SEA GUARDIAN Threat & Risk Assessment 28 January to 12 February 2026

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Brief Update No 26/03 Date: 13 February 2026

​​ STATEMENT

This document has been approved for distribution by SEA GUARDIAN S.G. Ltd / Intelligence Department. The provided Intel and Information derives from open sources, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) and the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) respective Web Pages, as well as products retrofit the company’s Strategic/Operational and Security situational awareness processes, for risks and threat assessment/impact to the Maritime Security. All rights reserved, “no part of this risk assessment may be reproduced in any form (electronical, mechanical, paper or other means) without written permission by SEA GUARDIAN S.G. Ltd which maintains the rights for personal data of this document writers”. Under no circumstances can SEA GUARDIAN S.G. Ltd be held responsible for any loss or damage caused by a reader’s reliance on information obtained by this assessment, especially on its firms, company’s management or individual decision-making.

objectives

To provide in a 15-day cycle, the maritime industry and Security Stake or Shareholders with:

• Major maritime security incident summary and analysis in Geo-strategic frame for Operational Security and Security of shipping for the period January 28 – February 12, 2026.
• Threat/risks assessment updates concerning military operations – terrorism – piracy and cargo theft, hijacking and dentations, smuggling, stowaways, ships fired, crew loses and Cyber-threats.
• Overview of risk assessment and relevant information, in order to support strategic & operational planning and decision-making contribution for shipping companies.

• SEA GUARDIAN, pursues innovative approach by analyzing Maritime Security in accordance with international standards and a certain frame of Geo-policy including synergies with a specialized entity for Cyber-defense, adding a new section in the assessment which includes the most important sectors of the policy, the methods and training to confront cyber threats and risks.

Risk Management | Sea Guardian Ltd Security Consultancy | Sea Guardian Ltd

RECENT KEY DEVELOPMENTS

• On January 28, France has said it supports the European Union’s push to designate Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a “terrorist organization”, reversing earlier opposition to the move. In a statement shared on social media, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot appeared to link the planned designation to the Iranian authorities’ recent crackdown on antigovernment protests across the country.
• On January 29, Egypt’s Suez Canal Authority (SCA) announced that the giant container ship CMA CGM SEINE, one of the world’s largest container vessels, transited the canal for the first time as part of the northbound convoy, carrying a gross tonnage of about 250,000 tons. The vessel, operated by the French shipping line CMA CGM, crossed the canal during its maiden voyage, sailing from Morocco to Malaysia, according to an SCA statement. SCA Chairman Ossama Rabiee said the return of the world’s largest and most modern container ships to the canal reflects confidence in its readiness and global standing as a key artery for East–West trade.
• On January 29, it was stated that Donald Trump is now entering Europe’s energy in a dynamic and interventionist manner. With a bill in Congress entitled the “Eastern Mediterranean Gateway Act”, he establishes four countries as strategic partners in the game being played in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt are the allies of the US and with the bill approved by the competent Committee on International Affairs of the House of Representatives of the US Congress, the hands of the United States Ministers of State and Energy are essentially untied for decisions that will strengthen the energy security and defense of the wider Eastern Mediterranean region.

• On January 30, a new chapter for Greek ports, logistics and the shipbuilding industry is opening with the deepening of trade relations between the European Union and India, following the Free Trade Agreement between the two sides. The European Union-India Free Trade Agreement, which was signed after two decades of negotiations, creates a new, expanded field of opportunities, covering a market of approximately 2 billion people. The gradual lifting of tariffs on almost all trade flows, from cars and machinery to medicines, textiles and financial services, creates significant opportunities for Greek ports, but also competitive challenges, which Greece is called upon to strategically exploit.
• On January 31, US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau was on a diplomatic tour of Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti from January 24 to February 1. According to the Department of State, Landau’s visit aimed to promote President Donald Trump’s priorities of “rebalancing trade, ensuring a positive business environment, and promoting security and peace.” Landau has described the trip, his first to the region, as “one of the great privileges” of his job, which allows him to exchange ideas with world leaders. Out of the four countries Landau is touring, three are part of the US-led multinational naval force deployed in the Red Sea to defend against attacks from Houthis.

• On February 01, Iran has declared European armies “terrorist groups” after a European Union decision to apply the same designation to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) over a bloody crackdown on recent protests. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said that the decision was made under “Article 7 of the Law on Countermeasures Against the Declaration of the IRGC as a Terrorist Organization”.
• On February 01, Israel reopened the Rafah border between Gaza and Egypt after nearly two years, on a trial basis to test security screening as thousands of sick and wounded Palestinians seek urgent medical care abroad. In one of the bloodiest days since an October “ceasefire” took hold, at least 31 Palestinians – including six children – have been killed in multiple Israeli air raids on northern and southern Gaza.

• On February 01, United States President Donald Trump claimed India will now buy Venezuelan oil after tussles last year over the South Asian country’s significant imports of Russian crude. “India is coming in, and they’re going to be buying Venezuelan oil as opposed to buying it from Iran. So, we’ve already made that deal, the concept of the deal,” Trump told reporters on board Air Force One. India has not been importing significant amounts of Iranian oil owing to US sanctions that have squeezed exports, but turned to Russia for supplies after Western penalties over the Ukraine war drove down the cost of crude. The US President, who has said his country intends to control Venezuela’s oil sales and revenues indefinitely after abducting former leader Nicolas Maduro last month, had put pressure on India to stop buying Russian oil.
• On February 02, it was stated that Hind Kabawat, Syria’s minister for social affairs and labor is the only female minister in the transitional government tasked with navigating the country’s jagged road from war to peace. Sectarian violence, which has killed thousands of people, has marred its first months in power, with many of Syria’s minority communities blaming governmental forces. Once an opposition leader is in exile, Kabawat acknowledged the government has made mistakes since President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s rebel forces swept into the capital on December 8, 2024, ending decades of the Assad family’s brutal dictatorship.

