uncertainty and regional tension. The new electoral process used indirect voting through electoral colleges. Security concerns had caused delays in Kurdish-controlled and conflict-affected provinces. Meanwhile, the Syrian Democratic Council in Aleppo continued to promote national dialogue centered on inclusivity and governance arrangements for northern and northeastern Syria. Their goal is to strengthen political stability through previously established agreements.
  • On the security front, a fragile ceasefire has been declared between government forces and Kurdish fighters in Aleppo, following recent clashes that resulted in casualties. Both sides reportedly agreed to stop hostilities across multiple fronts.
  • Externally, the interim government’s efforts to gain international recognition are complicated by tensions in Suwayda and its strategic position near Israel and Damascus. Israel’s attempts to secure a neutral buffer zone and pursue a peace framework with Syria seem to have stalled, although the country continues to maintain military deterrence through targeted airstrikes.
  • SEA GUARDIAN estimates that regional power dynamics are heavily influenced by Israel, Russia, and the United States, which have strong presences along Syria’s coastal areas. Observers believe that a UN Security Council initiative, possibly aiming to create a free trade zone, could emerge to stabilize the situation and support the country’s transition.
  • Triggers that will influence the escalation or de-escalation remain as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/15, July 10.
  • Indicators able to altering the “risks levels” are as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

Lebanon

  • Israel is continuing its military operations along the Lebanese border. It is carrying out targeted strikes against suspected weapons movements and trafficking routes. These actions indicate Israel’s support for the first stage of a broader disarmament plan aimed at controlling internal arms transfers involving Hezbollah and other armed groups. Despite widespread concern, no international system has been set up to enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament. This leaves Israel as the main actor overseeing arms control and monitoring movement in the border region.
  • SEA GUARDIAN believes that Israel’s current strategy is the first phase of a larger disarmament framework. This framework could move into a second stage focused on fully demilitarizing Hezbollah and Palestinian factions. Meanwhile, incidents across the border highlight the fragility of the situation. A recent drone strike killed two engineers linked to Hezbollah’s reconstruction efforts. This underscores the risks of escalation and the ongoing instability in southern Lebanon.
  • Triggers remain unaltered as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/15, July 10.
  • Indicators altering the “risks levels” are as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, Aug 13.

Gaza-Israel

  • The upcoming UN debate on separate states is expected to affect Israel’s diplomatic options rather than its strategic goals. Even if President Abbas is allowed to address the General Assembly remotely, this had mostly been a symbolic gesture due to the ban on his entry into the United States and his weakened international standing. His political position in this new era appears quite fragile.
  • Israel’s military operations have reached their intended goals, creating a situation of fait accomplish before the UN discussions. There has been a noticeable increase in settler incursions into the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound during recent religious observances, showing that the sources of tension and instability in the area are still deeply rooted.
  • Following the UN assembly, several states supporting the two-state solution have insisted on excluding Hamas from any future Palestinian government. The United Kingdom and France recognized a Palestinian state, with support from Saudi Arabia and a limited response from Washington. This shows that the positions within the international community have mostly remained the same while the situation in Jerusalem is worsening.
  • Tensions in Jerusalem intensify as President Trump announces the first phase of a ceasefire and captive-exchange plan between Hamas and Israel, featuring an Israeli troop withdrawal to a designated “yellow line”, while it is assessed that the fundamental issues are the exchange of hijacked Israelis and Hamas prisoned, as well as the future actions for a total withdraw of IDF from Gaza difficult to be happened in near future.
  • SEA GUARDIAN assessed that the regional environment remains tense, and maritime or commercial traffic in the eastern Mediterranean should be treated as operating in a conflict zone. Although Hamas is shown conditional readiness to accept a ceasefire proposal, progress toward peace is still uncertain. Disbanding its structures accompanied by its exclusion from a new Palestinian authorities’ positions could lead to the emergence of new extremist groups.
  • A special permit continues to be required to approach ports in the Gaza Strip or Israel.
  • Triggers and risks indicators remain unaltered as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/15, July 10.