• On February 03, Russian soldiers helped repel an attack claimed by the ISIL (ISIS) armed group on Niger’s main airport in the capital, Niamey, according to Moscow’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “The attack was repelled through the joint efforts of the Russian Ministry of Defence’s African Corps and the Nigerien armed forces,” Russia’s Foreign Ministry declared. Niger’s governing military earlier said that “Russian partners” had helped to fend off the rare assault on the capital, which saw 20 attackers, including a French national, killed and four army soldiers wounded. At least 11 fighters were also captured, Niger’s state television reported.
• On February 03, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said that his government remains committed to pursuing reforms and restoring full state sovereignty, stressing that both are essential to saving Lebanon, as he spoke at the World Government Summit in Dubai. Salam said sovereignty and reform are inseparable, describing them as two fundamental pillars for the country’s recovery. He defined sovereignty as the restoration of the state’s authority over decisions on war and peace, the extension of state control over all Lebanese territory, and the exclusivity of weapons in the state’s hands. Reform, he added, includes both financial and administrative restructuring.
• On February 03, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, son of Muammar Gaddafi, has died – or been killed – according to a public confirmation by his political adviser Abdullah Othman Andurrahim, ending years of secrecy and speculation surrounding his fate since the fall and death of his father by February revolutionary fighters in 2011. In a post published on Facebook, Andurrahim confirmed Saif Al-Islam’s death, marking the first direct acknowledgment from within his political circle. The announcement followed hours of reports circulating in Libya that Saif had been killed during clashes near Al-Hamada. While details of the incident remain limited, earlier reports linked the killing to armed confrontations in the area. Some accounts accused the 444 Brigade of responsibility, allegations the brigade has firmly denied in official statements.
• On February 04, Taiwan’s Central Bank has cautioned the public about images circulating online that claimed to show redesigned Taiwan dollar banknotes, saying no such visuals have been officially released. The warning came as the bank begun early-stage preparations for a future currency update centered on a proposed theme, “The Beauty of Taiwan,” with members of the public invited to weigh in on how different denominations could be framed, per CNA.
• On February 04, it was stated that Kazakhstan and Pakistan aim to boost bilateral trade to $1 billion in the medium term, Azernews reports. According to the Ministry of Trade and Integration of Kazakhstan, further steps to strengthen trade and economic cooperation were discussed during a bilateral meeting in Islamabad between Kazakh Minister of Trade and Integration Arman Shakkaliyev and Pakistani Minister of Commerce Jam Kamal Khan. By the end of 2025, trade turnover between the two countries had nearly doubled, reaching $105.6 million.
• On February 04, it was published that a cybersecurity survey has found Chinese state-backed hacking groups far outnumber those attributed to other major actors, with Taiwan described as facing some of the most intense pressure. A recent survey by cybersecurity firm Forescout’s research unit Vedere Labs, counted 210 China-based state-backed hacking groups, compared with 112 linked to Russia and 55 associated with Iran, per CNA. The report said activity from the groups reached 178 countries last year. Taiwan’s National Security Bureau said last January that cyberattacks directed at government infrastructure averaged 2.63 million dailies in 2025. The agency said the figure was 113% higher than when it began compiling statistics in 2023 and 6% higher than 2024.
• On February 04, the US has sent a “small group” of troops to Nigeria who can help Nigerian forces fight terrorist groups, including the Islamic State (ISIS), writes Reuters. The dispatch of fighters was announced by General Dagwin Anderson, who heads the US Command in Africa (AFRICOM). He said the arrival of the US military contingent in Nigeria was made possible after the two countries agreed on the need to counter the terrorist threat in West Africa. He said the military “has unique capabilities” but did not provide further details on the scope and nature of their mission.

On February 04,
the Estonian Navy detained the Barbados-flagged ship Baltic Spirit, which was carrying cargo
to the Russian Federation. The special operation was carried out with the involvement of the police and it is suspected that the ship was carrying smuggled goods to Russia. The detention took place around 5 p.m. on February 3 and was carried out by members of the police unit K-commando, a helicopter of the aviation squadron, naval ships Raju and Admiral Cowan, pilotage vessel Ahto-26, Estonian media outlet ERR reported. The event took place in the Baltic Sea off the coast of Naissar. The ship was flying the flag of the Bahamas, but all 23 sailors on board were citizens of the Russian Federation.

On February 04, it was stated in Israel National News site that the Houthis have moved missile and drone warehouses in preparation for a possible launch against American vessels. This move poses a threat to the calm that has been maintained in the region since last May. A source from one of the factions in Yemen fighting the Houthis provided the US administration with information about the Houthis’ operational preparations to renew attacks on American ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. This comes as the latest escalation in the region following the American decision to send an aircraft carrier and additional warships to the Arabian Sea in preparation for a potential war with Iran.

On February 05, it was stated that, for more than a decade, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi appeared virtually inseparable. They crushed Islamist movements, dictated oil markets, blockaded Qatar and presented themselves as the ultimate power brokers in the Arabian Peninsula. The two kingdoms were often described as strategic siblings, bound by shared vision, capital and a mutual obsession with stability on their terms. But alliances in the Middle East rarely break from a single betrayal. They corrode quietly, layer by layer, over conflicting ambitions, proxy wars and competition for resources. And then, one day, the guns point inward.

On February 05, Ukraine and Russia have concluded a second day of United States-brokered negotiations in the United Arab Emirates without achieving a breakthrough towards ending Russia’s war. The two sides agreed to each hand over 157 prisoners of war, with officials from Ukraine and the US as well as Russia’s Ministry of Defense confirming that the exchange had taken place.

On February 05, Somalia’s federal Cabinet approved several key agreements and contracts on maritime trade, including one with Turkey on maritime cooperation, at its regular meeting. The government is reportedly taking urgent measures to mitigate the effects of the ongoing drought and its impact on the country’s water and food supplies. During a meeting chaired by Somalia’s Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre, the country approved a law establishing a national disaster and risk management fund to govern the preparation, prevention, and response processes to natural and man-made disasters under a single scheme. The regulation aims to increase public and government solidarity on the issue.

On February 06, the insular but strategically positioned Red Sea country of Eritrea is coming under the radar of Arab capitals as a potential linchpin in Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s Red Sea rivalry. Two Arab officials familiar with recent diplomacy, told Middle East Eye (MEE) that Egypt is trying to broker deeper security links between Eritrea and Saudi Arabia, with an eye towards checking the UAE’s influence as it increases military ties to Ethiopia. The Arab officials told MEE that the developments are inspired by a defence deal struck between Sudan’s military and Pakistan in January. That agreement is widely understood to be financed by Saudi Arabia, although the weapons systems have yet to materialize. MEE reported that Pakistani chief of air staff Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu, and Lieutenant General Turki bin Bander bin Abdulaziz of the Royal Saudi Air Force negotiated the deal on behalf of army chief Abdul Fattah al-Burhan. The three-way diplomacy underscores the complex and shifting alliances rippling across the Red Sea.

On February 06, Indonesia and Australia signed a new bilateral security treaty committing both countries to consult — and potentially act together — if either faces threats to national or regional stability, in a move that deepens strategic ties between the two Indo-Pacific neighbors. The agreement was signed in Jakarta during Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s official visit, following talks with Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto at Merdeka Palace. “No country is more important to Australia or to the prosperity, security, and stability of the Indo-Pacific than Indonesia,” Albanese said after the signing. “Australia and Indonesia share one of the world’s longest maritime boundaries, which naturally makes us close partners. But today, we are more than just partners. We are close friends.”

On February 06, the UK is set to gift a compound at Mogadishu International Airport, previously known as Operating Base SHAND, to the African Union support and stabilization mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), the UK Ministry of Defence has confirmed. In a written statement to the Parliament on February 5, Minister for the Armed Forces Al Carns said a departmental minute had been laid before the House of Commons outlining the proposed transfer, in line with procedures governing gifts valued above £300,000. Carns said Operating Base SHAND was originally commissioned in 2017 to support a three-year deployment to the United Nations Support Office in Somalia, known as Operation CATAN, which was announced in 2015 and ended in March 2019. Since then, the base has continued to serve as the primary UK operating location in Somalia. However, Carns said the compound now exceeds the UK’s accommodation requirements.

On February 07, the UK is threatening to seize a Russia-linked shadow fleet tanker in an escalatory move that could lead to the opening up of a new front against Moscow at a time when the country’s oil revenues are tumbling. British defense sources confirmed that military options to capture a rogue ship had been identified in discussions involving NATO allies – though a month has gone by since the US-led seizure of a Russian tanker in the Atlantic. In January, 23 shadow fleet ships using false or fraudulent flags were spotted in the Channel or Baltic Sea, according to Lloyd’s List Intelligence. Many are linked to the export of Russian oil, largely by water to China, India and Turkey.

• On February 07, US President Donald Trump said Washington held “very good talks” on Iran after the two sides held an indirect dialogue in Oman. Iran for its part said it expected to hold more negotiations with the United States, hailing a “positive atmosphere” during a day of talks in the Gulf Sultanate. With an American naval group led by an aircraft carrier in Middle Eastern waters, US and Iranian delegations held talks in Muscat mediated by Oman without publicly meeting face-to-face.
• On February 07, Syria and Saudi Arabia have signed a major investment package spanning aviation, energy, real estate and telecommunications as Damascus’s new leadership seeks to rebuild after a devastating 14-year civil war. Syrian Investment Authority chief Talal al-Hilali announced a swath of deals, including the development of a new international airport in Aleppo, the launch of a low-cost Syrian-Saudi airline, and a telecommunications project called SilkLink aimed at turning the country into a regional hub.
• On February 08, after weeks of consultations in Riyadh, the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), Yemen’s internationally recognized government, has announced a new cabinet, whose members have diverse political and regional affiliations, as part of efforts to govern the divided Arab nation. The move came weeks after the collapse and dissolution of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and withdrawal of United Arab Emirates forces from southern Yemen. The UAE-backed southern separatists briefly took over two Yemeni provinces bordering Saudi Arabia, drawing military action from Riyadh. The events have strained ties between the two regional powers.
• On February 09, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s thumping election win has blunted domestic opposition to her hawkish security agenda, encouraging plans to press ahead with a defence expansion that China has condemned as a return to militarism. As the scale of her government’s historic victory became clear — capturing 352 of the 465 seats in the lower house — Takaichi said she would “work flat out to deliver” an agenda that includes building a military strong enough to deter Chinese threats to its islands, including those close to Taiwan.

On February 09,
the United States has issued new guidelines to US-flagged ships travelling through the Strait
of Hormuz, calling on them to stay away from Iran’s territorial waters amid tensions between Washington and Tehran. The advisory, released by the US Maritime Administration, also urged the captains of the ships against granting Iranian forces permission to board US vessels.

• On February 10, Somalia has signed a “military cooperation” agreement with Saudi Arabia, weeks after inking a similar deal with Qatar, as Mogadishu seeks regional support against Israel’s recognition of the breakaway region of Somaliland. The memorandum of understanding was signed between Somali Minister of Defence Ahmed Moallim Fiqi and his Saudi counterpart, Prince Khalid bin Salman bin Abdulaziz, in Riyadh.
• On February 10, TAAS was stated that talks on resolving the Ukraine conflict are ongoing, and there is still a way to go, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told NTV in an interview. “We have repeatedly cautioned against excessive enthusiasm over what’s happening: US President Donald Trump ‘put’ the Europeans and Vladimir Zelensky in their place <…>. Well, it’s all good, as long as we seek peace in Ukraine, but we are not there yet,” Lavrov argued. “The negotiations are ongoing, the second round of talks was held in Abu Dhabi, and there is still a long way to go,” he added. According to the top diplomat, Russia’s leading position in the global nuclear energy market is challenging the Americans, and they would like to reverse that.

• On February 10, President Donald Trump has indicated he’s considering deploying a second aircraft carrier to the Middle East, even as Washington and Tehran prepare to resume delicate negotiations aimed at de-escalating tensions and averting a new conflict. Last week, Oman facilitated talks between Iran and the U.S., which a spokesperson for Iran’s foreign ministry stated had allowed Tehran to assess Washington’s seriousness and demonstrated sufficient consensus for diplomatic efforts to continue. These discussions occurred after Trump had already positioned one aircraft carrier in the region, sparking fears of renewed military action.
• On February 11, Israeli government moved to change rules around land registration in the West Bank, making it easier for Israeli Jews to buy property in the illegally occupied territory, are raising alarm among Palestinians, fearful that the new rules will establish de-facto Israeli annexation. The Israeli cabinet announced the decisions on Sunday February 7, 2026. In addition to allowing Jews to buy property in the West Bank – a Palestinian territory that Israel has occupied since 1967 – the Israeli government has also ordered that land registries in the West Bank be opened up to the public.
• On February 11, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov told the Indian Express in an interview, that the US attempts to link trade issues to the Ukraine conflict are inadmissible. “This is completely unacceptable,” the high-ranking Russian diplomat said, when asked to comment on the US attempts to link trade and the conflict in Ukraine and calls on other countries to halt trade relations with Russia. “We are not in a war with Ukraine. We are operating under a special military operation mandated by the president, with the only purpose to protect Russians and Russian-speaking people living in Ukraine,” Ryabkov added.

MARITIME SECURITY INCIDENTS: January 28 – February 12, 2026¹

INCIDENT No	INCIDENT Type	INCIDENT TIME	INCIDENT DETAILS
UKMTO 001-26	ADVISORY	03 Feb 2026 // 0900 UTC	SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY. Master UKMTO has received a report of an incident 16NM north of Oman within the inbound TSS of the Straits of Hormuz. A vessel has been hailed on VHF by numerous small armed vessels. The vessel has ignored the request to stop and has continued on its planned route. Authorities are investigating. Vessels are advised to transit with caution and report any suspicious activity to UKMTO.