Sudan-EritreaEthiopia

  • The Sudan, Eritrea, and Ethiopia are very unstable due to ongoing political unrest, the presence of revolutionary and paramilitary groups, and occasional clashes that spread from the Red Sea to the nearby countries Kenya, Libya, and Egypt.
  • In Sudan, government forces have stepped up their operations against the Rapid Support Forces in Darfur. They reported the removal of several foreign fighters, including specialists like drone engineers and snipers, who were aiding the opposing side in urban combat. At the same time, tensions are rising between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of getting ready for armed conflict in cooperation with an internal opposition group.
  • This is part of a larger struggle over access to the Red Sea. Addis Ababa has been seeking diplomatic and regional support for its maritime goals, which has raised worries in Asmara. Eritrea has controlled the coastline since gaining independence.
  • According to SEA GUARDIAN assessments, the overall outlook is negative in the medium term. Ongoing instability presents risks to maritime traffic, port operations, and navigation throughout the Red Sea and nearby
  • coastal water. The possible stop of attacking ships by the Houthis could be a positive factor for marine traffic to return into the Red Sea. It has to be considered that ballistic missiles and combat drones are threats that need military actions and they could not be faced up by the Security Teams of the Private Maritime Security that are assigned to deter acts of piracy. The recent incidents in early July with the sunk of the vessels Magic Seas and Eternity C by the Houthis is the proof.
  • Triggers and risks indicators remain unaltered as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/15, July 10.

Red Sea – Yemen

  • The overall situation remains the same as described SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30.
  • The situation in Yemen is very unstable and continues to pose serious risks to the region and maritime activities. The ongoing conflict between the internationally recognized government and the Iranian-supported Houthi movement shows no signs of easing. Even with the country’s severe economic struggles, the Houthis seem to have strong financial and military capabilities, probably backed by covert external funding.
  • Government forces have been trying to manage this by intercepting smuggling operations that provide materials for drones, explosives, and missiles to areas controlled by the Houthis. At the same time, the Houthis have tightened internal control by detaining United Nations employees, capturing crew members from sunk ships, and accusing international organizations of spying.
  • The breakdown of a ceasefire between Yemen’s Houthi group and the United States has intensified risks to global maritime security. The Houthis announced the end of a truce on September 30 and plan to resume targeting U.S.-linked assets, raising threats to all vessels in practice, transiting the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and western Indian Ocean.
  • From a maritime viewpoint, the Houthis remain a serious threat to ships operating in or near Yemeni waters, especially those with ties to Israel or Western interests. Ongoing instability could disrupt regional trade routes and impact freight costs leaving the shipping-routes of Red Sea unhampered for the Chinese and South-Asian shipping.
  • SEA GUARDIAN advises operators to stay vigilant, frequently update risk assessments, and avoid routes or arrangements that could make vessels vulnerable to potential attacks or political pressure in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. At the same time Shipping Companies have to assess what would be the right time for return to the area avoiding to jeopardize their freight costs against the market, as it is formulated by the South-Asian shipping (transit from South-Asia to Europe needs about 8 additional days when vessels use the CoGH route).
  • Triggers and risks indicators remain unaltered as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/15, July 10.

Northern Persian Gulf / Iran-Israel conflict

  • The overall situation remains the same as described in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30.
  • Iran is currently experiencing significant internal tension, marked by increased purges and executions of people linked to Israel and the United States.
  • The government is actively suppressing opposition and preventing any potential leaks of information while dealing with various external and internal challenges. Recent executions of individuals accused of carrying out armed attacks in Khuzestan, highlight Tehran’s commitment to maintaining internal control through force and fear, after the end of the 12-day conflict with Israel. This strategy, along with the ongoing international sanctions and a lack of collaboration with the United Nations on nuclear monitoring, creates a climate of uncertainty and possible instability in the area of Persian Gulf, derived from the Iranian insistence to this policy.
  • SEA GUARDIAN assesses that these conditions could lead to a sudden escalation within Iran but also in the Gulf region. Ongoing monitoring of geopolitical developments is necessary to identify early warning signs of conflict or changes in the general situation, as Iran plays a key role in the overall security situation in the Middle East.
  • The “triggers” that could create escalation are security incident involving the Houthis and civilian or military vessels/target in the Red Sea or Gulf of Aden and the stalemate in UN-brokered peace talks on Yemen.