1 In accordance to JMIC and/or UKMTO sources

GEOPOLITICAL AWARENESS / ASSESSMENTS SECTIONS (CONTEXT TABLE)
VICINITY / AREA / DOMAIN	OVERALL	THREAT’s sections	RISK’s sections
THE GEOPOLITICAL PROFILES & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (G3is)	X	–	–
Libya – Central Mediterranean	–	X	–
Syria (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)	–	X	–
Lebanon (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)	–	X	–
Gaza-Israel (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)	–	X	–
Sudan-Eritrea–Ethiopia	–	X	–
Red Sea – Yemen	–	X	–
Northern Persian Gulf / Iran-Israel conflict	–	X	–
RUSSIA-UKRAINE war (Black Sea / NW part)	–	X	–
RUSSIA-UKRAINE war (Baltic Sea / NE part)	–	X	–
Cyber-Defense / assessment and mitigation of Risks by CyberPax	–	X	–

Terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways	X	X
Gulf of Guinea	–	–
Central Mediterranean Sea – Libya	–	–
East Mediterranean Sea	–	–
Suez Canal – Northern Red Sea	–	–
Bab-el-Mandeb Straits – Southern Rea Sea	–	–
Gulf of Aden – Somalia	–	–
Arabian Sea – Gulf of Oman	–	–
Hormuz Straits – Persian Gulf	–	–
Malacca Straits	–	–
Black Sea / East Part	–	–
Baltic Sea / West part	–	–
Taiwan – Japan & South China Seas	–	–
Piracy – Boarding conditions, kidnapping, firing, electronic harassment	X	–
OVERALL ASSESSMENT – CONSULTING	X	–
ANNEXES TO “SECURITY ASSESSMENT”
ANNEX “A”: Overall Threats / Risks Level per SGUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSED AREA	X	–
ANNEX “B”: Lessons Learned & Useful documents and manuals for GNSS interference	X	–

THE GEOPOLITICAL PROFILES & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (G3is)

• Geo-political / Geo-Strategic profile:

Major powers are increasingly avoiding direct warfare while competing through indirect means, such as economic influence, control of strategic regions, and dominance over maritime spaces. This reflects a fragmented and uneven multipolar international system with blurred spheres of influence. The Arctic illustrates how geopolitical tensions are often driven by geo-economic interests, particularly access to natural resources and control of EEZs, while climate change is transforming the region into a new arena of great-power competition. Additionally, the US presence in several areas of the Globe shows an escalation with its presence being in every new model of multipolarity. Thus, the new era, at least for the Geo-strategic view of super/high powers, exists as a new concept for them pursue power as the new Geo-policy profiles demand. In simple terms, diversified terrains emerge due to differences among the parts of the globe, which are driven by geo-economics and are, in turn, driven by them.

• Geopolitical / Geo-economic Profile:

The EU-India free trade deal could really help Greece out, especially with its ports and all that logistics stuff, plus shipbuilding too. It opens up this massive market, and trade would probably pick up a lot. Other EU ports are in the mix too, competing hard, so Greece has to make sure its infrastructure holds up, and the planning is solid. Otherwise, it might not get the full advantage. On the bigger picture, projects like India getting oil from Venezuela, even with the US pushing things around, show how trade and energy are tangled up, recently. The world is shifting to something more multipolar anyway, where countries use money and military stuff together to get what they want strategically. For Greece, that means any economic chances come loaded with complications from all this global mess. It seems like the maritime industry needs to plan carefully just to grab the benefits without getting hit by the risks. This part gets a bit tricky; it is not totally sure how it all balances out.

• International Security / Strategic sector:

Global security feels a lot more split up these days. Great powers keep pushing their own national concepts and seeing threats just in their regions, instead of sticking to those big international rules everyone used to agree on. In this multipolar setup, things get tailored to whatever is happening locally, with risks varying so much. Coalitions form on the fly, not some solid global system with clear rules. The US government worries a ton about the situation in the Gulf and other spots, such as West Africa, where norms shift based on different arguments. They look at it through their national security lens, claiming how things should work globally. Russia is pulling similar moves in its own area, justifying interventions the same way. It’s almost like two sides of one coin, everyone seeing security differently. This whole period brings in so much diversion and uncertainty to international security, which leads to unlimited fragmentation just keeps growing, and it’s hard to say if it will settle. Some experts might argue it is just adapting, but others see it as a mess with the academic theories of how international security works being keenly controversial.

• Global Maritime Security profile:

Escalating attacks on shipping demonstrate the need for integrated, multi-layered maritime security that combines physical, cyber, and advanced technological defenses. As land-based instability increasingly transfers to the maritime domain, comprehensive security has become a core survival requirement for global shipping and trade. With the dispersal of hybrid technology into the hands of unknown actors connected to difficult-to discriminate sources of attacks, as well as the Cyber-threats spread around the globe, the Global maritime security will suffer from more complicated methods of attacking, making it difficult to discriminate on a wide early warning basis. New anti-terrorism/piracy/smuggling/hijacking methods and means must be used, such as UAV’s, UUVs, and USVs countermeasures, to face the threats, while training, digital means, and physical guarding use have to be upgraded into a unified tool.

THREAT ASSESSMENT UPDATE:

Military Operations

Libya – Central Mediterranean

• Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, son of Libya’s previous leader Muammar Gaddafi, has passed away, as declared by his political adviser, Abdullah Othman Andurrahim. This comes as confirmation of his passing after years of doubt about his fate since the fall of his father in 2011. It is claimed that Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi was killed in combat near Al-Hamada, although this has been denied by the 444 Brigade.
• The Political Steering Committee in Libya, in collaboration with Turkey and the African Union, held an expanded meeting in Tripoli with the aim of agreeing on organizational and political arrangements for the upcoming Africa-Turkey Partnership Summit. The meeting’s objective was to ensure effective coordination with the African Union Commission for the summit.
• The country is still highly prone to threats from political fragmentation, economic uncertainty, and maritime security threats. All vessels sailing in Libya’s waters are advised to be on high alert.

• Triggers and risk indicators remain unaltered per area as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/15, July 10 and SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.
• Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “MEDIUM” – ICC/Piracy: “NSR” (NO SIGNIFICANT REPORT) – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “LOW” – GNSS interference: “LOW”.

Syria (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)

• The situation remains unstable due to ongoing internal conflict, external military intervention, and shifting political allegiances. The economic recovery has been slow, and stability varies greatly, especially in the north, west, and coastal regions, making it very unsafe for political and economic endeavors.
• Within this fragile process of change, Hind Kabawat stands as the solitary female member of the transitional government, tasked with the role of social affairs and labor minister. Once an individual from the opposition ranks who lived in exile for years, she admitted to grave blunders from the new government. Notably, the government is struggling with sectarian strife, which has claimed thousands of lives, with various minorities blaming the government forces for the acts. These realities underscore the difficulty of the Syrian attempt towards change from war to a stable government.