Russia – Ukraine / Black Sea NW part

  • The overall situation remains unchanged as described in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, Sep 30.
  • The Russia-Ukraine conflict remains very unstable. The increased use of long-range missiles and drones has expanded the destruction and raised the risk of damage to maritime routes and shipping. These attacks based on telematics have widened the threat landscape, as losing control of these weapons poses real dangers beyond the battlefield. Sanctions from the United States and the European Union still limit Russia’s oil exports. Meanwhile, a “shadow fleet” of vessels transporting Russian crude under unclear ownership adds to the uncertainty.
  • Russia has stepped up airstrikes on Ukraine’s railway infrastructure and civilian transport. Ukraine reports that the situation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant remains critical due to power losses from ongoing shelling. European leaders have differing opinions on how to respond. Some call for stronger deterrence against Russian hybrid warfare, while others suggest restraint to avoid escalation.
  • SEA GUARDIAN finds that the maritime and regional security situation is growing more complex, with threats coming from various directions. For shipping operators, the primary risks include enforcement actions by Ukrainian authorities, hazards linked to underwater risks and drones, and indirect effects of ongoing fighting. Those involved with both Russian and Israeli-related operations face a higher threat from the combined actions of the Houthis, Ukrainian intelligence, and Western sanctions. Regular evaluation and adjusting routes are suggested to reduce exposure to disruptions from conflict and geopolitical instability.
  • The triggers remains as of in the previous SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30.
  • Indicators which altering the “risks levels” remains as has been stated in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/19, September 16 .

Baltic Sea / NE part

  • There are no significant changes in relation to SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30.
  • Incidents of drones crashing in Western Baltic countries, whether from error or technical issues, are raising concerns about border security. This has led countries like Estonia to improve their protective measures. At the same time, Russia’s seaborne crude exports are close to a 16-month high. Ukrainian drone attacks on refineries are forcing the diversion of supplies to export terminals, which is putting more pressure on their capacity.
  • Indicators remain as of in the previous SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30.

Terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways

  • SEA GUARDIAN warns that cybersecurity and electronic harassment threats, which include large-scale cyberattacks and ongoing regional intrusions, pose serious risks. These threats can cause extensive damage, especially during the shift to network-based command and control systems. In regions like Southeast Asia, coordinated efforts are starting to form, but state cybersecurity capabilities and cooperation between countries are still limited. Risk indicators and threat levels vary between ships operated by Western and Far Eastern companies.

RISK ASSESSMENT

Gulf of Guinea

  • The Gulf of Guinea is a hotspot for organized piracy and armed robbery, often with extreme brutality.
  • Nigeria’s petroleum sector is growing, showing increased daily crude oil production and a rise in active drilling rigs. These improvements reflect reforms under President Bola Tinubu, attracting investments. However, the sector is still susceptible to disruptions. A recent nationwide strike over layoffs at the Dangote refinery caused a significant temporary loss in oil output.
  • On the security side, Boko Haram militants took control of a town in northeastern Nigeria, forcing thousands of residents to flee into Cameroon. This attack targeted important infrastructure, including military barracks and administrative offices, highlighting the ongoing intensity of the insurgency in the region. Additionally, there are signs of re-emerging al Quenda affiliate groups operating in the states of the gulf, jeopardize the unstable political situation due to sporadic attacks in supply chains, as the attack in Mali.
  • According to the SEA GUARDIAN assessment, Nigeria faces a dual challenge. The country must foster economic growth in its petroleum sector while managing ongoing security threats at sea and on land. The overall situation
  • fluctuates continuously between positive and negative situations not only in Nigeria but also in other neighboring states of the Gulf.
  • Indicators which altering the “risks levels” as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

Central Mediterranean Sea

  • Libya still faces political division and weak security, despite ongoing talks between the High Council of State and the House of Representatives aimed at unifying national institutions and reaching a political agreement. Internal conflicts make it hard to manage crucial assets, particularly ports, which are vital for oil exports and national recovery. Economically, the Central Bank of Libya warns about the risks from delays in implementing important anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing laws. These delays reveal larger issues in governance and ongoing limitations on how institutions and resources work.
  • SEA GUARDIAN stresses the need for strong security cooperation and the deployment of protection teams at ports to ensure safe maritime operations. It also points out that Libya is a major source of instability in the Central Mediterranean, with rising risks affecting nearby western countries. Additionally, Libya’s role as a major departure point for irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa raises concerns about navigation and regional security.
  • Indicators which altering the “risks levels” as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