• Triggers and risk indicators remain unaltered per area as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/23, November 13.
• Overall threat/risk level: “HIGH” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “HIGH” – ICC/Piracy: “NSR” – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “MEDIUM” – GNSS interference: “MEDIUM”

Lebanon (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)

In this respect, the Lebanese government has reiterated its resolve to build its nation through reform and enhancing its sovereignty. But it has been set back and delayed the restoration of this reform and weapons control, giving reason to Israel to attack the most. Thus, it has been shown that sovereignty, reform, and weapons control are key aspects of restoring Lebanon’s stability. Sovereignty, according to the prime minister, was the absolute power of the nation over war and peace, over all territory, and the exclusive possession of weapons by the state’s national services.

The security level in Lebanon is still at an elevated state due to geopolitical tension between Hezbollah and Israel, with the ports at an increased level of security risk, but with minimal effect on Mediterranean shipping as a whole.

In this respect, the Lebanese government has reiterated its resolve to build its nation through reform and enhancing its sovereignty. But it has been set back and delayed the restoration of this reform and weapons control, giving reason to Israel to attack the most. Thus, it has been shown that sovereignty, reform, and weapons control are key aspects of restoring Lebanon’s stability. Sovereignty, according to the prime minister, was the absolute power of the nation over war and peace, over all territory, and the exclusive possession of weapons by the state’s national services.

• Triggers and risks indicators remain unaltered per area as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/23, November 13.
• Overall threat/risk level: “LOW” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/ Terrorism: “MEDIUM” – ICC/Piracy: “NSR” Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “LOW” – GNSS interference: “LOW”.

Gaza-Israel (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)

• Despite a framework of ceasefire, conflicts in and outside Gaza have escalated. Israel has reopened the Rafah crossing with Egypt, at least partially, on a trial basis to enable sick and wounded Palestinians to receive urgent medical care outside the country.
• At the same time, Israeli airstrikes have been reported across northern and southern Gaza, resulting in significant casualties among Palestinians, including women and children, according to local authorities. Cases of the worst attacks have been witnessed in areas hosting internally displaced persons, which indicates the fragility of the ceasefire and the possibility of rapid escalation.
• Regionally, conflicts and tensions between Israel and Hezbollah have maintained Lebanon’s coastal region and Israel-Gaza sea-banks as a region of heightened risk. However, the wider Mediterranean maritime trade appears to be unaffected to some extent.
• Maritime and harbor activities in the eastern Mediterranean remain subject to intense scrutiny and prevailing security concerns.

• Triggers and risk indicators remain unaltered per area as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/23, November 13.
• Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “MEDIUM” – ICC/Piracy: “NSR” – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “LOW” – GNSS interference: “MEDIUM”.

Sudan-Eritrea–Ethiopia

• Sudan is in a highly fragile state, with its civil war characterized by drone warfare. That is affecting the country as its army, as the Rapid Support Forces (rebels) are using cheaply accessible drones that have led to losses among the civilian population, infrastructure destruction, and power outages. This war, therefore, poses a threat to port security and maritime activities in the Northern Red Sea.
• If we consider the largest regional context, we can see that a significant shift in regional security is coming upon us. If we look specifically at Eritrea, we can see that it has become a strategically important location in increasing competition for influence in the Red Sea region by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Ethiopia. Moreover, there are other states, such as Turkey, which have no apparent or direct interest in the area, but are getting involved. However, we can also recognize that recent drone strike activity within Ethiopia’s Tigray region indicates conflict resurfacing between regional and federal forces.

• Triggers and risk indicators remain unaltered as cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/15, July 10.
• Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “HIGH” – ICC/Piracy: “NSR” – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “LOW” – GNSS interference: “MEDIUM”.

Red Sea – Yemen

• The Red Sea route, although open, poses a significant security risk due to conflicts and political instability in the region. Yemeni coasts and ports are at relatively higher risk compared to the past due to future uncertainties in relation to international ship protection and threat status therein.
• In the Horn of Africa, a border crisis has developed following violent clashes between the Gadabuursi and Issa ethnicities within western Somaliland. These clashes have disrupted longstanding relationships within the Seila area and Zeila corridor. There are concerns that outsiders have infiltrated the region, and a potential spill over to neighboring states exists.
• On the other hand, Yemen is moving towards an even more unstable period due to precarious alliances and power struggles. Saudi Arabia is trying to build its power base during a period of divided loyalties in the region, while the Houthis, in their control of the north, have developed threatening missiles and drones capable of attacking ships in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea. All these factors represent unstable regions in maritime and border areas with potential perils towards civilians and the stability of the global trade route.
• Triggers and risks indicators remain unaltered as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/15, July 10.
• Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “HIGH” – ICC/Piracy: “LOW” – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “MEDIUM” – GNSS interference: “MEDIUM”.
• Northern Persian Gulf / Iran in post-war
• The northern Persian Gulf zone will also remain a high-risk area due to unrest in Iran, tensions, and its strategic control of the Strait of Hormuz, thus necessitating enhanced security for maritime activities in the area. The political relations between Iran and Europe have taken a severe blow due to attempts to label the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a terrorist group, leading to aggressive countermeasures from Iran.
• Moreover, the Iranian authorities have made it clear that any military strike will spark a bigger regional war with the buildup of foreign military forces in the region. On the other hand, there are clear indications that Tehran might be open to negotiating with the US, but under certain conditions; however, there is no room for discussing Iranian missile and defense issues except in the latest negotiation, which provides indicators of the alleviation of the situation but also creates controversial signs, as the military presence remains high.
• All these issues have made the situation extremely volatile, with a series of security implications on some ports and sea passages.
• Triggers that could create escalation are: Iran seizes commercial vessels around the Strait of Hormuz, stalemate in UN-brokered peace on Yemen.
• Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “MEDIUM” – ICC/Piracy: “NSR” – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “MEDIUM” – GNSS interference: “MEDIUM”.

RUSSIA-UKRAINE war (Black Sea / NW part)

• Currently, the Black Sea is a high-risk area due to hybrid threats and shipping sanctions that result from the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia.
• Russia has been able to divert its natural gas exports to Asian nations, thereby counteracting the recent EU ban on Russian LNG or natural gas deliveries. The diversification of exports is one of the strategies for mitigating sanctions from the West.
• Efforts to bring a halt to the war, however, have not yielded significant results. Ukraine and Russia have agreed, in US-brokered meetings, to exchange POWs, but no progress has been achieved toward ending the war. In fact, Russian officials have indicated that discussions over providing Ukraine with a security guarantee may slow the peace process, mainly because of plans for a potential NATO-led coalition to be deployed as Stabilization and Monitoring Force in Ukraine.
• Meanwhile, Russian nationals in Ukraine are undergoing a process of acquiring Ukrainian citizenship, with many of them being relatives or spouses of Ukrainians, dissidents, and volunteers of the Ukrainian Army. Some of these Russian nationals have been facing various problems with their original passports.
• The situation also illustrates the complexity of balancing military risks, the shift in the energy balance, political stalemates, and the consequences.

• Triggers and indicators per area remain as in the SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30 and SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/19, September 16 .
• Overall threat/risk level: “HIGH” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “HIGH” – ICC/Piracy: “NSR” – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “HIGH” – GNSS interference: “HIGH”

RUSSIA-UKRAINE war (Baltic Sea / NE part)

• The Baltic Sea basin continues to be characterized as a high-risk zone, especially considering the tense NATO-Russian conflict and the prevalence of ‘shadow fleet’ ships. Specifically, it is noted that the Estonian Navy intercepted the cargo ship Baltic Spirit in the waters off the coast of Naissaar.
• The ship, which flew a flag of convenience and was bound for the Russian Federation, was suspected of carrying smuggled goods while on board; all the crew were Russian citizens.

• The incident also highlights the focus of regional enforcement of sanctions evasion and unauthorized maritime trade. Additionally, it emphasizes the need for commercial navigation within the Baltic Sea to be guided by strict security practices while being aware of prevailing political and military trends within this region.

• Triggers and indicators per area remain as in the SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30 and SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/19, September 16 .
• Overall threat/risk level: “HIGH” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “HIGH” – ICC/Piracy: “NSR” – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “MEDIUM” – GNSS interference: “HIGH”

Cyber-Threats / Risks assessment and mitigation by CYBERPAX

From Awareness to Drills – Building Cyber-Resilient Crews and Shore Teams

• In many shipping companies, “cyber awareness” is still treated as an administrative requirement: a CBT once a year, a policy to sign, a checkbox in an audit. Yet recent incidents have shown that when cyber events affect navigation, port calls or communication systems, the decisive factor is not the written policy but the behavior of crews and shore staff under pressure.
• Real resilience requires moving beyond static awareness to recurrent, realistic drills, just as the industry already does for fire, collision, grounding or piracy. Bridge teams, ECR staff, port and fleet operations centers need to practice how they will detect, report and manage cyber incidents that combine elements of electronic interference, IT disruption and OT malfunction.
• This means rehearsing scenarios such as: loss of key digital services during port approach, corruption of planning data, or simultaneous IT and OT alarms with limited time to decide. These drills should be integrated into existing safety management and emergency procedures, not treated as a separate “IT issue”.
• The shipping sector is now clearly recognized as a target for hybrid operations. Investing in practical training and scenario-based exercises for crews and shore teams is no longer an option – it is becoming a core component of maritime safety and continuity.

Risk Snapshot

Cyber-attacks on maritime command / control / information systems: HIGH
Human-factor / awareness gap in crews & shore staff: MEDIUM–HIGH and rising.

Imittou 201 Street, Athens, 11632, Greece Our Mailbox: info@cyberpax.eu Our Phone: +30 210 7525 363

Terrorism – piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways

• Shipping around the world is faced with several kinds of threats and risks these days, but what is most important is their complexity, technology, and the methods of their being mixed up.
• New threats, such as cyber-attacks, could destroy systems, giving access to terrorists to harass ports, while piracy to attack at open sea is more fatal, not to mention smuggling, which is sneaky and hard to catch.
• In addition, management functions ought necessarily to be in accordance with the highest international standards to ensure effective countermeasures avoid suffering from disasters. Conclusively, these plans are only profitable when they are updated frequently, near-real-time information in accordance with technological improvements is being inserted, and reforms due to a causative threat and risk analysis are being provided; otherwise, they would be useless in post-attacking situations.
• We have to start these kinds of procedures in advance because this is directed by the complexity of world threats and risks, exploiting “lessons learned” for new tactics plans developing and strategic decisions.

RISK ASSESSMENT

Gulf of Guinea

• The West African maritime security environment remains at high risk due to the presence of political instability, terrorism, and growing criminal activity. The instability in Niger, northern Nigeria, and Guinea continues to spill over into the maritime environment, posing a threat to vessels, ports, and offshore assets in the Gulf of Guinea and Southern Atlantic.
• In Niger, attacks on military and aviation infrastructure have led to accusations against regional and European countries and have drawn attention to the growing role of foreign military forces, raising the potential for escalation. In Nigeria, the continued counterterrorism efforts against Boko Haram and Islamic State-affiliated groups, in partnership with foreign forces, indicate the persistent threat of instability, while kidnappings continue to demonstrate the criminal and non-ideologically motivated nature of much of the violence.
• These trends are propelling the growing merger of militant and criminal groups. Piracy and armed robbery are becoming increasingly deadly and spreading southward, now entering Angolan waters, posing a threat to vessels, crews, and port infrastructure. The ongoing election cycle in the region is likely to continue to stretch the security forces, necessitating continued vigilance and increased maritime security measures.

• Indicators which altering the “risks levels” as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/26, December 29, 2025.
• Overall threat/risk level: “HIGH” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “HIGH” – ICC/Piracy: “MEDIUM” – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “HIGH” – GNSS interference: “LOW”

East Mediterranean Sea

• The region remains stable overall, but there is a risk of insecurity around Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza, due to high levels of geopolitical tensions. Ever-changing regional alliances pose risks that require careful assessment for navigation.
• A more dynamic and interventionist role has been taken by the United States in the energy sector of the eastern part of it, at most. US prompt Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt to proceed in a stronger and cooperative alliance that reinforces the US interest in the area.

Country	Key Energy Resources	Economic Performance	Constraints / Risks
Greece	Natural gas, wind/solar	Moderate growth	Regional tensions, infrastructure limits, EEZ disputes
Cyprus	Offshore gas	Small, stable	Limited extraction, EEZ disputes
Israel	Natural gas (Leviathan, Tamar)	Strong export growth	Regional conflicts, export security
Egypt	Natural gas, LNG hub	Large-scale infrastructure	Political risk, regional instability

• Indicators which altering the “risks levels” as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/22, November 12.
• Overall threat/risk level: “LOW” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “LOW” – ICC/Piracy: “NSR” – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “LOW” – GNSS interference: “MEDIUM”.

Suez Canal – Northern Red Sea

• Shipping activities via the Suez Canal are slowly rising again, indicating an increasing trust in the security and usability of the waterway. Although direct threats are low, some elements of uncertainty necessitate vigilance in maintaining the safety of the waterway.
• The passage of one of the world’s largest container ships is a test to the ability of the Canal to serve very large vessels and reinforces its position as a vital conduit of East-West trade and world maritime commerce.