East Mediterranean Sea

  • Risks in the Eastern Mediterranean are changing due to the complicated threat environment along its eastern coasts. Overlapping conflicts and political uncertainties continue to be an issue. Turkey’s increasing involvement in the Middle East and North Africa is a major concern. Its deep engagement in the Syrian conflict and efforts to define maritime boundaries with Syria raise the risk of regional escalation.
  • SEA GUARDIAN assesses that Turkey’s increased military and diplomatic activity could heighten current tensions and spread instability throughout the surrounding maritime area even if the war in Gaza seems to be ended. Additionally, the mobilization of international fleets aiming to send humanitarian aid to Gaza adds more risks. These movements might lead to confrontation or mistakes at sea.
  • SEA GUARDIAN recommends that the shipping sector and regional stakeholders carry out ongoing both the strategic and operational assessments. They should remain highly alert when operating in or passing through the Eastern Mediterranean, where political and security situations are changing and uncertain.
  • Indicators which altering the “risks levels” as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

Suez Canal – Northern Red Sea

  • Even if the traffic in Suez Canal is directly connected to the Bab el Mandeb traffic, there are signs of differentiation which derive from ships having as port call Sudan the last two months, due to the enhancement of its oil exports.
  • SEA GUARDIAN advises Shipping to focus on prevention against piracy for the upcoming medium-term period more than focusing on the military/paramilitary threats.
  • Indicators altering the “risks levels” as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

Bab-el-Mandeb Straits – Southern Rea Sea

  • Traffic in the strait has been slightly increased the latest two months, as it is shown in the “overall assessment section”.
  • Although the summer events create some uncertainty regarding the recurrence of attacks, the end of the Monsoon season favors the use of small boats, increasing the risk of piracy returning.
  • SEA GUARDIAN advises Shipping to focus on against Piracy for the upcoming medium-term period more than focusing on the military/paramilitary threats.
  • Indicators altering the “risks levels” as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

Gulf of Aden – Somalia

  • There are no significant changes in relation to the SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30.
  • The overall threat and risk level remains high, but the contribution of piracy/robbery/hijacking of vessels to this level has now increased, due to more favorable weather and situational conditions. In general, the presence of military operations reduces the likelihood of piracy, while their reduction increases it. It has to be considered tha pirates’ capabilities have not been eliminated.
  • SEA GUARDIAN advises Shipping to focus on piracy prevention over the upcoming medium-term period.
  • Indicators altering the “risks levels” as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

Arabian Sea – Gulf of Oman

Hormuz Straits – Persian Gulf

  • Freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz depends solely on the potential escalation of the Israel-Iran conflict. Special caution is also advised regarding GNSS interference, combined with the approach of vessels by small boats with armed crews claiming to represent official authorities and requesting to board in order to carry out inspections and checks.
  • Indicators altering the “risks levels” as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

Malacca Straits

  • Recently, some movements have been made by government bodies and organizations in the region to address the cyber threat through joint actions under ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), as the area remains under high threat.
  • Additionally, the local population is under significant pressure from environmental disasters at the end of the Monsoon periods. On the other hand, the end of the Monsoon season and the tough weather conditions will favor the navigation of small boats, which in turn increases the risk of piracy/robbery against shipping.
  • SEA GUARDIAN advises Shipping to take enhanced measures, as an increase in crime and attacks on vessels is expected. This specific area is one of the two regions where the frequency of piracy/ship robbery attempts remains high.
  • Indicators altering the “risks levels” as cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30.

Black Sea / East Part

  • Russian President Vladimir Putin has agreed to compensate Azerbaijan for Russia’s accidental downing of an Azerbaijani passenger plane last year, which had strained relations between the two nations. The pledge was made during a meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, ten months after the crash that killed 38 of the 67 passengers.
  • Meanwhile, the “Zangezur Corridor” project – part of the Azerbaijan-Armenia agreement – remains a potential source of regional tension, as Armenia shows limited support and aligns more with Iran, while China continues to high financially support in its development.
  • SEA GUARDIAN assesses that the creation and, above all, the development of the corridor – with a strong U.S. presence and Russia’s reaction, feeling that its southern link with Iran is being cut off – will become a new point of friction in the coming year.
  • Indicators altering the “risks levels” as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/18, August 27.

Baltic Sea / West part

  • In September 2025, NATO faced heightened tensions with Russia. On September 19, Russian jets violated Estonian airspace, ignoring NATO signals, shortly after drones entered Polish airspace. Russia denied the incursion.
  • Separately, in late August, NATO launched a major submarine hunt off Norway after a U.S. aircraft carrier was left exposed. Despite extensive joint operations by U.S., UK, and Norwegian forces, the suspected Russian submarine was not located.
  • SEA GUARDIAN assesses that, although the western part of the Baltic is safer, there is a high likelihood of the “uncertainty” spreading, resulting in an increase in the level of threat and risks generated by this tension.
  • Indicators altering the “risks levels” as cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30.

Taiwan – Japan Sea

  • Japan seems to be moving away from just watching things from the sidelines when it comes to Taiwan. Back in the past, Tokyo stayed careful not to upset Beijing at all. But lately the situation has changed. Certain think tanks realize that Taiwan’s safety ties right into Japan’s own security. The new Japanese approach is to become directly involved in support of Taiwan, while China might put more pressure in the Senkaku Islands as an entry point in order to respond to the Japanese involvement with Taiwan.
  • Even if for north and south of Taiwan the main adversary is China backed-up by Russia, the implications are different. This is the reason why SEA GUARDIAN is examining the situation separately but in the same security frame.
  • SEA GUARDIAN assesses that Japan is stepping up more actively in the region. Certain Japanese Think Tanks see today Taiwan as a partner rather than a neighbor, being part of Japan’s main security plan. This new security policy approach is carefully implemented not by creating direct friction with China. In practice this terrain has a specific and long history of conflicts between Japan and China.
  • Indicators that distort the “risk levels” include: the potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the development of deepen political and defense ties between Japan-Taiwan, the existence of potential contingencies by Taiwan and its surrounding including military presence, the presence of balance diplomacy with deterrence (USA-Japan-Taiwan-Shouth Korea) without provocation to China.

Taiwan – South China Sea

  • The world news doesn’t really talk about the Philippines so often. The regional security setup in the South China Sea, especially when PLA has military presence in the area south of Taiwan, has real knock-on effects for Manila. It is well known that more Chinese presence into the Taiwan Strait could mess with sea safety in key shipping routes of the South China Sea. That hits the Philippines pretty hard. It has to be considered that China would like to avoid any spread of turbulence southern of Philippines, not to hamper its own maritime interests.
  • Philippines keep a sharp eye on Taiwan trying not to be directly involved in the tensions with China. In case of a Chinese aggression against Taiwan, Philippines will support definitely the coalition of the US.
  • It is known that Taiwan is withdrawing capitals from the Chinse economy, redirecting them to USA. That bolsters its stand against Beijing ramping up the tensions around the region. Philippines stay skeptical seeing the increased fiscal interaction between Taiwan and the US and the relevant balance of power in the area.
  • Indicators that distort the “risk levels” include: The China reactions due to the reduction of military and financial dependence of Taiwan, the widening of military and financial dependence to the US and Western countries, Taiwan’s strengthened position in the region against Chinese coercion, the implementation of US and western countries sanctions against China and Russia by Taiwanese companies.

Piracy – Boarding conditions, kidnapping, firing, electronic harassment

  • At the recent UN General Assembly, Trump’s speech, beyond other issues and the Israel–Gaza conflict, focused on illegal immigration, urging the representatives of other countries (the Assembly being at the level of heads of states) to take stronger measures against illegal immigration, stating that it would destroy their countries.
  • SEA GUARDIAN assesses that the intensification of this phenomenon will generate collateral threats and advises Shipping to utilize all available means of digital and physical guarding, hull inspections, and intelligence analysis in order to address contemporary threats.
  • The indicators that differentiate the “risks levels” remain the same as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/18, August 27.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT – CONSULTING