• Indicators altering the “risks levels” as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.
• Overall threat/risk level: “LOW” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “NSR” – ICC/Piracy: “NSR” – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “LOW” – GNSS interference: “LOW”.

Bab-el-Mandeb Straits – Southern Rea Sea

• US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau is currently undertaking a diplomatic visit to Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti with the aim of implementing President Donald Trump’s agenda of rebalancing trade, providing an encouraging business environment, and enhancing security and peace. Landau described his trip as “one of the great privileges” of his job, which allows him to “exchange ideas with leaders of the world.” Three of the nations he is visiting are part of a US-led multinational force stationed in the Red Sea to protect against attacks by the Houthis.
• The Bab el-Mandab Strait is currently passable but is in a dangerous state due to the presence of Houthi and Somalia-based groups, political tensions, and the presence of maritime traffic.
• Indicators altering the “risks levels” as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.
• Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “MEDIUM” – ICC/Piracy: “MEDIUM” – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “MEDIUM” – GNSS interference: “LOW”.

Gulf of Aden – Somalia / Somaliland

• The risks are still high regarding piracy attacks and the increasing threats of militants due to the prevailing tensions related to the end of the UAE agreements.
• In terms of politics, Somalia has adopted key agreements regarding its maritime affairs, including the signing of a new cooperation agreement with Turkey, indicating an evolutionary trend in its strategic partnerships. On the other hand, the government is making concerted efforts to address the effects of the drought through the provision of water and food security, as well as the creation of a disaster and risk management system in the country.
• The security sector has continued to receive international support, and the UK’s compound was handed over at Mogadishu International Airport to the African Union force, indicating that engagement, at least in the vicinity of the major maritime routes, will be streamlined.
• The official recognition of Somaliland by Israel has triggered geopolitical and Strategic shifts in the area, resulting in Saudi Arabia trying to fill the gap created in the area due to the withdrawal of UAE interests. At the same time, the conflicts in Somaliland have escalated in the latest trimester.

• Overall, efforts by Somalia and Somaliland to strengthen maritime governance, disaster management, and security remain at an unworkable level and continue to cause uncertainty.

• Indicators altering the “risks levels” as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.
• Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “LOW” – ICC/Piracy: “HIGH” – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “HIGH” – GNSS interference: “MEDIUM”

Arabian Sea – Gulf of Oman

• Maritime risks in the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, and the western Indian Ocean are still significant due to terrorism and regional tensions, which need to be handled cautiously and effectively in the region. Despite all that, this area has fewer maritime security threats and risks than the surrounding areas, making Oman a hub for mediation meetings concerning the conflicts in the Arabian Peninsula.
• At a political level, a dialogue has been underway through indirect talks mediated by Oman, and it has been described as constructive by both countries, with a willingness to continue talks despite the presence of US naval forces within its waters.

• Indicators altering the “risks levels” as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.
• Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: NSR” – ICC/Piracy: “LOW” – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “LOW” – GNSS interference: “MEDIUM”.

Hormuz Straits – Persian Gulf

• Security concerns linked to strategic and military activities within and across the Strait of Hormuz and its surrounding areas would remain elevated; a sudden surge in conflict is not out of the question. The situation addresses pre-planning and subsequent measures for risk mitigation. In light of these increased uncertainties, Greece has advised its shipowners to avoid areas closer to the Iranian coastline and proceed closer to the UAE and Omani waters.
• In terms of the political climate, underlying tensions have come up in the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Owing to their formerly close association in the role of Middle Eastern power brokers, the relationship between these actors has gradually deteriorated, further complicating the region’s tenuous security and maritime environment.
• Overall, the Hormuz straits are one of the most crowded straits in the world, while they have been overburdened by Naval Forces lately, making them an uncertain route for a secure passage.

• Indicators altering the “risks levels” as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13
• Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “MEDIUM” – ICC/Piracy: “NSR” – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “HIGH” – GNSS interference: “MEDIUM”.

Malacca Straits

• No change from the SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 26/02, January 28. Smuggling in the Straits remains high, and cyber threats persist along the Malacca Straits. Ships should stay on high alert and maintain priority communication with Singapore authorities.

• Indicators altering the “risks levels” as cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30.
• Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “NSR” – ICC/Piracy: “HIGH” – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “MEDIUM” – GNSS interference: “MEDIUM”

Black Sea / East Part

• The region remains high-risk to shipping due to unrest, shadow fleet activity, sanctions exposure, and military operations that call for stringent security measures and vigilance.
• Meanwhile, Kazakhstan and Pakistan are working to strengthen economic ties, aiming to boost bilateral trade to $1 billion, building on a recent surge that nearly doubled trade turnover to $105.6 million.
• Overall, the East part of Black Sea is an important region not only for energy sources but also for the commercial routes, while any expansion of the Russia-Ukraine conflict could influence the stability in the area, deriving more uncertainty for shipping companies.

• Indicators altering the “risks levels” as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/18, August 27.
• Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “MEDIUM” – ICC/Piracy: “NSR” – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “LOW” – GNSS interference: “MEDIUM”

Baltic Sea / West part

• The Baltic Sea continues to be a risk-sourced zone due to a combination of GNSS interference threats, hybrid attack risks, and grey/shadow fleet activities, forcing operators to maintain vigilance in such critical zones.
• There are several lawless ships, mainly from Russia, used to transport oil to China, India, and Turkey, identified as flying false or fraudulently registered flags.
• The UK is reportedly considering more robust measures against Russia-linked shadow fleet tankers-a move that would likely ratchet up international tensions. Meanwhile, the Baltic Sea route remains a vital and unavoidable part of oil exports, with ships transiting via the northern or southern corridor.

• Indicators altering the “risks levels” as cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30.
• Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “NSR” – ICC/Piracy: “NSR” – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “LOW” – GNSS interference: “HIGH”.

Taiwan – Japan Sea

• The Japanese ruling coalition is on the brink of securing a historic parliamentary majority, setting Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in a powerful position as she attempts to strengthen defense spending and impose stricter immigration controls, as well as implement her proposed tax policies against a divided opposition.
• Regional tensions remain on edge due to strained Japanese-Chinese relations, as one of the scopes of these intermediate elections is to strengthen Takaichi’s position for implementing a more active security plan in the area against China. Strengthening ties with Taiwan has elevated geopolitical risks in East Asia.
• As regards the maritime/shipping industry, the above case calls for greater vigilance on the part of shipping companies operating in the region. Companies need to be more vigilant as the new political administration in Japan emphasizes defense and security, heightening tensions in the region.

• Indicators that distort the “risk levels” as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/21, October 16.
• Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “MEDIUM” – ICC/Piracy: “NSR” – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “LOW” – GNSS interference: “MEDIUM”.

Taiwan – South China Sea

• The South China Sea and Taiwan Strait are also considered high-risk regions due to continuous military activity and escalated geopolitical confrontations. Chinese military aircraft and naval ships are frequently spotted in the area and crossing the median line in the Taiwan Strait.
• At the same time, the scope of cyber threats by Chinese state-sponsored actors has grown, with activities identified in a significant number. Taiwan is among the most affected, with incidents of large-scale cyberattacks against its government infrastructure. That raises significant concerns, particularly regarding the ability of cyberattacks to compromise maritime navigation systems such as GNSS, AIS, and ECDIS.
• Vessels operating in this area should have a high level of understanding of the situation, safety, and readiness to halt navigation, in addition to the traditional safety issues.
• Indicators that distort the “risk levels” in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/21, October 16.
• Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: “MEDIUM” – ICC/Piracy: “MEDIUM” – Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping: “HIGH” – GNSS interference: “LOW”.

Piracy – Boarding conditions, kidnapping, firing, electronic harassment

• Maritime operations face multiple types of threats that vary by region and nature:

• Collateral risks from military conflicts (e.g., missile exchanges affecting ports and nearby waters).
• Unprovoked military-type attacks on vessels, aimed at destruction or capture.
• Organized piracy with hostage-taking, as in the Gulf of Guinea.
• Opportunistic piracy/theft is frequent in high-traffic areas such as the Straits of Singapore.
• Methodical piracy for ransom, targeting entire vessels without crew casualties.

• Maritime risks vary by region and operator, with threats from piracy, crime, and military actions unpredictable but regionally concentrated. Ships should maintain vigilance, strong security, and tailored contingency planning.
• Indicators that differentiate the “risks levels” remain the same as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/18, August 27.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT – CONSULTING

• Maritime trade remains vulnerable globally, especially in areas of geopolitical instability, impacts of climate change, cyber-attack threats, and energy security, requiring various forms of resiliency, flexible planning, and security: physical and cyber resilience. The European Union has discussed imposing more rigorous controls over external investment in ports, with specific infrastructure also being evaluated as dual-use for commercial and military activities.

• Regional stability is deteriorating along different fault lines, ranging from US allegations of undeclared nuclear tests conducted in China, clandestine weapons activities in China and Russia, attacks and kidnappings in Africa, ongoing hostilities in Yemen, drone strikes in Tigray, and Israeli airstrikes in Gaza. The hostilities between Iran and the US persist, with indications of a willingness to dialogue based on conditions free of threats, and with frequent heightened security risks in the Strait of Hormuz.

• Diplomatic and economic activities persist in these circumstances, like Kazakhstan-Pakistan trade expansion, Libya moving to host a regional summit with Turkey and the African Union, and Ukraine denying some security guarantees in discussions with Russia. The presence of shadow fleets in the Baltic Sea, related to Russian oil exports, and scenarios in Iranian ports underscore rising risks to maritime activities. Alliances are constantly changing, as seen in the Gulf of Aden, where the UAE’s withdrawal from the area has left room for Saudi Arabia to strengthen its presence, while the increase in traffic through the Suez Canal remains uncertain.

• Overall, various initiatives such as escalating tensions, political maneuvers, economic pressures, and maritime threats are adding to a volatile situation with considerable implications for trade and commerce in the globe.

ANNEX “A” TO PERIODIC “SECURITY ASSESSMENT”

Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944373465)
can support your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and aid in decision making by producing tailor-made assessments upon request on ports in the region, on routes, on cargos and specific merchant vessels. You can refer to our previous Threat & Risk assessment analysis briefs for more information and background analysis on the events and situation for each specific region.

ANNEX “B” TO PERIODIC “SECURITY ASSESSMENT”

LESSONS LEARNED
INCIDENTS	REACTIONS	TRANSFORMATION NOTICES
The attacks on July 2025 in RED SEA	The permanent contact with the shipping company hiring maritime security teams.	Developing indepentent international relations and operational apps for supporting crew recovery after a submerging.
The defensive actions against the attack on ETERNITY C	The Security management and team’s high standards in decision-making proccesses in international environment respecting the ship’s Captains’ capacity.	Developing of training standards.
The attacks on July 2025 in RED SEA	The active contigency plans and bussiness impact analysis in case of discontinuation with the guarding of security teams (such an attack difficult to be faced by small arms).	Further implemantation of matitime/ISO standards.
The aftermaths analysis of the ETERNITY C submercion	The possible changing in Houthis attacking methods not only to destroy but also to attain ships under their internal coast guard rules for ransoms in the form of penalty fees to liberate it.	Specifying and bordering threats/risks analysis for depicting what needs military response.
Inbound in an area of high military/ paramilitary threats with all navigational aids and AIS closed	Opened all the navigational aids and AIS / communication systems on after having had attacked by ballistic or related missiles while visual targeting was available due to the lack of international naval forces.	Stabilize the closed navigational aids to prevent targeting with the necessity of giving informations through them to friendly entities.
The detailed analysis after a special interview of secuirty crew assessing decision-made	A fundamental analyzed decision, involves choosing whether to abandon a sinking ship using a lifeboat for safety, or to escape directly into the sea with only life jackets, while under the threat of attacking boats searching for survivors.	Balance the threat of being targeted while in the sea whith the trheat environmental and geography conditions to survive.
The re-emergence of piracy in Gulf of Aden-Somalia	From the latest incidents in the area it was porven that the existence of Maritime security teams is paramount as well as the continue of military Maritime operations in the area is a necessity.	The overall security umbrella is achieved if: – A consistent/ coherent Security assessment has been done in advance – Military Maritime operations in the region are exist – The use of Security teams onboard for a widen area is available.

Usefull links for conflict indexes and picture of piracy attacks in:

• ACLED and IMB/ICC for the war threat levels and International commerce crime incidents.
• Companies under sanction by Ukraine (Black Sea):Database Of Legal Entities Under Sanctions
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pt6GS7QohAI, for an overall general assessment by the SEA GUARDIAN President presented at Naftemboriki TV (Shipping) for the latest period, covering the time-frame before and after the Houthis ballistic, drones and UCAV attacks.

Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944373465) can support your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and aid in decision making by producing tailor-made assessments upon request on ports in the region, on routes, on cargos and specific merchant vessels. You can refer to our previous Threat & Risk assessment analysis briefs for more information and background analysis on the events and situation for each specific region.

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Viewers can see here below the previous report and connect same with today’s (above):

https://allaboutshipping.co.uk/2026/01/30/sea-guardian-threat-risk-assessment-13-28-january-2026/