  • SEA GUARDIAN emphasizes that aggression directed at states cannot be separated from aggression targeting shipping assets, and therefore advises the shipping industry to adopt the same analytical approach.
  • Global maritime and geopolitical situations are getting more tense, really changing things up. Shipping plays a significant role in keeping international trade going strong. Greek shipping companies own a lot in the global market, adapting quickly to all the ups and downs in freight rates, the new environmental rules, as well as the ongoing uncertainty from geopolitics. The dry bulk side of things has bounced back pretty well.
  • Libya’s financial folks keep working on money laundering issues and fighting terrorism financing. Libyans deal with delays in their institutions too.
  • Greece and ASEAN are building up their economic ties. That helps expand investments and trade connections considering it is a sign that shows a pursuing of worldwide agreements.
  • SEA GUARDIAN report on maritime intelligence points out something clear. Aggression against countries ties right into threats against shipping. Shipping industry needs an all-around security plan. Key spots to watch include the Eastern Mediterranean, the Horn of Africa, and Libya. Instability stays high there. In the Black Sea and Baltic areas, the Russia-Ukraine fight keeps affecting trade paths, produces environmental dangers, and risk for safety at sea. Piracy and maritime organized crime are picking up in the Gulf of Guinea and around Malacca and Indonesia. Political problems in those coastal countries make it worse. Cyber threats are rising too, along with more incidents of interference. All that adds layers to the security picture.
  • Humanitarian problems are getting deeper in Gaza, Syria, and Ukraine. Displacement of civilians and deaths are going up. Alliances are shifting, like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan working closer together, or Libya and Greece building economic links. Those events show significant strategic changes happening under pressure. SEA GUARDIAN stresses it for shipping operators. They should mix in intelligence, cyber defenses, and plans for different scenarios. That builds resilience in this multi-threat setup.
  • On the political side, Syria’s Democratic Council keeps talking about governance. The Council wants inclusive setups for Aleppo and the northeast regions. Israeli leaders deal with internal issues after some tough diplomatic moves and decisions. European leaders discuss deterrence and defense. They worry about drone incursions and hybrid warfare linked to Russia. Denmark and France push for different ways to handle escalation in the EU. The bloc considers a huge reparation plan too. That would use frozen Russian assets to rebuild Ukraine.
  • In other places, Taiwan strengthens its global economic connections. It cuts back on depending on China. Legal cases in the US show Chinese companies allegedly dodging sanctions. They use foreign middlemen for that. It strains tech and trade relations more. Still, Taiwan’s investments going out focus a lot on the United States now. That marks a real shift in strategy and economics.
  • Finally, the follow diagrams represent the evolutions of traffic on main points of maritime roads of Arabian Peninsula and South Africa


Overall, SEA GUARDIAN assesses that the world is entering an era where
economic performance, energy security, and maritime stability are tightly interlinked

with political, criminality at the borderline of terrorism and cyber risks. Governments and private entities alike are urged to enhance intelligence sharing, strengthen risk management, and adopt proactive security postures to safeguard assets and maintain operational continuity amid growing global uncertainty.

ANNEX “B” TO PERIODIC “SECURITY ASSESSMENT”

INCIDENTSREACTIONSTRANSFORMATION NOTICES
The attacks on July 2025 in RED SEAThe permanent contact with the shipping company hiring maritime security teams.Developing indepentent international relations and operational apps for supporting crew recovery after a submerging.
The defensive actions against the attack on ETERNITY CThe Security management and team’s high standards in decision-making proccesses in international environment respecting the ship’s Captains’ capacity.Developing of training standards.
The attacks on July 2025 in RED SEAThe active contigency plans and bussiness impact analysis in case of discontinuation with the guarding of security teams (such an attack difficult to be faced by small arms).Further implemantation of matitime/ISO standards.
The aftermaths analysis of the ETERNITY C submercionThe possible changing in Houthis attacking methods not only to destroy but also to attain ships under their internal coast guard rules for ransoms in the form of penalties fees to liberate it.Specifying and bordering threats/risks analysis for depicting what needs military response.
Inbound in an area of high military/ maramilitary threats with all navigational aids and AIS closedOpened all the navigational aids and AIS / communication systems on after having had attacked by ballastic or related missiles while visual targeting was avalilable due to the lack of military forcesStabilize the closed navigational aids to prevent targeting with the necessity of giving informations by them to flriedly entities.
The detailed analysis after a special interview of secuirty crew assessing decision-madeA fundamental decision decision analuzed, involves choosing whether to abandon a sinking ship using a lifeboat for safety, or to escape directly into the sea with only life jackets, while under the threat of attacking boats searching for survivors.Balance the threat of being targeted while in the sea whith the trheat environmental and geography conditions to survive.

Usefull links for conflict indexes and picture of piracy attacks in:ACLED and IMB/ICC.

Useful documents / manuals and links

a. For GNSS interference:

/1/ G1082 Ed2.1 An Overview of AIS June 2016

/2/ EUROCONTROL Guidelines on a Process for Civil and Military GNSS Interference Testing

/3/ Global Navigation Satellite System GNSS Radio Frequency Interference

/4/ ICAO GNSS RFI MITIGATION PLAN

b. For other shipping issues:

Companies under sanction by Ukraine (Black Sea):Database Of Legal Entities Under Sanctions


Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944373465) can support your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and provide assistance in decision making by producing tailor-made assessments upon request on ports in the region, on routes, on cargos and specific merchant vessels. You can refer to our previous Threat & Risk assessment analysis briefs for more information and background analysis on the events and situation in the region.

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